## Equilibrium and reinforcement learning in private-information games:
an experimental study

### Nick Feltovich

This paper examines the abilities of standard game-theoretic solution
concepts (static Nash equilibrium) and a simple model of individual learning to
describe subject behavior in an experiment involving private-information games
with mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium outcomes. The experimental data are
compared in several ways with the predictions of static Nash equilibrium and
the quite different predictions of the learning model, which is based on the
models of Roth and Erev (1995). Nash equilibrium does not adequately describe
subject behavior, whereas the learning model performs well in describing
aspects of the evolution in behavior over time.

Feltovich, Nick (1999), "Equilibrium and reinforcement learning in private-information
games: an experimental study," *Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control* 23 (9-10),
pp. 1605-1632. DOI:
10.1016/S0165-1889(98)00086-4.