

The semantics and pragmatics of names and naming

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Since at least the time of Apollonius Dyscolus 1981, *On Syntax I*: 78 it has been recognized that proper names express *idia poiotes* literally “individual quality”, loosely “a unique identifier”. But on closer inspection they do more. I do not subscribe to the check-list account of proper names of Frege 1892, Russell 1905, Searle 1958, Strawson 1959, preferring the Kripke 1972 notion of the name as rigid designator. I argue that proper names need to be included in a lexicon because they have certain lexical properties. Proper names for animates typically indicate the gender of the referent (cf. Searle 1958), which is why transgender folk usually change their forename, and why *John washed herself* sounds anomalous/ungrammatical. Moreover, names often indicate the ethnic origin of the referent, compare the names Agyeman, Chen, Cohen, Françoise, Giancarlo, Kwame, Lyudmila, Mei, Nguyen, Papadopoulos, Shevardnadze, Tomiko, Wojciech. Although it is often claimed that names uniquely identify, they only do so in limited contexts: there are numerous individuals named *Jesus* or *Elizabeth Taylor*. Names are linked with roles (not merely gender roles): *Robert Zimmerman* may name the same person as *Bob Dylan* but it was only the latter that is properly the creator of ‘Blowin’ in the Wind’. It is *Marilyn Monroe* and not *Norma Jeane Mortenson* who appeared in ‘Gentlemen Prefer Blondes’. A man may be *Bill* to his friends but *William* as a legal person. Names may vary across languages: *London* = *Londres*, შვედრდნაძე = Shevardnadze. Names vary across-time: *Byzantion* ⇒ *Kōnstantinoupolis* ⇒ *Kostantiniyye* ⇒ *İstanbul*. Naming, Kripke’s ‘baptism’, is influenced by the role of the name-bearer in a certain spatio-temporal context. There is semantic content to a name but there is also pragmatic (encyclopaedic) information that cannot be ignored, cf. *My boss is a little Hitler*. I extend the discussion to all kinds of names, proper names, natural kind names, common names.

I propose a way to manage all these characteristics of names, beginning with the suggestion that lexicon entries supply one means of access to encyclopaedia entries, and that the lexicon forms a part of an encyclopaedia.

Keywords: names, lexicon, encyclopaedia, Kripke, rigid designator

1. A lexicon is part of an encyclopaedia

DICTIONARIES such as the *OED*, *Oxford English Dictionary*, are publications created (not necessarily consciously) as partial models of the mental lexicon; thus, in this essay, the term *dictionary* is to be understood as “(partial) model of the mental lexicon”. A LEXICON (sc.

mental lexicon) is a bin for storing the meanings of those language expressions whose meaning is not determinable from the meanings, if any, of its constituents, an ENCYCLOPAEDIA functions as a structured data-base containing exhaustive information on many, potentially all, branches of knowledge. It seems fair to say that the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, for instance, is a (partial) model of human knowledge.

Important for linguistic semantics is the question: How much information is it necessary to include in a complete semantic representation in a lexicon? In school, comprehension of a text is usually tested by having a student summarize the text and/or answer questions on it. Attempts in the field of artificial intelligence to program a machine to interpret a text so as to answer questions on it or to provide a summary for it reveal that the project requires input from what Schank and Abelson 1977 call 'scripts', Lakoff 1987 'idealized cognitive models', and Barsalou 1992; Fillmore 1975; 1982; Fillmore and Atkins 1992; Minsky 1977 'frames'. These hypothetical constructs are by no means identical, but they all call extensively upon encyclopaedic knowledge. The normal practice before the 1980s was to favour parsimonious dictionary knowledge against elaborated encyclopaedic knowledge, but things have changed. Haiman 1980: 331 claimed 'Dictionaries *are* encyclopaedias' which is certainly true of some existing dictionaries, for example *The New Grove Dictionary of Jazz* (Kernfield 1994) is more encyclopaedia than lexicon. Ray Jackendoff 1983: 139f suggested that information in the lexical entry 'shades toward "encyclopaedia" rather than "dictionary" information, with no sharp line drawn between the two types'. Anna Wierzbicka developed semantic descriptions very similar to descriptions of their denotata in an encyclopaedia; compare her proposed semantics for *tiger* (Wierzbicka 1985: 164) with the entry she quotes from the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (Wierzbicka 1985: 194). Ronald Langacker says that the information in a lexicon IS encyclopaedic:

The distinction between semantics and pragmatics (or between linguistics and extralinguistic knowledge) is largely artifactual, and the only viable conception of linguistic semantics is one that avoids false dichotomies and is consequently **encyclopedic** in nature. (Langacker 1987: 154, *sic*)

Geoffrey Leech offers the contrary view:

[T]he oddity of propositions like 'The dog had eighty legs' is something that zoology has to explain rather than conceptual semantics. (Leech 1981: 84)

Leech is surely correct, but there has to be a cognitive path from the LISTEME (what needs to be listed in a lexicon/dictionary¹) to directly access encyclopaedic information about dogs (or

¹ The term 'listeme' was first used by Di Sciullo and Williams 1987.

whatever) because of a hearer's ability to 'shadow' a text very rapidly – that is, to begin understanding it and drawing appropriate inferences milliseconds after the speaker has uttered it (Marslen-Wilson 1985; 1989). Consequently, the lexicon entry is one access point into the isomorphic set of encyclopaedia entries, all of which are activated by recognition of the listeme. If the encyclopaedia is a database, then the lexicon forms an integral component of the encyclopaedia.

Let me rehearse some additional terminology here to clarify what I mean by the terms I use. The SENSE of a listeme corresponds to a description of the salient properties of the typical decontextualized denotatum. The DENOTATION of a language expression α is what α is normally used to refer to in some possible (not necessarily real but imagined) world. The REFERENCE of a language expression is what the speaker/writer/signer is using the language expression to talk about – be it intensional, extensional, or non-existent. Thus, the sense of *I crashed my car yesterday* is “the speaker did something which caused severe damage to his or her automobile the day before the utterance was made”. ‘I’ denotes the speaker; ‘my car’ denotes some kind of automobile driven by the speaker, etc. If, on Sunday 3 May 2020, Max says *I crashed my car yesterday* and his car is a BMW, then Max is referring to himself, his BMW, and the event of his crashing the BMW on Saturday 2 May 2020.

The most important thing the lexicon does is identify the senses of an item within it; and the sense of an item is essentially a description of salient characteristics of its typical denotation. Information about denotata (potential referents) is stored in their encyclopaedia entries. It is this information from which the senses of isomorphic listemes are abstracted. Such abstraction from particulars is evident in the ontogenetic development of listemes by children. Eve Clark 1973 reports a child's extension of *bird* to any moving creature (sparrows, cows, dogs, cats), *moon* to any round object, *bow-wow* to things that are bright, reflective and round (?based on the dog's eyes) such as a fur piece with glass eyes, pearl buttons, cuff links, a bath thermometer. The same process operates when adults encounter a new name or a new use for a known name. The idealized model of the encyclopaedia and lexicon requires a heuristic updating facility. Suppose that Z has only ever encountered female bearers of the name *Beryl*, so that the semantic specification in Z's lexicon entry is “bearer of the name *Beryl*, normally a female”. If Z comes across the name *Beryl* used of a cisgender man, not only is Z's encyclopaedia expanded, but also Z's mental lexicon entry will be updated to “bearer of the name *Beryl*, normally a female, but attested for a male”.

If sense is a description of the salient properties of the typical decontextualized denotatum it seems to me inescapable that sense derives from encyclopaedic information about the typical denotatum. Consider some semantic accounts of the English word *cup*.

Physical Object

Inanimate

Vertical Orientation

Upwardly concave

Height about equal to top diameter

Top diameter greater than bottom diameter

Artefact

Made to serve as a container from which to drink liquid. (Katz 1977: 49)

The *Oxford English Dictionary* is somewhat more precise and also obviously inspired by encyclopaedic information about the denotation of *cup*.

1. A small open vessel for liquids, usually of hemispherical or hemi-spheroidal shape, with or without a handle; a drinking-vessel. The common form of cup (*e.g.* a tea-cup or coffee-cup) has no stem; but the larger and more ornamental forms (*e.g.* a wine-cup or chalice) may have a stem and foot, as also a lid or cover; in such cases *cup* is sometimes applied specifically to the concave part that receives the liquid.

[...]

4. A natural organ or formation having the form of a drinking-cup; *e.g.* the rounded cavity or socket of certain bones, as the shoulder-blade and hip-bone; the cup-shaped hardened involucre (cupule) of an acorn (*acorn-cup*); the calyx of a flower, also the blossom itself when cup-shaped; a cup-shaped organ in certain Fungi, or on the suckers of certain Molluscs; a depression in the skin forming a rudimentary eye in certain lower animals (also *eye-cup* or *cup-eye*).

[...]

[6]c. That part of a brassière which is shaped to contain or support one of the breasts.

Accounts of the semantics of *cup* in Labov 1973: 366-367, Wierzbicka 1984, Goddard 2011: 228-229, and Allan 2020a although very different in format, all show significant reliance on encyclopaedic information about cups when offering a model of lexicographical meaning.

Furthermore, it is undeniable that encyclopaedic data was called upon when extending a proper name like *Kleenex* to denote facial tissues in general, *Hoover* to denote vacuum cleaners and vacuum cleaning, and to explain the formation of the verb *bowdlerize* from the proper name *Bowdler*. It is equally obvious that encyclopaedic data is called upon in statements like (1)–(3).

- (1) Caspar Cazzo is no Pavarotti!
- (2) Nellie Norman is another Janis Joplin!
- (3) Harry's boss is a bloody little Hitler!

(1) implies that Caspar is not a great singer. We infer this because Luciano Pavarotti's salient characteristic was that he was a great singer. (2) implies that Nellie is an accomplished (and

probably white) blues singer and/or perhaps that she has severe problems with her self-image. Such comparisons draw on biodata of individuals that cannot be expected to come out of a lexicon; it must be drawn from the encyclopaedia entry for the person who is the standard for comparison. Because of the (sketchy) encyclopaedic entry for the name *Hitler* given in (4), (3) is abusive.

- (4) **Hitler** *proper name* for **Adolf Hitler**, primarily responsible for World War II and castigated for being a fascist dictator who was ultimately responsible for the liquidation of six million Jews, and countless Slavs, gypsies, homosexuals, and others whom he regarded as socially undesirable. Comparisons with Hitler imply a ruthless dictatorial manner, someone willing to murder millions of the people he disapproves of.

A more carefully composed encyclopaedic entry for *Hitler* than (4) would contain more genuine historical fact. It might also allow for a neo-Nazi assessment of Hitler, which would be far more positive than (4). Significantly, different (groups of) individuals make different interpretations of the facts, and the prejudices of language users are just as relevant to a proper account of language understanding as the true facts (if ‘truth’ can be nonsubjectively determined, Allan 2022). This raises a problem: Will the lexicon and encyclopaedia have to institutionalize the mainstream stereotype? Or should the prejudices of different groups within the community be represented? The latter may be morally dispreferred, but as a model of reality it is the preferable option. And there is the outstanding question: Should the lexicon contain every word in the language and the encyclopaedia contain exhaustive information on all branches of knowledge, or should they be modular, rather like a collection of human minds? For instance, a medic’s lexicon is full of medical jargon and a medic’s encyclopaedia contains medical knowledge unknown to the average patient; a botanist knows more about plants than I do and has the lexicon to talk about that knowledge; and so forth through the community for different interest groups. No one is sure what constitutes the common core of a lexicon nor of an encyclopaedia. Even if they can be identified, they will have to be connected to specialist modules with jargon dictionaries and specialist encyclopaedias. And a modular system would need an archiving device to facilitate information incrementation and update to both lexicon and encyclopaedia. There are two reasons for favouring multiple lexicons and encyclopaedias: first it would putatively model individual human capacities; second, it would divide data and processing into manageable chunks. As already shown in (4), the encyclopaedia will contain entries for people under their proper names. In reality, as recognised above, individuals in a community will have different mental encyclopaedias, i.e. partially different information (cf. Katz 1977a). For example, suppose Jax says:

- (5) I know four Annas.

There is no requirement that an addressee knows, or even knows of, any of the Annas referred to by the speaker of (5), Jax. It does, however, call for lexical knowledge about the name *Anna*, because it implicates Jax's assumption that his addressee will understand that "Jax knows four female human beings each of whom is called *Anna*." On the other hand, when Jax utters (6), it is normally expected that the addressee will understand not merely that Jax had a letter from some female human being named *Anna* but will, in addition, be able to identify further facts about the person spoken of from the assumed common ground (Allan 2013b; 2023).

(6) I had a letter from Anna yesterday.

Being able to identify the referent means being able to access information about her, and information about name-bearers is entered into a mental encyclopaedia. In uttering (6) Jax normally assumes that he and the addressee have partially coincidental encyclopaedia entries for the intended referent. A speaker will have different expectations of different addressees. For instance, if Jax utters (6) to Harry at time t_x , Harry assumes the referent is $Anna_S$ for whom they share an encyclopaedia entry with a considerable amount of additional information about the referent, some of which is mutual. If (6) is addressed to Tom at time t_y , the latter assumes the referent is $Anna_T$. On the other hand, Jax should not utter (6) to Sue at time t_z without some contextual clarification, because they each know that they each have encyclopaedia entries for both $Anna_A$ and $Anna_B$, so a potential referential ambiguity needs to be resolved. We conclude that the name *Anna* will evoke one or more encyclopaedia entries, depending on the number stored.

Information about people is stored in the encyclopaedia and one means of access will be via a person's proper name. (The whole encyclopaedia entry can be accessed through part of the information in it, enabling the name and further information about the referent to be retrieved.)

(7) sketches a partial set of encyclopaedia entries for *Aristotle*.

(7) **₁Aristotle** *proper name* of an ancient Greek philosopher, born in Stagira in C4 BCE.

Author of *The Categories*, *On Interpretation*, *On Poetry*, ... Pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great ...

₂Aristotle *proper name* of **Aristotle Onassis**, C20 CE Greek shipping magnate ...

₃Aristotle *proper name* of **Ari Papadopoulos**, friend whose phone number is 0439 111...

The information in (7) is clearly not of the kind that anyone should expect to find in a lexicon because it is not lexicographical information about a name in the language. Instead, it is encyclopaedic information about particular name-bearers; furthermore, the entry **₃Aristotle** indicates that everyone's encyclopaedia is unique. Similarly for information about things, whether natural kinds such as gold and dogs, or unnatural kinds such as polyester and

computers. Information about the ways in which cats differ from dogs will be culled from encyclopaedia entries. The semantic difference between *cat* and *dog* as lexicon entries is minimal.

In §7 I shall demonstrate paths through which the lexicon and encyclopaedia are linked. In the meantime, I will investigate the properties of names in more detail. §2 addresses the use of proper names as identifiers; §3, semantic constraints on naming, §4 the persistence of names through time, §5 the problem of alternative names, §6 names for non-natural kinds, §7 the semantics and pragmatics of names; and §8 sums up the discussion.

2. Names as identifiers

A critical property of names is that they identify referents. Consider some names: *Homer*, *Hitler*, *Elizabeth Taylor*, *Alfred the Great*, *the Virgin Mary*, *God*, *Santa Claus*, *Hercule Poirot*, *Brooklyn*, *the Bronx*, *Mexico City*, *the City of London*, *Ayers Rock*, *I-40*, *the Pacific Ocean*, *the Milky Way*, *the Mayflower*, *the Bodleian*, *WordPerfect*, *Tampax*, *Picasso's 'Les Demoiselles d'Avignon'*, *the OED*, *Pink Floyd*, *the Grateful Dead*, *the Hopi*, *the Mafia*, *Zabar's*, *Factory-2-U*, *Oxford University Press* [the publishers], *General Motors*, *the Himalayas*, *COVID-19*. The typical proper name refers to an individual, a 'particular', but also named are (inter alia) collections whose members share some common property; real and imaginary people; pets; newly discovered and cultivated biological phenomena; constellations, places and topological features, buildings, institutions, businesses, radio stations, pop groups, orchestras, acting companies; events like wars and epidemics; computer files, books, newspapers, films, TV shows; manufactured products of all kinds.

The Ford Motor Company is a proper name, but *a Ford* (sc. a make of car) is not. Why is it, then, that the noun 'Ford' in the latter is standardly written with an upper-case *F* in positions other than sentence initial? John Algeo reminds us:

Most but not all proper nouns are capitalized in English, and a great many things that certainly are not proper nouns are regularly capitalized. Present-day English has some words like *Chevrolet* that are usually capitalized, some like *Roman* that are often capitalized, some like *devil* that are occasionally capitalized, and some like *first base* that are rarely capitalized. (Algeo 1973: 17)

In respect of proper names, the property I describe as uniquely identifying referents was named 'rigid designation' by Saul Kripke: 'Let's call something a *rigid designator* if in any possible

world it designates the same object' (Kripke 1972: 269).² Before considering how natural kind terms and common names can be accommodated, let's review Kripke's motivation.

Kripke was specifically challenging the 'checklist' or 'cluster' theory of proper names that gives a 'bundle of qualities', at least one of which is supposedly necessary in order to correctly identify the referent. Frege believed that a proper name has sense(s).

The sense of a proper name is grasped by everybody who is sufficiently familiar with the language or totality of designations to which it belongs. [Footnote: In the case of an actual proper name such as 'Aristotle' opinions as to the sense may differ. It might, for instance, be taken to be the following: the pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great. Anybody who does this will attach another sense to the sentence 'Aristotle was born in Stagira' than will a man who takes as the sense of the name: the teacher of Alexander the Great who was born in Stagira. So long as the reference remains the same, such variations of sense may be tolerated, although they are to be avoided in the theoretical structure of a demonstrative science and ought not to occur in a perfect language.] (Frege 1960: 57–58 [1892])

Because the sense of a listeme is a description of the salient properties of the typical denotatum, not a description of the attributes of a particular referent, Frege has not given the sense of the name *Aristotle* (Kripke 1972: 272, 277); instead, he gives part of an encyclopaedia entry for one bearer of the name *Aristotle*. Frege's quoted remarks are open to the following objection from Kripke:

If 'Aristotle' meant *the man who taught Alexander the Great*, then saying 'Aristotle was a teacher of Alexander the Great' would be a mere tautology. But surely it isn't; it expresses the fact that Aristotle taught Alexander the Great, something we could discover to be false. So, *being the teacher of Alexander the Great* cannot be part of the sense of the name. (Kripke 1972: 258)

Kripke's solution is that the name *Aristotle* referring to the Stagirite, the philosopher, the teacher of Alexander the Great, is what he calls a 'rigid designator'; in other words, it uniquely identifies a particular referent.

This is a refinement on Mill 1843 and a grammatical tradition that extends back at least as far as the Alexandrian grammarian Dionysos of Thrace c.100 BCE. Non-rigid designators would be such definite descriptions as *the teacher of Alexander the Great* and *the author of 'On Interpretation'*. Although it appears that these definite descriptions uniquely identify an individual, it ain't necessarily so because Alexander may have had other teachers and there could be more than one work entitled 'On interpretation'. In other words, these definite descriptions are rigid (i.e. true) at some possible worlds but not every possible world.

² I shall use Kripke's term 'rigid designator' with the understanding "Let's call something a *rigid designator* if in any possible world it denotes the same concept or object."

Furthermore, in a counterfactual world, Aristotle might not have been the teacher of Alexander the Great, but he would still have been Aristotle; he might not have written ‘On Interpretation’, but he would still have been Aristotle. The name remains the same even in counterfactual worlds – that is why Kripke calls it a ‘rigid designator’. Therefore, we can make counterfactual statements like *If Aristotle had not been born, scholarly life would have been so much the poorer* – in which the word ‘Aristotle’ refers to Aristotle and rigidly designates, that is, in this instance uniquely identifies the philosopher born 384 BCE in Stagira.

It is not essential that the name-bearer be real for the name to rigidly designate (i.e. act as a unique identifier). Historians believe that Homer may never have existed in fact; and even if a man of that name did exist, that he was just one contributor to the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. The historical facts make no difference whatsoever to Homer’s expositors or other language users. The proper name *Homer* rigidly designates just as well when it is a convenient fiction as it would if it were historically validated as the true name of the real and sole author of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. If it turns out that someone else is authenticated as the author of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, Homer will be redesignated in the encyclopaedia ‘formerly the supposed author of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*’, and the name *Homer* will remain a rigid designator of this person.

Although Kripke never refers to anything like an ‘encyclopaedic entry for the name’, he does talk about evidence for fixing the reference of the rigid designator, and the evidence is composed from exactly the kind of information that goes into the encyclopaedia entry. Definitions are one means of fixing denotation/reference, but there are other ways. For instance, the measurement name *metre* is a rigid designator; the length was fixed in 1875 as the length between marks on a certain platinum iridium bar at normal atmospheric pressure at 0°C. A *metre* is also defined as 1,553,164.13 wave lengths of red cadmium light, and as 1.093614 of a yard. For the average person, it is a length identified by whatever ruler or tape-measure is to hand. All these are some of the possible ways of fixing the reference of *metre*. Similarly, the reference of the rigid designator *Aristotle* can be fixed by means such as identifying him as the pupil of Plato, the teacher of Alexander the Great, the philosopher born in Stagira in 384 BCE. Plato could have fixed the reference of *Aristotle*, e.g. for Eudoxus, by ostension: i.e. by pointing out Aristotle and telling Eudoxus *Ἦτοι Ἀριστοτέλης* “That’s Aristotle”. Not everyone will fix reference in the same manner, but the rigid designator holds for everyone for whom it identifies the same denotation/referent (Kripke 1972: 331). This is so even when a person’s encyclopaedic information is minimal, such that the reference of *Aristotle* is merely “a historical personage”. If Caspar Milquetoast has only this information about *Plato* too, all that keeps Aristotle distinct from Plato is the form of the name.

Kripke allows that a rigid designator is translatable. The form of the name is determined by the particular (variety of) language being used, and its reference is fixed by the norms and conventions of that language/language variety. For example, many proper names change their form across languages: *London* = *Londres*, *Cuk Şon* = *Tucson*, *Uluru* = *Ayers Rock*, *Kirinyaga* = *Mount Kenya*, *Athēnai* = *Athens*, *Αριστοτέλης* = *Aristotle*, *შევერდნაძე* = *Shevardnadze*. *London* is a rigid designator when speaking English but when speaking French the same referent is called *Londres*. Such alternative names abound within some language communities in which people typically have more than one version of their personal proper name. In some communities a person will have a public name and a secret name, the latter known to a very few privileged people and subject to taboos on its use. Many people have nicknames or familiar names in addition to their official name. *Michael* alternates with *Mike* in different, though overlapping, sets of contexts. A jazz buff will know that *Bird* refers to the same person as *Charlie Parker* (Charles Parker Jr, August 29, 1920 – March 12, 1955). Stage names are rigid designators also; and the name *Bob Dylan* identifies the same person as bears the name *Robert Zimmerman*, and *Marilyn Monroe* the same person as bore the name *Norma Jeane Mortenson*. Each of these designators is rigid, but used in different contexts.

(8) Bob Dylan wrote ‘Blowin’ in the wind’.

(9) Robert Zimmerman wrote ‘Blowin’ in the wind’.

(9) is misleading (and arguably false) because Robert Zimmerman’s name does not appear on the credits – Bob Dylan’s does. To make (9) felicitous, it needs qualifying: *Robert Zimmerman wrote ‘Blowin’ in the wind’ under his stage name of Bob Dylan*. It is a necessary fact that Bob Dylan = Bob Dylan, and that Robert Zimmerman = Robert Zimmerman; but it could be false that Bob Dylan = Robert Zimmerman. Only someone aware of the contingent equivalence can infer (8) from (9) and vice versa. There is more on alternative names in §5.

Proper name using practice is initiated when a referent is ‘baptized’ with a rigid designator that is subsequently passed down through the community (Kripke 1972: 302, 309; Evans 1982: 376f). There are semantic constraints on naming: it is not the case that anything goes.

3. Semantic constraints on naming

Judgments about the appropriateness of a name are judgments of semantic and pragmatic acceptability arising from the connotations of the name. The connotations of a language expression are semantic effects that arise from encyclopaedic knowledge about its denotation (or reference) and also from experiences, beliefs, and prejudices about the contexts in which the expression is typically used (Allan 2007). Connotations vary between contexts and speech communities independently of sense and denotation. For example, *Mike* and *Michael* can have

the same reference but different connotations. Just as *John* is an unsuitable name for your newborn daughter, so is *Springtime in Paris* an inappropriate name for a 1200cc Harley-Davidson motorbike or an auto-repair shop. *Wheels and Deals* might be a good name for a used car mart, but not for a new strain of corn, nor for a maternity boutique. People are well aware of these facts, and marketing folk exploit such knowledge to the full. Consequently, when Lehrer 1992 ran a questionnaire on the suitability of a set of names for a variety of denotata, she found a high degree of inter-subject agreement on the matter.

For instance, Lehrer reports on the names for models of American cars. The name of the make, e.g. *Ford*, or model, e.g. *Mustang*, is a proper name. The name of a particular car, as in *I drive a Mustang*, is not a proper name. The connotations of proper names for car models must be able to attract buyers from a significant section of the general public, so there are naming patterns for car models. As one would expect, many model names have associations with power and/or importance (*Monarch, Le Baron, Ambassador, Jaguar, Laser*), luxury (*Malibu, Monte Carlo*), speed (*Mustang, Falcon, Corsair, Dart, Grand Prix, Le Mans, Volare*), macho (*Challenger, Matador, Maverick, Fury*), and travel (*Safari, Ranger*). It is notable that car models are not named after trees, human body-parts, or mundane things like articles of clothing and items of household furniture (none of which move). And if there are models with names like *Cyclone*, a word with connotations of speed and force, it is unlikely one would find a car model named *Rain* or *Overcast*. The names *Firebird, Thunderbird, Falcon, and Hawk*, even *Skylark*, are found; but the names of nondescript unexciting birds such as sparrow, crow, pigeon, chicken, goose, turkey are not used. Table 1 compares the connotations of *hawk* with those of *pigeon* to suggest why one is an appropriate model name, and the other is not.

Table 1. What's in a name?

NAME:	<i>Hawk</i>	<i>Pigeon</i>
ATTRIBUTES:	A hawk is a high-flying raptor. It soars and swoops and has an efficient aerodynamic appearance.	A pigeon is a compact-bodied, short-legged bird that waddles when it walks. It has ungainly take-off and flappy flight. It is friendly but mundane.
COMMENT:	These are attributes appropriate to a reasonably prestigious car, with a macho image.	If any car were to be called a <i>Pigeon</i> , it would surely have to be a runabout.
USED BY:	Humber, Studebaker	No one.

You might imagine that a new car model could be called anything at all; in practice it cannot. The connotations of names affect their appropriateness. Similar constraints hold for all

potential baptisms. Lehrer's research of the proper names of car models, rock bands, beauty salons, streets, and university buildings shows that baptisms are mostly systematic, and each genre develops its own naming themes and styles based on connotation. At the same time, all proper names are constrained by the nature of their denotation because it is reflected in their senses. Life would be tough for a boy named *Sue* or a girl named *John*; it was even tough for the American who had his name changed to *One Zero Six Nine* – he had to go to four courts in two US states before he found a sympathetic judge; and even then he was required to spell the numbers and not use numerals (Adrienne Lehrer p.c.).

Names can be descriptive, picking up on a salient characteristic perceived in, wanted for, or (sometimes ironically) imputed to the referent, perhaps as a mnemonic. A friend of mine identifies some contacts on her phone with their forename and characteristic, e.g. *Helena Cabin* because Helena lived in a cabin, *Hugo Builder* because Hugo was a builder. Some baptisms of peacock spider species (*Maratus*) were explained in <https://theconversation.com/i-travelled-australia-looking-for-peacock-spiders-and-collected-7-new-species-and-named-one-after-the-starry-night-sky-135201>: *Maratus constellatus*: “starry” in Latin, referring to the markings on the male's abdomen which look like a starry night sky; *Maratus inaquosus*: “dry” or “arid” in Latin, for the dry landscape in Little Desert National Park this species was found in; *Maratus noggerup*: named after the location where this species was found, Noggerup, Western Australia. *Maratus suae*: named in honour of photographer Su RamMohan who discovered this species and provided useful information about their locations in Western Australia. In *The Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy*, Douglas Adams gives the following account of what Ford Prefect was called at one time:

The other kids at school nicknamed him Ix, which in the language of Betelgeuse Five translates as “boy who is not able satisfactorily to explain what a Hrungr is, nor why it should collapse on Betelgeuse Seven.” (Adams 1992: 44)

Less imaginative examples are the topographical names *Green River*, *Black Mountain*, and *Shiprock*; Ghanaian day names such as *Akua* (female born on Wednesday), *Kofi* (male born on Friday³); the Puritan Christian name *If-Christ-Had-Not-Died-For-You-You-Had-Been-Damned*; the characteristics Shakespeare imputed to *Doll Tearsheet*, to *Pistol*, and to *Justice Shallow*; the implications of nicknames like *Shorty* and *Four-eyes*, adopted names like *Sid Vicious* and *Yahoo Serious*, or family names like *Baker* and *Smith*. All such names were/are

³ The late celebrated Kofi Annan was born Friday 8 April 1938 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kofi_Annan).

motivated as descriptions, yet once the referent is baptized (in Kripke's sense) the name becomes a rigid designator of that referent.

4. Persistence through time

A rigid designator persists, but the characteristics of the denotatum may change over time. A baby baptized *PN* can, and often does, bear the name *PN* at all stages in his or her life (even when various bodily organs have been removed and replaced by organs transplanted from other people). And, of course, the name continues to rigidly denote (i.e. apply to that same entity) after death. The membership of a pop group, orchestra, or sports team may change from time to time without affecting the name of the ensemble. Cities grow or they fall into ruin, all the while retaining their proper name. This kind of chronological mutation in the characteristics of the denotatum is equally applicable to common names.

Once a proper name exists in the language, there is presumed to be a 'historical chain' stretching back through users of the name to the original baptism (Kripke 1972: 302). This notion of the historical chain is a variation on a long-established view that a history of conventional usage characterizes the vocabulary in the language and allows successive generations to communicate easily. The motivation for Kripke's historical chain conjecture is that the proper name persists in time denoting just the name-bearer, whereas common names denote a class of entities each of which is distributed in time. Note, however, that the class or kind persists, and Kripke 1972: 328 does propose that kind terms are rigid designators.

This conclusion [that names are rigid designators] holds for various species names, whether they are count nouns such as 'cat', 'tiger', 'chunk of gold', or mass terms such as 'gold', 'water', 'iron pyrites'. It also applies to certain terms for natural phenomena, such as 'heat', 'light', 'sound', 'lightning', and, presumably, suitably elaborated, to corresponding adjectives – 'hot', 'loud', 'red'. (Kripke 1972: 327)

In the light of Kripke's observation, compare these two statements from Anna Wierzbicka which demonstrate the same idea.

The man called John = the man thinking of whom we say "John"
 a cat = an animal thinking of which one would say "cat" (Wierzbicka 1972: 22)

The *SOED* (Little 1944) entry for *cat* describes it as 'A carnivorous quadruped' and in the context of zoology 'A member of the genus *Felis* or *Panthera*'. Both senses are followed by lists of species, which is encyclopaedic information. *Gold* is also given a largely encyclopaedic entry in the *SOED*: 'The most precious metal; characterized by its yellow colour, non-liability to rust, high specific gravity, and great malleability and ductility. Chemical symbol Au.' Clearly these are guides to fixing the appropriate denotation – which is a good practical aim for

a dictionary. As we can see, the semantic specification of natural kind terms locates them in a natural taxonomy, but is otherwise similar to the semantic specification of a proper name. Defining the cat as a “carnivorous quadruped” merely describes what cats are, it does not give a semantic description of the word *cat*. Consider Hilary Putnam’s notion that cats may turn out to be alien automata that we humans (and our dogs) have been hoodwinked into believing are animals: in this circumstance (Putnam 1962), is *cat* truly a rigid designator? Kripke says ‘Cats are in fact animals!’ the alien automata would be automata ‘in a cat-like form’ (1972: 321). Though Putnam disagrees, Kripke seems to be right. The unnatural history of such cats is surely part of the encyclopaedia entry. Putnam and Kripke are discussing an outlandish possibility; there is in fact a good deal of renaming in the various branches of biology when research leads to life-forms being relocated in new tribes, or families, or superfamilies, and so forth; or else a new variety or subspecies is recognized. This is straightforwardly indicated in reference books:

Stribolanthes species (syn. *Goldfussia*) [‘syn.’ = “synonymous with”] ... *Tibouchina* species (formerly *Lasiandra*). (Moore 1980: 220, 221)

Australian chats Family Ephthianuridae [The molecular biology work of Sibley & Ahlquist indicates the chats *are* true honeyeaters and they include them in the prior Family Meliphagidae. We separate them in this classification for the present.] (Simpson and Day 2003: 347 [sic])

The encyclopaedia will record the changes, and the lexicon user will thereby have access to them; thus, the entry for *Lasiandra* should be cross-referenced with *Tibouchina* and, perhaps in future, *Ephthianuridae* with *Meliphagidae*. Because animacy is both semantically and syntactically relevant in the English language, it will need to be indicated in the lexicon; so, given the Putnam/Kripke scenario, if cats do turn out to be automata yet continue to display all the characteristics of animates (e.g. they are born, breathe, nurture themselves, die), then at least some automata will have to be grammatically classified along with animates!

As already noted, proper names may be changed over time, e.g. *Byzantion* ⇒ *Kōnstantinoupolis* ⇒ *Kostantiniyye* ⇒ *İstanbul*; *St Petersburg* (Санкт-Петербург) ⇒ *Petrograd* (Петроград) ⇒ *Leningrad* (Ленинград) and then, once again, *St Petersburg*.⁴ People change names for a variety of reasons. In some communities, women get a new name on being married. Transsexuals change their name as they change gender, e.g. *Malcolm McGregor* ⇒ *Catherine/Cate McGregor*, *Barbara Barres* ⇒ *Ben Barres*. Also noted earlier, some people use a different name in certain given contexts, hence stage names, pen names, noms de guerre, gamertags, usernames, handles, and codenames. None of this presents a

⁴ ⇒ can be glossed “became”.

problem: each of these alternative names is the rigid designator of an entity in certain contexts (where a context may be a given period of time; on contexts see Allan 2018; 2023).

5. Alternative names (again)

X-phemism is the union set of orthophemism, euphemism, and dysphemism (Allan and Burrige 2006). Although the context of use may modify such judgments, orthophemism (‘straight-talking’) is polite and so is euphemism (‘sweet-talking’). Typically, however, euphemism is more figurative and colloquial, orthophemism more literal and more formal. Dysphemism is typically impolite because it is offensive. Examples are offered in Table 2.

ORTHOPHEMISM	EUPHEMISM	DYSPHEMISM
African American	person of color	nigger
homosexual	gay	shirt lifter
vulva	pussy	cunt
faeces	poo	shit

As should be obvious, these sets of X-phemisms are not usually simply triples, for instance alternatives among the orthophemisms comparable to *vulva* are *pudendum muliebre*, *female pudendum* and *vagina* (not semantically but often referentially identical), and many additional euphemisms and dysphemisms to those in Table 2. The sets of X-phemisms are sets of alternative names and to that extent comparable with pairs of alternative names such as *William* \approx *Bill* or *Norma Jeane Mortenson* \approx *Marilyn Monroe* or *Ocypode ceratophthalmus* \approx *horned ghost crab* or *Element 79 (Au)* \approx *gold*.⁵ Typically, each one of these pairs of alternative names is appropriate in a different context, and the same is true for the sets of X-phemisms; in other words, each member of a set of alternative names has distinctive connotations but there is meaning overlap, by which I mean they could, *mutatis mutandis*, be used of the same referent. This relation is not marked in a lexicon, but in the encyclopaedia of which the lexicon is a component.

Terms of address like *Darling*, *Mum*, *Bitch*, *Nigger*, which can also be used as third person descriptives, are alternative names. The first two are typically orthophemistic, though *darling* can be used dysphemistically; the last two are typically dysphemistic, but can be used in the spirit of camaraderie (Allan 2015; 2016; 2020b; Jeshion 2020). Strictly speaking, pronouns and pro-verbs are also alternative names, but there is nothing of interest to say about them in the context of this essay.

⁵ \approx can be glossed “has the same reference as”.

6. Names for non-natural kinds

It is far from obvious why Kripke 1972 did not include the names for non-natural kinds as rigid designators – not that he explicitly excluded them. The process of naming a new human being, a new town, a newly discovered mineral, and a new invention seem to me to be broadly similar. The way that the names are transmitted through a historical link is exactly similar for all kinds of names. If there are philosophical problems with non-natural kinds (Schwartz 1980, Pulman 1983), the linguistic facts seem to force a comparison with natural kind terms. Rigid designators name denotata/referents, they do not classify them.

I said that *a Ford*, denoting a car marque, is not a proper name despite the fact that it derives from a proper name and looks like one. However, it denotes a non-natural kind and is a rigid designator. So too is *a Toyota*.

- (10) There are three Toyotas in my garage.
- (11) In my garage there are three cars of the same kind/make: they are Toyotas.
- (12) In my garage there are three cars with the same name: *Toyota*.

(10) means the same as (11), which is explicitly classificatory. The most probable interpretation of (12) is also (11). It could, however, mean that each car was baptized with the same proper name, *Toyota*, in which case it is feasible that one car could be a Ford, another a BMW, and a third a Hyundai (it has been known for someone to perversely name their cat *Dog*). Note that in these unlikely circumstances, (12) has a different meaning from (10)–(11).

Proper names don't work the same way:

- (13) There are three Susans in my class.
- (14) *In my class there are three girls of the same kind/make: they are Susans.
- (15) In my class there are three girls with the same name: *Susan*.

(13) means the same as (15) but not the would-be classificatory (14). In (11), there is a class of objects with certain common characteristics that identify them as Toyotas, and a subset of these characteristics is not shared with other cars. Although all Susans are most probably female, there are many females who are not Susans. There is no defining characteristic of all things called *Susan* that will systematically distinguish them from all things called *Anna* except that they bear different names. The form of the proper name marks the difference, and not its semantic or morphosyntactic specification. It follows that something can unproblematically bear both names without being a hybrid; furthermore, *Susan Anna* is a rigid designator distinct from *Anna Susan*.

Thus, within a community of speakers K a particular referent ρ or a class of denotata D is baptized with a name N , and afterwards is known within K as N . Many ρ s and D s are baptized with more than one N , each of which is a rigid designator; the form of N may also change over time, or if taken into another language. There are normally contextual constraints on which N is applicable in the world and time spoken of. Baptisms of the same natural kind are likely to be different among different language communities, which is why the class of things called *dog* is also called *chien*, *Hund*, *pies*, *ájá*, *kare*, *mbwa*, and many other names besides. The historical chain explains as well as anything does how the listeme N becomes conventionalized within a community. Some names are initially descriptive, but after the baptism they become rigid designators. The reference/denotation is fixed for a rigid designator by ostension (pointing out and naming), definition, or description which constitute part of the encyclopaedic information about the referent/denotation (ostension is included for an encyclopaedia that represents visual or auditory images – as our mental encyclopaedias surely do).

7. Proper names in the lexicon and encyclopaedia

[I]t may be conventional to name only girls “Martha”, but if I name my son “Martha” I may mislead, but I do not lie. (Searle 1958)

Many people share the same family name, more share the same given name, some share their entire proper name with others; the *Elizabeth Taylor* listed in the 1989 Tucson AZ phone directory was not the frequently husbanded British-born movie-star Elizabeth Rosemond Taylor 1932–2011. What do language users do about this state of affairs? Well, take *London, Ontario* versus *London, England*, or *Boulder, Utah* versus *Boulder, Colorado*. The strategy used in the proper identification of incomplete names is to add further information to the proper name, thus turning it into a more-complete-and-explicit name (‘Elizabeth Rosemond Taylor’) with perhaps some non-rigid descriptive material to fix the intended reference (‘1932–2011’). Paradoxically, although the incomplete proper name is a rigid designator, the more complete proper name – e.g. *Aristotle, the ancient Greek philosopher* – may not be. In practice, what saves proper names as rigid designators is that they are typically used in a context in which they can felicitously function as incomplete names (on defining context, see Allan 2018; 2023). If many proper names are shared by different name-bearers, there must be a stock of proper names. This stock must surely be located either wholly in the lexicon or partially in the lexicon and partially in the encyclopaedia.

The lexicon entry alone would be the tripartite network of formal, morphosyntactic, and semantic specifications. Thus, the sense of a proper name PN is given in (16) and exemplified in (17). Note the mediated link between formal specification PN_f and semantic specification

_s“bearer of the name fPN ” which are co-indexed via the morphosyntactic specification fN_s , where N = Noun.

(16) $PN_f — fN_s — s$ “bearer of the name fPN ”

(17) **Aristotle** /'æɪɪstɒtl/_{f500} — $f_{500}N_{s600} — s_{600}$ “bearer of the name $f_{500}Aristotle$ ”

The subscript numbers in (17), e.g. **Aristotle** /'æɪɪstɒtl/_{f500}, uniquely identify the relevant item and allow for cross-referencing.⁶ In a model they are assigned arbitrarily, I cannot say how their counterpart identifier is assigned in nature (in other words, what triggers the relevant synapse). (17) makes no reference to any particular individual such as the 4th century BCE philosopher from Stagira, or a shipping magnate who married the widow of an assassinated US president, or my friend Ari Papadopoulos, or any of thousands more bearers of the name. Furthermore, this formula looks extremely plausible because it yokes together the proper name with the name-bearer, and that is exactly what we want to do. The point of identifying senses of language expressions is to represent them in a lexicon and to display their semantic structure and the semantic relations they enter into. It is the semantic specification “bearer of the name ...” that identifies the noun as a proper name.

(17) is inadequate. For instance, we know that the statements in (18)–(19) are anomalous whereas those in (20)–(23) are not.

(18) *John washed herself.

(19) *Mary washed himself.

(20) John washed himself.

(21) Mary washed herself.

(22) Robin washed himself.

(23) Robin washed herself.

The gender of the pronoun is normally determined by attributes of the referent. The anomaly of (18) and (19) derives directly from semantic incompatibility of the proper name and its clause-mate reflexive pronoun, and indirectly from the fact that the typical denotatum of *John* is male and the name is therefore of masculine gender, whereas *Mary* typically denotes a female and is feminine. *Robin* may denote either a male or a female, and so is semantically compatible with a pronoun of either gender. There are quite general gender constraints on names. **Richard is lactating* is anomalous. *Mary's just had a baby* normally means she has given birth, whereas *John's just had a baby* means that his female partner has given birth. The most significant characteristic of a personal proper name is that it identifies the gender of the name-bearer. The

⁶ A somewhat similar device is found in Jackendoff 1975, though I don't subscribe to his theory.

forename name *Morton* does not identify the gender of the name bearer, consequently when she began publishing, Professor Morton Ann Gernsbacher took to using her gender differentiating middle name, *Ann*, to assert her social identity.⁷

Based on a comparison of sixty societies, Alford 1988: 66–8) finds that the sex of an individual is the most common item of information conveyed by first names. This is certainly the case for the United States, where names typically convey gender. Androgynous names are relatively uncommon even at present: In New York State not one of the leading 100 boys' names overlaps with the leading 100 girls' names. (Lieberson and Mikelson 1995: 933)

Thus, wherever possible, gender expectations need to be indicated in the lexicon entry, see (24)–(26).

(24) **John** /dʒɒn/_{f100} — _{f100}N_{s200} — _{s200}“bearer of the name _{f100}*John*, normally a male”

(25) **Mary** /'meəri/_{f110} — _{f110}N_{s210} — _{s210}“bearer of the name _{f110}*Mary*, normally a female”

(26) **Robin** /'rɒbɪn/_{f120} — _{f120}N_{s220} — _{s220}“bearer of the name _{f120}*Robin*, either male or female”

The gender of *Robin*'s referent on a particular occasion can be determined from further information about the bearer, which either emerges from the context or can be attached as part of a more complete name.

If given names are included in the lexicon there seems no good reason to exclude from the English lexicon such common family names as *Smith* and *Jones* with an entry such as “bearer of the name *Smith*, normally a family name”. To do this recognizes that some names typically occur as family names and are retained in memory as such. A question arises whether or not foreign family names like *Sanchez*, *Papadopoulos*, and *Pavarotti* have any entry in an English lexicon. Native speakers of English readily recognize some names as Scottish, or Welsh, or Cornish, or Jewish; and immigrants to an English-speaking country who wish to assimilate sometimes Anglicize their names: e.g. *Piekarski* becomes *Parkes*, *Klein* becomes *Clyne*, so it seems that even family names have lexical properties. Consequently, the name *Papadopoulos* should be tagged as originally a Greek name, *Pavarotti* Italian, *Shevardnadze* Georgian.

Although the family name offers a clue to the bearer's ancestry, it gives no guarantee of it being a contemporary fact. This reflects a general truth about proper names which distinguishes them from common names. The common name [a] *cat* necessarily names something animal, but the proper name *Martha* only most probably names a female. Unusual names like *If-Christ-Had-Not-Died-For-You-You-Had-Been-Damned* or *Yahoo Serious* would presumably have empty lexicon entries leading directly to encyclopaedic entries. A name such as *If-Christ-Had-*

⁷ Incidentally, she is known to her friends as 'Morti'. I am very grateful to Professor Gernsbacher for allowing me to write about this.

Not-Died-For-You-You-Had-Been-Damned, or *Boy-who-is-not-able-satisfactorily-to-explain-what-a-Hrung-is,-nor-why-it-should-collapse-on-Betelgeuse-Seven*, and a topographical name beginning *Mount* or *River*, is interpreted via the lexicon just like any other polyword listeme. Once the component meanings are assembled and an interpretation determined for the name, a matching encyclopaedia entry is sought and, if none already exists, a new entry is created. Where a hearer encounters a new proper name, a lexicon entry is established on the basis of its formal and syntactic characteristics, and any sense that is assigned to the lexicon entry derives from encyclopaedic information about the name-bearer.

A lexicon contains information about listemes, whereas an encyclopaedia contains information about what listemes denote and, potentially, are used to refer to (cf. Katz 1977b). The meanings of ‘content words’ – nouns, verbs, adjectives, adverbs – are influenced by the things that they denote and the circumstances in which the words are used. That is, semantic information in a large part of the lexicon is distilled from encyclopaedic information about the salient characteristics of typical denotata. I have already suggested that some lexicon entries for names contain no semantic information but function merely as access points to the encyclopaedia. The encyclopaedia is a general knowledge base of which lexical knowledge is a proper part – lexical information is just one kind of encyclopaedic information.

From a lexicological viewpoint, alternative spellings and pronunciations of names should be included. For example, the lexicon might contain something like the following entries. The position of the subscripts relative to what they index is of no consequence. In (27)–(29), ‘V’ symbolizes “or”.

- (27) f_{150} **Robin** V f_{151} **Robyn** /'rɒbɪn/ — $f_{150-151}N_{s250-251}$ — “bearer of the name f_{150} *Robin*, either male or female” $_{s250}$ V “bearer of the name f_{151} *Robyn*, normally female” $_{s251}$
- (28) f_{160} **Graeme** V f_{161} **Graham** /'greɪəm/ — $f_{160-161}N_{s260}$ — “bearer of the name f_{160} *Graeme* V f_{161} *Graham*, normally a male” $_{s260}$
- (29) f_{170} **Colin** /'kɒlɪn/ V f_{171} /'kɒlɪn/ — $f_{170-171}N_{s270}$ — “bearer of the name $f_{170-171}$ *Colin*, normally male” $_{s270}$

Rather than being a triple, the combined lexicon+encyclopaedia entry is quadripartite, where the encyclopaedia entry is indexed e_{000} ; f_{e000} is the form in the encyclopaedia, se_{000} is the semantic content in the encyclopaedia.

- (30) f_{500}, f_{e500} **Aristotle** /'æɪrɪstɒtl/
 $f_{500}N_{s600}$
 s_{600} “bearer of the name f_{500} *Aristotle*, normally a male” $_{se701-703}$
 f_{e500} Derived from Greek Αριστοτέλης

se701 — Ancient Greek philosopher, born in Stagira in C4 BCE. Author of *The Categories*, *On Interpretation*, *On Poetry* ... Pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great ... etc.

se702 — **Onassis**, C20 CE Greek shipping magnate ... etc.

se703 — **Papadopoulos**, friend whose phone number is 0439 111 ... etc.

A fragment of the corresponding network is presented in Figure 1.




Figure 1. Networked fragment of the combined lexicon-encyclopaedia entry for *Aristotle*

For simplicity's sake much cross referencing has been omitted from Figure 1. There is no encyclopaedic information on N included, none on Greece, philosophers, poetry, Stagira, Plato, etc. Further complexity would result from there being more than one encyclopaedia or if the encyclopaedia is divided into cross-referenced modules, as I believe should be the case.

Alternative names such as *Mike* and *Michael* should also be linked. This is a generally applicable rule of English, and different from a completely contingent circumstance asserted in *Daddy is the bearer of the name Fred*, which identifies alternative descriptions of a particular individual not a class of individuals. However, we need to accommodate the facts that there is a stylistic difference between *Mike* and *Michael* or *William* and *Bill*, and that some name-bearers accept only one of these names and reject the other. So I propose that the entries will look something like Figure 2. Conditions for using alternate names are, of course, far more complicated than Figure 2 suggests. For a fascinating and very thorough discussion of the different conditions for using alternate Russian personal names such as *Katerina*, *Katen'ka*, *Katjuša*, *Kat'ka*, *Katjuxa*, *Katja*, *Katënok*, and *Katënyš*, see Wierzbicka 1992.




Figure 2. The linking of alternative names *Bill* and *William*.

8. Concluding remarks

The aim of this essay was to elucidate the complexities of naming and to suggest ways in which names should be represented by the linguist. Although names are identifiers and in principle can be arbitrary, in fact there are semantic constraints on naming. These involve attributes of the typical denotatum and also connotation. Names are linked with contextual roles: the Austrian male born *Thomas Neuwirth* also has a female stage persona *Conchita Wurst*; *Robert Zimmerman* may name the same person as *Bob Dylan* but it was only the latter that is properly the creator of ‘Blowin’ in the Wind’. The hypocorism *Bob* is appropriate in some contexts, *Robert* in others; the same referent may in other circumstances be called *son*, *Dad*, *Grandad*, *friend*, *bud(dy)*, *man*, *bastard*, and many other things too.

Kripke 1972 demonstrated that a proper name is a rigid designator because in every possible world and time it has the same denotation/referent. His theory is in opposition to the checklist or cluster theory of proper names, which claims that the meaning of a proper name is given by at least one of a cluster of attributes of the name-bearer. The evidence for fixing the reference of the rigid designator is composed from exactly the kind of information that goes into the encyclopaedia entry. Referents are ‘baptized’ with rigid designators that are subsequently passed down through the community. Once a rigid designator exists in the language, there is presumed to be a historical chain stretching back through users of the name to the original baptism. This is a version of the belief that meaning and form are correlated by convention. Rigid designators name denotata/referents, they do not classify them. Rebaptism occurs, and names change over time and across languages. The same referent may have more than one rigid designator. A name may begin as a description, but once it becomes idiomatic it is a rigid designator.

Kripke argues that natural kind terms are rigid designators. They differ from proper names in that their semantic specifications locate them within a natural taxonomy. I extend the notion

of rigid designator to non-natural kind terms, too, because there are no linguistic grounds for not doing so.

In a currently unpublished paper entitled ‘Names without reference (towards a theory of pragememes)’ Alessandro Capone claims that vocative uses of names do not refer on the basis that: ‘names are used for calling people and they can appear in isolation; thus, they are not grammatical subjects ... reference makes sense only if an NP is inserted into a sentence/utterance that can be evaluated for truth or falsehood or in a non-assertive speech act where the NP constitutes an object of desire or a goal, etc. – in other words, it will constitute an argument of the verb.’ I have discussed reference at length in Allan 2013a wherein I wrote: ‘a speaker’s act of referring is the speaker’s use of a language expression in the course of talking about (referring to) its denotatum’ (p.264). With respect to vocatives, this adapts to talking TO its denotatum. Suppose Alessandro on the phone to Gianni sees Giovanni walking by and calls out (31):

(31) Giovanni!

Gianni on the phone says ‘Che cosa?’, to which Alessandro responds with (32):

(32) Sto chiamando Giovanni, non te. [I’m calling John, not you]

Capone describes (32) as a ‘re-description’ of what the speaker has done in (31) and, although he doesn’t explicitly say so, in (32) ‘Giovanni’ must refer on Capone’s definition and so must ‘te’. But if Alessandro wasn’t referring to Giovanni in (31), what was he doing? Well, calling or addressing Giovanni – and doing so by referring to him by name. As Capone says in his paper, “‘Calling’ can be considered a speech act with felicity conditions, and should be considered a pragememe, since various contextual clues determine its interpretation; in many cases, the act of calling is parallel to some other illocutionary act.’ This is entirely compatible with all I have claimed in this essay. Within the ‘calling’, the form of naming matters: using insulting vocatives like *Fatso!*, *Bitch!*, *Faggot!* only work as insults because the calling is effected by referring to the target by a dysphemism. Similarly, (31) works as an attention grabber by naming its target *Giovanni*. (31) will function as an attention grabber even if Alessandro mistook Marco for Giovanni – but that raises a topic for another essay.

In sum, I have demonstrated that there is semantic content to a name but there is also pragmatic (encyclopaedic) information that cannot be ignored, as demonstrated by *My boss is a little Hitler*. Therefore, names should be entered into both the lexicon and the encyclopaedia. I began by arguing that the lexicon forms a part of an encyclopaedia and established links between the two. I extended the discussion to all kinds of names, proper names, natural kind names, common names. And I have shown that lexicon entries supply one means of the access

to encyclopaedia entries and (hopefully) established how the lexicon is very closely correlated with the encyclopaedia. I discussed this relationship between lexicon and encyclopaedia, concluding that the lexicon is properly part of an encyclopaedia which stores information about the formal, morphosyntactic, and semantic specifications of listemes. Etymological and stylistic information, for instance, are encyclopaedic data that are not strictly a part of the lexicon even though they must be closely networked with it. Similarly, encyclopaedic data on the denotata of listemes must be closely networked with the lexicon entries. I also argued that to reflect reality, no language (at least none comparable with English) has one single unique all-encompassing lexicon/encyclopaedia, instead being a network of modules.

This discussion of names and naming has interesting consequences.

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