

Reports, indirect reports, and illocutionary point

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This essay examines the properties of reports and the diagnostic value of illocutions in reports.

Essentially a report is X's re-presentation to Y of what Z said. Because X is not identical with Z, what Z said is necessarily transmuted by X. X may use a different medium (e.g. written in place of spoken); X will have a different voice; and X will re-present what Z said, more often than not using different lexis and grammar, even when attempting a verbatim quote. X may have misheard or misinterpreted Z's utterance: she may add an affective gloss. All of these distinguish X's report ρ from Z's utterance υ in both form and content, which renders every report "indirect" to some extent; there are different degrees of indirectness, but a truly indirect report utilises pragmatic enrichment, e.g. when Z's utterance *It's never stopped raining since we arrived* is reported as *Z complained about the terrible weather there* or *I won easily* is reported as a boast, mistake, or lie.

The accuracy of X's report ρ depends on whether or not the message in Z's υ can be reconstructed from it. In other words, the content of ρ is dependent on the content of υ . If υ deviates from the truth in respect of what Z speaks of, then ρ will also deviate from the truth unless X recognizes this deviation and repairs it.

An accurate report ρ re-presents the illocutionary point of the source utterance υ . So a report can function as a diagnostic of the illocutionary point of the source utterance. For instance reports of them show that explicit performative clauses are statements and have truth values. Reports are a means of identifying different functions of imperatives and of disambiguating different utterances of e.g. *Out!* as a verdictive in a tennis match or a command on some other occasion. And reports help determine whether e.g. 'whimperatives' are primarily questions or primarily requests.

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1. Reporting

Essentially a report is X's re-presentation to Y of what Z said. Z can be identical with X (*what I said/did was ...*) and, less commonly, with Y; in some personal diary entries, X fulfils

all roles.¹ These situations are parasitic on the commonest state of affairs in which the three roles are distinct.

Because, typically, X is not identical with Z, what Z said is necessarily transmuted by X. If what Z said was clever, witty, or shocking it has a better chance of being remembered and reproduced almost verbatim (Lehrer 1989). However, X's memory for meaning will be better than her memory for verbatim textual recollection (Bartlett 1932, Lehrer 1989). X may use a different medium from Z, e.g. written in place of spoken. X will have a different voice – literally and figuratively – from Z. Normally, X will re-present what Z said using different lexis and grammar, even when attempting a verbatim quote. Lehrer found changes in word order, substitution of nouns for pronouns and vice versa, swapping of one determiner for another, simplification and clarification through the omission of hedges, repetition, conjunctions, and removal of clefts (e.g. *What he did was buy a car* is changed to *He bought a car*). An important consideration for reports is that the reporter may choose to render the report more coherent by rearranging what was said, and/or more vivid by embellishing the original to attract and/or maintain audience attention.

On the other hand, X may have misheard or misinterpreted Z's utterance: she may deliberately misinterpret Z's utterance to save Y's feelings or to mislead Y maliciously. X will often report what Z said with some affective gloss, e.g. describe Z himself as an angel, a jerk, etc. and Z's manner as joyous, boastful, boring, or whatever.

All of these transmutations distinguish X's report p from Z's utterance v in both form and content, which renders every report "indirect" to some extent; but there are different degrees of indirectness, compare the near verbatim report (2) of (1) with the more indirect version in (3).

- (1) It's never stopped raining since we arrived.
- (2) Z said that it's never stopped raining since they arrived.
- (3) Z complained about the terrible weather there.

This suggests that we should speak of *indirectness in reports* rather than of *indirect reports*; however, as always, the truth is more complicated.

¹ A diary is often treated as an addressee, cf. 'I don't want to jot down the facts in this diary the way most people would do, but I want the diary to be my friend, and I'm going to call this friend Kitty.' (Anne Frank, 1929-1945, Saturday June 20, 1942, Frank 1997)

We need to maintain a distinction between *quotation* and *report*, which sometimes seem to be conflated (e.g. by Recanati 2001, Wieland 2013). It makes sense to speak of direct quotation if there is verbatim representation of the speaker's words, e.g. (4) directly quotes Galileo. But (5) is not an indirect quotation, it is a report; and so is (6), despite the quotation marks.

- (4) Galileo ha detto del mondo '*Eppur si muove*'.
- (5) Galileo said of the earth that, nonetheless, it moves.
- (6) Galileo said of the earth 'And yet it moves'.

Quotation marks are a feature of punctuation in written language. As Recanati 2001 and Saka 2011 point out: in spoken language there is no difference between *Alice said that life is difficult to understand* and *Alice said that life is 'difficult to understand'*. Both are reports of what Alice said, and neither is more indirect than the other. The same holds true for (8)A–B which, if Sue has the role of Z and 'you' = Harry, are both reports of (7).

- (7) I'm leaving you, you bastard!
- (8) A. While I was there Sue yelled 'I'm leaving you, you bastard' at Harry.
B. Sue told Harry she was going to leave him.

When X's report ρ is compared with Z's utterance v , the accuracy of ρ depends on whether or not Z's message in v can be reconstructed from it. In other words, the content of ρ is dependent on the content of v .² Under the principle of charity (or something like it³), we have to allow that in uttering v , Z most probably spoke accurately according to his intention. However, Z may have accidentally or even deliberately misspoken (e.g. said *left* when he should have said *right*). None of this necessarily vitiates X's report ρ , though it may mean that if v deviates from the truth in respect of what Z speaks of, then ρ will also deviate from the truth unless X recognizes the deviation and repairs it.

This essay makes frequent reference to illocutionary point, which is what the speaker intends to achieve by making the particular utterance v in the particular context in which it is uttered (see Allan 1986b, 1998 for more detailed discussion). For present purposes, we might gloss this as 'Z's message in v '. There is a distinction to be made between illocutionary point

² This is assumed by all those who have sought to explain it, e.g. Davidson 1969, Platts 1979, Cappelen & Lepore 1997, Wieland 2013, among many others.

³ None of Wilson 1959, Quine 1960, nor Davidson 1984 specifically allow for this, but perhaps Dennet 1987 does.

and perlocutionary intention: typically, the illocutionary point (and illocutionary intention) of *I bet you ten dollars I can jump that fence* is to offer a bet; its perlocutionary intention is to achieve the perlocutionary effect of getting the bet taken up and making \$10.

The embedded clauses of reported speech have the illocutions of the direct speech they report.⁴

- | | |
|---|-------------------------------------|
| (9) A. Sue said, ‘Turn left!’ | B. Sue said to turn left. |
| (10) A. Henry asked ‘Can I leave?’ | B. Henry asked to leave |
| (11) A. Jo asked ‘Will Ed come?’ | B. Jo asked whether Ed will come. |
| (12) A. Max wondered ‘Does she ever smile?’ | B. Max wondered if she ever smiles. |

(9)B is the report of Sue’s imperative clause instruction. There is no doubt that the imperative contributes to the illocutionary point of this utterance – Hearer is intended to heed the instruction, see the discussion of (27)–(29) below. So, in (9)B the infinitive clause has the same illocutionary force as the direct speech in (9)A. Similarly, for the illocutionary forces of questioning in (10)A and (10)B, (11)A and (11)B, or wondering (self-questioning) in (12)A and (12)B.

This essay examines the properties of reports and the diagnostic value of illocutionary points in reports. §2 illustrates that indirect reports result from pragmatic enrichment in that X goes beyond Z’s illocutionary point as sanctioned by the locution. §3 examines the fact that an accurate report faithfully re-presents the illocutionary point of the source utterance, though it may add to that. §4 investigates the effects of entailments, implicatures, and implicatures on reporting. §5 discusses the value of a report as a diagnostic for the illocutionary point of the source utterance. §6 Summarises and concludes the essay.

2. Indirect reports result from pragmatic enrichment

Under many circumstances (3), *Z complained about the terrible weather there*, is an appropriate report of (1), *It’s never stopped raining since we arrived*. If (1) were uttered when Z was in a locality that had been undergoing severe drought it is possible that Z would not have been complaining and the weather would be the antithesis of terrible, in which case (3) might be an inaccurate or at least infelicitous report. I’ll return to that shortly. First let’s assume that Z was on a beach holiday and this was known or suspected by X. The illocutionary point of (1) is based on the standard illocutionary intention that ‘Speaker

⁴ This was recognised in Allan 1986b, Vol.2: 215ff, Allan 1986a, and elsewhere. A similar idea can be found in the work of Alessandro Capone since Capone 2010.

reflexively intends the utterance of the clause to be recognized as a reason for Hearer to believe that Speaker has reason to believe that Φ' (Allan 2006); notice Z's purported commitment to the truth of what he's said. Applying this definition to (1) we get (13), which is accurately reported in (2).

(13) Z reflexively intends utterance of the locution *It's never stopped raining since we arrived* to give X reason to believe that there has been almost continual rainfall in the locality where Z is currently situated since Z's arrival there.

A speaker has an illocutionary intention to create a perlocutionary effect by means of a reflexive intention to have the hearer (addressees and ratified participants (Goffman 1981: 131)) recognize this intention via an understanding of the locution and illocutionary point of the utterance. A speaker's reflexive intention towards the hearer is the intention to have the hearer recognize that when uttering U in context C, the speaker intends U to have a certain effect on the hearer partly caused by the hearer recognizing that the speaker has the intention to communicate with him or her by means of U.⁵

(13) is unaffected by whether or not anyone thinks the continual rainfall a good or bad state of affairs, so if (3) is a felicitous report it must arise from X's assessment of the circumstances of Z's utterance and perhaps of Z's intention to inform her of an unwelcome state of affairs. In other words, X may be imposing her own interpretation on Z's circumstances, or she could be adopting his view based on additional cues from him such as tone of voice and/or other things Z said along with *v*. The significance here is that if the term *indirect report* is to have any value it must be to refer to reports in which there is pragmatic enrichment. Pragmatic enrichment results from X going beyond Z's illocutionary point as sanctioned by the locution (cf. (2)) to additional inferences arising from the context of Z's utterance or some external context. Consider Nellie Wieland's example (adapted from Wieland 2013: 395 to my participants).

(14) Z to X: My favourite *tapa* is *patatas bravas*.

(15) X to Y: Z said that his favorite *tapa* is the third item on your menu.

If (15) is to be a felicitous report of (14), one must assume that 'patatas bravas' appears as the third item on Y's menu. (15) is an outlandish exploitation of the cooperative principle that

⁵ Reflexive intention was first recognized by Grice 1957 and has been revised by others, notably Recanati 1987. The speaker has a reflexive intention towards the hearer but not towards an overhearer (Allan 1986a, b).

would be unusual in language exchange between people other than philosophers or linguists; but it is nonetheless acceptable because it allows the illocutionary point of Z's utterance to be recovered by Y from X's locution plus the context of X's report.

Let's backtrack to reconsider the illocutionary points of (2) and (3) spelled out in (16) and (17) respectively.

(16) In (2) X reflexively intends utterance of the locution *Z said that it's never stopped raining since they arrived* to give Y to believe that Z gave X reason to believe that there has been almost continual rainfall in the locality where Z is currently situated since Z's arrival there.

By contrast:

(17) In (3) X reflexively intends utterance of the locution *Z complained about the terrible weather there* to give Y to believe that Z gave X reason to believe, or at least surmise, that Z had expressed feelings of discontent about the bad weather Z was experiencing in the locality where Z is currently situated.

Whereas (16) clearly reflects the illocutionary point of (1) as spelled out in (13) such that Z could not honestly dispute it, (17) offers instead X's reinterpretation of (1) in terms of what she takes to be the context of its utterance, and her report could be disputed by Z, e.g. by him responding *I wasn't complaining, I was just saying we had a bit of rain*. Alternatively Z might accept (3) as an accurate account of his perceived state of mind at the time of uttering (1).

What we see in (3) is a pragmatic enrichment of (1) such that the report almost amounts to commentary. It is X's re-presentation to Y of what X took Z's message to be, namely, continuous rain during a beach holiday implicates bad weather for a beach holiday and to make the report more vivid (sensational) X exaggerates from 'bad weather' to 'terrible weather'. A further implication is that such weather motivates discontent in the holiday-maker, who may therefore justifiably be said to be complaining about it if s/he draws attention to it.

Next, consider a peculiar case where a woman seemingly had an identity problem on (Australian) ABC News 24, 11th November, 2010 (www.youtube.com/watch?v=GEN1mffc).

(18) Virginia Trioli: Good morning, you're watching ABC News 24, I'm Michael Rowland.

Trioli was reading from the auto-cue intended for her male co-presenter and obviously not self-monitoring. Possible reports of (18) are the verbatim (19) without comment and the indirect (20) with X's comment included.

(19) Virginia Trioli said 'Good morning, you're watching ABC News 24, I'm Michael Rowland'.

(20) Virginia Trioli mistakenly said she was 'Michael Rowland'.

Some sort of comment seems to be required for a felicitous report since, if (21) is an acceptable report of (18), it has to be jocular because of the apparent contradiction – which of itself implies unspoken comment.

(21) Virginia Trioli is Michael Rowland.

We should compare (18) with, say, Trioli on ABC1 on 26/05/2013 (www.abc.net.au/siness/content/2013/s3767571.htm) where she identifies herself correctly.

(22) Virginia Trioli: Good morning, welcome to Inside Business. I'm Virginia Trioli.

It is appropriate to report this either verbatim or as in (23). However, (24) is inappropriate as a report of self-introduction. Although true, the indirect reports in (25) and (26) are pragmatically inappropriate: (25) because it misleadingly indicates that being the wife of Russell Skelton is somehow relevant to the program that she is introducing and (26) because reporter, X, is introducing extraneous content unless the context of the report was such that being the wife of Russell Skelton makes Trioli more readily identifiable – for example if addressee, Y, was familiar with Skelton but not Trioli.

(23) Virginia Trioli introduced herself.

(24) Virginia Trioli introduced Virginia Trioli.

(25) Virginia Trioli introduced the wife of Russell Skelton.

(26) The wife of Russell Skelton introduced herself.

What I have shown in the foregoing is that material introduced in an indirect report as a pragmatic enrichment must be strictly relevant to the matter being spoken of by the reporter.

3. Reports and illocutionary point

An accurate report p re-presents the illocutionary point of the source utterance v . Thus, as we shall see, a report can function as a diagnostic of the illocutionary point of the source utterance.

Suppose X asks directions of Z who says, inter alia, (27).

(27) Turn left at the second set of traffic lights.

As they approach the second set of traffic lights X says (28) to Y.

(28) He said to turn left here.

(28) is an accurate report of (27). So is (29).

(29) He told us we need/have to turn left at these lights.

But because they have different illocutionary points from (27), none of (30)–(34) is an accurate report of it.

(30) He suggested we turn left here.

(31) He demanded we turn left at these lights.

(32) He ordered us to turn left here.

(33) He asked us to turn left at these lights.

(34) He persuaded us to turn left at these lights.

Let's consider (27) as the basis for (28)–(29). (27) is an instruction given in response to a request for directions; it is not, therefore, surprising that the primary illocutionary force of (27) is directive employing the default clause type for directives for which the standard illocutionary intention is that 'Speaker reflexively intends Hearer to take the utterance of the clause as a reason to do A' (Allan 2006). Unfortunately, this turns out to be insufficiently explicit because, applied to (27), Z reflexively intends X (and Y) to take the utterance of (27) as a reason to turn left at the second set of traffic lights on whatever path they are pursuing at the time this instruction is relevant – something that will be contextually determined in readily predictable ways. However, it seems reasonable to argue that all of (30)–(34) also reveal Z's (reflexive) intention that X (and Y) take the source utterances to be reason to turn left at the second set of traffic lights. They differ from (28)–(29) in ascribing marked illocutions to Z that are not justified by (27) and the circumstances under which it was uttered. In order for (30) to be accurate, Z would need to have said something like (35)A–B.

(35) A. I suggest you turn left ...

B. Why don't you turn left ...

The basis for (31) would need to have been, e.g. (36) (upper case indicates the main stress):

(36) You **MUST** turn left ... (as distinct from *Y must turn LEFT...*)

The basis for (32) would require a different situation of utterance than that described for (27), e.g. where there was no request from X, but Z instigated the giving of directions for his own

benefit. (33) reports a request from Z. (34) reports an act of persuading which is entirely absent from (27) and the circumstances of its utterance.

There are also more problematic reports of (27):

(37) He advised us to turn left at these lights.

(38) He directed us to turn left here.

(37)–(38) are infelicitous reports of (27) because although the giving of directions in response to a request to do so has something in common with the giving of advice and also the issuing of a directive, to spell this out in a report goes beyond the constraints of accurate reporting. For instance if (37) were reported back to Z, he might very well respond with (39).

(39) I didn't (exactly) adVISE them to turn left at the second set of traffic lights; I told them they SHOULD turn left.

(38) is trickier because undoubtedly Z was giving directions in (27); on the other hand, the verb 'directed' in (38) seems imply that Z commanded X (and Y) to undertake an act: the giving of directions under the circumstances described for the utterance in (27) is more advisory and less peremptory than *Z directs X to do A*. Thus if (38) were reported back to Z, he might respond with something like (40).

(40) I didn't diRECT them to turn left at the second set of traffic lights, I told them that if they want to reach their goal, they SHOULD turn left there.

The foregoing discussion shows that the true illocutionary point of (27) is not fully captured by 'Speaker reflexively intends Hearer to take the utterance of the clause as a reason to do A'. This description needs to be elaborated into 'Speaker reflexively intends Hearer to achieve the requested outcome by electing to take the utterance as a reason to do A'. (41) makes this specific to (27).

(41) Z reflexively intends X (and Y) to achieve the requested outcome by electing to take Z's utterance of the locution *Turn left at the second set of traffic lights* as a reason to turn left at the second set of traffic lights they encounter.

This revision still omits an expectation arising from what may be variously called the principle of charity, optimal relevance (Sperber & Wilson 1995), and Levinson's Q-principle (Levinson 2000): Z is recommending the most convenient route for X to take. For instance, it may be that Z knows that X could have arrived at her destination by turning right at the first set of traffic lights and taking the second left and travelling straight ahead to pass through the second set of traffic lights, but this would have involved an unnecessary deviation from the

simplest path, so it would have been uncooperative of Z to have recommended it unless, say, Z knew that the road between the first and second set of traffic lights was blocked.

The reason that (28), *He said to turn left here*, is an appropriate report of (27) is that in it X takes the locution in (27) to be the reason to turn left at the second set of traffic lights they have encountered, as per (41). More specifically:

- (42) X reflexively intends utterance of the locution *He said to turn left here* to be recognized as a reason for Y to believe that X has reason to believe that Z's uttering *Turn left at the second set of traffic lights* is reason to turn left at these second set of traffic lights.

Suppose that instead of (27), Z had uttered (43).

- (43) If I were you I'd turn left at the second set of traffic lights.

The illocutionary point of (43) is sketched in (44).

- (44) Z reflexively intends X (and Y) to achieve the requested outcome by electing to take Z's utterance of the locution *If I were you I'd turn left at the second set of traffic lights* as a reason to believe that X (and Y) should turn left at the second set of traffic lights they encounter because that is what Z (says he) would do in order to arrive at their stated destination.

Problematically, all of (28), (29), (30), and (37) could be acceptable reports of (43). The reason that (28) is acceptable may be seen when comparing (45) with (42) and (44).

- (45) X reflexively intends utterance of the locution *He said to turn left here* to be recognized as a reason for Y to believe that X has reason to believe that Z's uttering *If I were you I'd turn left at the second set of traffic lights* is reason to turn left at these second set of traffic lights because, according to Z, that's what he would do.

The reason that (30), *He suggested we turn left here*, is an appropriate report of (43) is that a suggestion is the putting forward of an opinion to be acted upon (see *Oxford English Dictionary* 1989). The opinion put forward in (43) is that if Z were X he would act in a certain manner, namely turn left at the second set of traffic lights. Thus (46) captures the illocutionary point spelled out in (44).

- (46) X reflexively intends utterance of the locution *He suggested we turn left here* to be recognized as a reason for Y to believe that X has reason to believe that in uttering *If I were you I'd turn left at the second set of traffic lights* Z was putting forward the

opinion that to turn left at these second set of traffic lights would be a good way to achieve their goal.

And (37), *He advised us to turn left at these lights*, is an appropriate report of (43) because:

(47) X reflexively intends utterance of the locution *He advised us to turn left at these lights* to be recognized as a reason for Y to believe that X has reason to believe that in uttering *If I were you I'd turn left at the second set of traffic lights* Z was offering his advice as to the best course of action to undertake to achieve their goal, namely to turn left at these second set of traffic lights.

Again, the illocutionary point of (43) sketched in (44) forms the basis for (47).

In this section I have argued through discussion of (27)–(47) that an accurate and felicitous report ρ of source utterance v must capture the illocutionary point in v .

4. Reporting entailments, implicatures and implicatures

All entailments, implicatures, and implicatures of a proposition within the utterance are communicated, giving rise to indirect (and occasionally unintended) illocutions: a speaker does not exactly *tell* the hearer these things, but *lets them be known*. For example, (48)A entails (48)B. Let's assume that Z utters (48)A as an out-of-the-blue bit of information, i.e. it is not a response to *What colour is John's new car?*

(48) A. John's new car is red \rightarrow B. John has a new car

The illocutionary point of (48)A is (49).

(49) Z reflexively intends utterance of the locution *John's new car is red* as a reason for X to believe (it is true) that John has got a new car which is red.

X can report this directly to Y as in (50).

(50) Z says John's new car is red.

X can also report (48)A as in (51) where the colour is ignored perhaps because it is less relevant to Y than the fact that John has just acquired a new car.

(51) Z says John has got a new car.

This does not rely on pragmatic enrichment, so it is also a direct report. So what about (52)–(53) with the semantic paraphrase of (48)A? These too are direct reports because there is no pragmatic enrichment.

(52) Z says John's got a new car and it's red.

(53) Z says John's got this new car, which is red.

On the other hand, using (48)A as the source, there is pragmatic enrichment in (54)–(55):

(54) Z says John's driving a new car.

(55) Z says John's bought a new car.

I said earlier that for the term *indirect report* to have any value it must be used of reports in which there is pragmatic enrichment in that X goes beyond Z's illocutionary point as sanctioned by the locution. If Z was speaking about a matchbox-sized toy car or John was incapable of driving himself then (54) would be false; therefore, if true, (54) augments the source with additional information. So does (55), because it would be an inaccurate report if in (48)A John were a driver for his boss, the car's owner. (54)–(55) are indirect reports not entailed by (48)A.

A report of *What he did was, he bought a car* entails *he bought a car*, which can function as a direct report. However supplying a name or pronoun for a description or replacing a description with a name or pronoun is pragmatic enrichment; but it is pragmatic enrichment that does not go beyond Z's illocutionary point as sanctioned by the locution. We saw an example of this in (28) as an accurate report of (27) in which 'here' substitutes for the coreferent 'the second set of traffic lights'. For another example, if Susan is Z's daughter and Y doesn't or may not know this fact, then X's report of (56) in (57) arises from the co-reference of 'Susan' and '[Z's] daughter' arises from the situation of utterance and is therefore built into Z's locution in (56), so it is what Bach 1994a would call an 'implicature' (Bach 1994a, b). Although it constitutes pragmatic enrichment, X does not go beyond Z's illocutionary point as sanctioned by the locution and therefore (57) does not qualify as an indirect report.

(56) Susan has just told me she's engaged.

(57) Z says his daughter has just got engaged.

Another instance of implicature is where Z phones X from Liverpool and says *It's snowing*. X might turn from the phone to report this to Y as *It's snowing in Liverpool*. The apparent indirectness arises from the implicature sanctioned by Z's locution, whose illocutionary point is to have X believe that it is snowing wherever it is that Z is located.

As a final example of reporting implicature: suppose my wife and I have been invited to a wedding and my wife exclaims (58).

(58) I've got nothing to wear!

Clearly this is not a literal statement and the illocutionary point encompasses pragmatic enrichment via an implicature.

(59) Z [my wife] reflexively intends utterance of the locution *I've got nothing to wear* to give X [me] to believe that Z believes she has nothing that she considers suitable for her to wear to the wedding to which she has been invited.

Once again reports like those in (60) and (61) do not go beyond the illocutionary point sanctioned by the locution in (58), though (61) spells out the implicature.

(60) We've been invited to a wedding and my wife says she's got nothing to wear.

(61) My wife says she's got nothing suitable to wear to a wedding we've been invited to.

Whereas (60) and (61) only report the pragmatic enrichment implicit in (59), (62) goes further by picking up on the real reason utterances like (58) are made and thus adds X's assessment of it.

(62) My wife wants a new outfit to attend this wedding we've been invited to.

Whereas (60) and (61) are direct reports, (62) is indirect in that it goes beyond the locution and the illocutionary point elaborated in (59).

Finally, consider reports of implicatures. The difference between implicatures and implicatures is that the latter constitute additional propositions external to the locution but not the illocutionary point in what is said. Consider the illocutionary point of (63)Z, given in (64).

(63) X: I need to get some fish.

Z: There's a supermarket down the hill.

(64) Z reflexively intends utterance of the locution *There's a supermarket down the hill* to have X believe that there is a supermarket down the hill where the fish X says she needs can most likely be bought.

If X were to later to report what Z had said to Y in terms of (65) it would not be an indirect report because she does not go beyond the illocutionary point of (63)Z.

(65) Z said there was a supermarket down the hill where I could buy some fish, but it was closed.

The additional clause ‘it was closed’ is not part of the (direct) report of what Z said, but a comment that constitutes part of the (direct) report on the whole situation.

Consider (67) as a report of (66).

(66) Z to X: If you’ll mow the lawn I’ll give you the \$10 you were asking for.

(67) X to Y: Z says if I don’t mow the lawn he won’t give me the \$10 I need.

The illocutionary point of (66) is (68).

(68) Z reflexively intends utterance of the locution *If you’ll mow the lawn I’ll give you the \$10 you were asking for* as a reason for X to believe that Z has (truly) stated a commitment to the future act of paying her the \$10 she has asked him in exchange for her mowing the lawn.

In (66) there is an invited inference (Canegem-Ardijns 2010, Geis & Zwicky 1971, inter alios) from ‘if’ to *if and only if*. In (68) this invited inference is captured by the notion of payment in exchange for service, i.e. the lawn must be mowed for the exchange to take place; if X fails to mow the lawn she will not get the \$10. Thus, until the final clause, ‘I need’ (67) counts as a direct report. If this final clause were *that I asked him for* the whole of (67) would be a direct report. But it does not necessarily hold true that if one asks for something, one needs it – even though this will often be the case. Consequently, when X says ‘[that] I need’ she is adding a perfectly plausible motivation for having asked Z for \$10, but it nonetheless augments (66) and (68). So (67) is in fact an indirect report by the criteria established in this paper.

In this section, §4, I have sought to refine the notions of directness in reporting when a report ρ takes account of entailments, implicatures and implicatures arising from source utterance υ . It turned out that they do not have any direct bearing on the criterion for distinguishing indirect from direct reports.

5. The diagnostic value of illocutions in reports

Even when it adds some additional information, a felicitous report accurately reflects the illocutionary point of the source utterance and so may be used as a diagnostic tool when trying to determine that illocutionary point. Consider (69)–(70):

(69) I promise to take Max to a movie on the weekend.

(70) Z said that he’ll take Max to a movie on the weekend.

There is firm evidence that explicit performative clauses like the one in (69) have the primary illocution of a statement (declarative), see e.g. Allan 1986b, 2006, Bach 1975, Cohen 1964, Lewis 1970. Part of the evidence lies with reports like that in (70).⁶ In (69) Z states a commitment to a future action and, if 'I' = Z, that is what X reports in (70). The illocutionary point of (69) is elaborated in (71) and that of (70) in (72).

(71) Z reflexively intends utterance of the locution *I promise to take Max to a movie on the weekend* as a reason for X to believe (it is true) that Z commits to the future act of taking Max to a movie on the upcoming weekend.

(72) X reflexively intends utterance of the locution *Z said that he'll take Max to a movie on the weekend* as a reason for Y to believe that Z has (truly) stated a commitment to the future act of taking Max to a movie on the upcoming weekend.

An utterance of *Out!* can have the quite distinct illocutionary functions as recognized in the reports in (73) and (74).

(73) The umpire declared the ball out, though Serena Williams disputed it.

(74) Having chewed up the new cushion, the miscreant dog was expelled with a horrified yell of 'Out!'.

Interpreting these reports we reconstruct a declaration (verdictive) from a tennis umpire in (73) and a command (order) from the cushion owner in (74).

Similarly, reports of the imperatives in (75) and (77) show them to be of different kinds, the former commanding, (76), the latter invitational, (78).

(75) Get out of my house, Sonia.

(76) Z ordered Sonia out of his house.

(77) Come and sit down, Phoebe.

(78) Z invited Phoebe to seat herself.

More controversial is the argument in Allan 1986b, II: 216-218 disputing the widely accepted 'whimperative analysis' in Sadock 1970, Sadock 1974 which was based on the assumption that questions are not themselves requests. Allan claims that 'questions' are requests to tell, e.g. *What's your name, sir?* is a request for 'sir' to speak (or write or sign) his name. Any kind of directive may be met with a verbal response, e.g. Sonia might have

⁶ In a different context Cappelen & Lepore 1997: 280 write: 'The content of (i.e., the proposition expressed by) an utterance u of a sentence S is p iff 'It was said that p' is a true report of u.'

responded to (75) by either the refusal *No I bloody well won't!* or the acceptance *Can't wait, you fucking asshole*. Many requests get a verbal response, too, though it is not obligatory; e.g. (79) may get an assent *Certainly* or refusal *Certainly not* which respond to (80) rather than (81).

(79) Will you come with me, sir?

(80) Z requests that 'sir' accompany him.

(81) Z asks 'sir' to tell him whether or not 'sir' will accompany him.

The report that should be sanctioned by the 'whimperative' hypothesis is the almost incoherent (82) which contrasts with the normal (83).

(82) Z asked 'sir' to tell him whether or not 'sir' will accompany him and in doing so requested that 'sir' accompany him.

(83) Z asked/requested that 'sir' accompany him.

In Allan 1986a I used reports as evidence against the claim in Clark & Carlson 1982 for their so-called 'informative analysis', which I briefly sketch. There is often more than one hearer, and the speaker may have different intentions toward (= messages for) different hearers. All those who can reasonably consider themselves hearers are expected, as part of the cooperative endeavour, to keep tabs on what is said, so that if called on to participate in the discourse they may do so appropriately.

[T]he speaker performs two types of illocutionary act with each utterance. One is the traditional kind, such as an assertion, promise or apology; this is directed at the addressees. The other, called an informative, is directed at all participants in the conversation – the addressees and third parties alike. It is intended to inform all of them jointly of the assertion, promise, or apology being directed at the addressees. (Clark & Carlson 1982: 332)

My point in this essay is not to challenge Clark and Carlson's informative analysis, but to show the value of reports in trying to establish what is going on in the utterances being reported. Suppose Z utters (84) to Jo, Sue, and X.

(84) Will the last one of you to go to bed please turn out the light?

The informative analysis postulates the following illocutions:

(85) Z informs Jo, Sue, and X that Z requests the last one of them to go to bed to please turn out the light.

The Clark and Carlson claim is that the primary illocution is an informative and other illocutions are indirect; thus in (84) all hearers are informed of the request, but for the last one

of them to go to bed (suppose it is Sue) the illocutionary point is that of a request; in their scenario, no request is made of Jo or X. The traditional and simpler view is that in (84) the request is made of all three hearers because at the time of utterance it is unknown who will eventually comply with the request (perhaps none of them). This view is justified by a realistic true report of (84) in (86). It would be logically correct but pragmatically inappropriate for any of Jo, Sue, or X to report (87) or (88).

(86) Z asked that the last one of us to go to bed should turn out the light.

(87) Z asked me to turn out the light.

(88) Z informed us that the last one of us to go to bed should turn out the light.

In the light of the discussion of (84), consider the illocutionary force of the placard in (89). The context is that in late May 2013 Ford Australia announced that in October 2016 it will close its Australian manufacturing plants including one in Geelong where the Ford plant is the major industry. The protester pictured in (89) makes the ironic statement *the last person to leave Geelong please turn out the lights*.

(89)



The placard is a hyperbolic play on the figurative meaning of *turning the lights out*, namely shutting the place down. An indirect report of (89) would be something like (90).

(90) Z is protesting against the Ford plant closure by implying that it will cause Geelong to be abandoned because there will no longer be any jobs in the city.

The illocutionary point of (89) is equally indirect and it calls on contextual knowledge of public affairs in order to be understood – which is common for protesting banners.

(91) Z reflexively intends utterance of the locution *the last person to leave Geelong please turn out the lights* to be a reason for the reader ('hearer') to believe that everyone will have to leave Geelong because there will no longer be any jobs in the city once Ford Australia shuts its plant down.

In this section I have demonstrated that felicitous reports enable us to identify the illocutionary point of the utterance reported on. Because the felicity of a report ρ is determined by the faithfulness with which it re-presents the content of source utterance υ there is an unavoidable circularity. The only justification for using a report ρ as a diagnostic for the illocutionary point of υ is an appeal to what is variously called the principle of charity, the cooperative principle, or relevance: the default assumption is that an utterance is felicitous unless there is good reason to believe otherwise.

6. Concluding remarks

In this essay I have established a criterion for distinguishing indirect from direct reports with the proviso that all reports are in some measure indirect in that they re-present the source utterance with transmutations of voice and expression and perhaps also medium and perspective. I have suggested that the term *indirect report* be limited to just those reports in which the reporter X pragmatically enriches source Z's illocutionary point as sanctioned by the locution, its entailments, implicatures and implicatures. However, there is a constraint that material introduced in an indirect report as a pragmatic enrichment must be strictly relevant to the matter being spoken of by the reporter. Let me reaffirm this point and point to problems with the restriction 'strictly relevant' by adapting an example from Cappelen & Lepore 1997: 293; assume that (92) is the source for (93) and (94):

(92) Z to X: Names are not rigid designators.

(93) X to Y: Z said that Kripke is wrong about names.

(94) X to Y: Z said Mill is wrong about names.

Both the pragmatically correct (93) and the false (94) are pragmatic enrichments of (92). (93) relies on the correct information that the theory of names as rigid designators was proposed by Saul Kripke (in Kripke 1972) and is a proper indirect report of (92). The Millian theory of names (roughly that the meaning of a proper name is the bearer of that name, see Mill 1843) is not evoked by Z in (92). The reason is that an accurate and felicitous report ρ of utterance υ must capture the illocutionary point in υ such that Z's message in υ can be correctly reconstructed from X's report ρ . Because the accuracy of the content of ρ is dependent on the illocutionary point of υ , and on the default assumption that an utterance is felicitous unless there is good reason to believe otherwise, a felicitous report ρ functions as a diagnostic for the illocutionary point of υ .

Let's briefly review these findings in the light of an utterance of (95).

(95) Z to X: I won easily.

Depending on the circumstances of utterance, (95) can be felicitously reported in various ways.

(96) Z said that he won easily.

(97) A. Z quite rightly said that he won easily.

B. Z mistakenly believed that he won easily.

C. Z lied that he won easily.

D. Z boasted that he won easily.

(96) is a direct report. All of (97)A–D add X's perspective that pragmatically enriches the report and so they are indirect reports. All the reports include the illocutionary point of (95) – that of statement (with a truth value), even those with additional comment by X that might be judged to have a force such as *X opined that Z quite rightly/mistakenly/lied/boasted that Z won easily*.

Let's compare reports of (98) with those of (95).

(98) Did I win easily?

Given the right prosody this form of words could constitute a boastful rhetorical question, in which case its illocutionary force would be (99).

(99) Z reflexively intends utterance of the locution *Did I win easily?* to be recognized as asking X to agree with Z's presumption that Z won easily.

The direct report would be something like (100) and an indirect one (101).

(100) Z wanted me (X) to concur that he had undoubtedly won easily.

(101) Z boasted he'd won easily.

But (98) might also sound like a genuine question such that its illocutionary force is (102).

(102) Z reflexively intends utterance of the locution *Did I win easily* to be recognized as asking X whether or not Z won easily (on the presumption that X can respond appropriately to what is asked).

In this case, direct reports are (103)A–B.

(103) A. Z didn't know whether or not he had won easily.

B. Z wanted me (X) to tell him whether or not he'd had an easy win.

The first conjunct of (104) is also a direct report of (98) and (102) but the second conjunct augments the report with additional information that refutes the presumption in (98) and (102) that Z had won.

(104) Z asked me (X) whether he'd won easily and I had to tell him he'd been disqualified.

In going beyond the locution and illocutionary point of (98), the second conjunct in (104) appeals to relevant context or background information to refute Z's presupposition but this does not render the report indirect because it is simply additional information that reports on the situation and not on what Z had said.

I have also argued for the diagnostic value of report ρ in identifying the illocutionary point of the utterance reported on, v , with a default assumption that the source utterance is felicitous. For one additional example, take (101), *Z boasted he'd won easily*, as a report of (98), *Did I win easily?* Assuming it is an accurate report of a felicitous utterance we must construe (98) as a boastful rhetorical question rather than a genuine polar question, which is a reasonable conclusion.

Hopefully, this essay has succeeded in revealing some new and worthwhile properties of reports, indirect reports, and illocutionary point.

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