Exemplifying the pragmatics of communication

(version 2)

Abstract

Pragmatics permeates every facet of human communication, shaping how meaning is constructed from the locution. The components of human communication, which structure the essay, are all pragmatic: sender S is motivated to communicate with recipient R in order to achieve some perlocutionary effect; accordingly, S makes assumptions about common ground (CG) with R and selects the medium for communication; composes the message in the form of φ, taking cognizance of cognitive and contextual factors that affect the readiness of R to receive the message by recognizing the illocutionary point of φ in order to realize S's intended perlocutionary effect. CG is a dynamic, inferentially rich resource enabling underspecification in the locution. Context comprises: C1 (the world spoken of), C2 (S's situation), and C3 (R's situation), shaping meaning through text, deixis, the structured knowledge systems of frames, scripts, and conventional norms. Felicity conditions are linked to presupposition and the inferential supports of implicature, explicature, and impliciture. It is enlightening to apply the theoretical components of communication in a comparison of two existing texts communicating the same event as proof of the concepts described.

Keywords

Common ground (CG), context (C1, C2, C3), inferencing, illocutionary point, perlocutionary effect, encyclopedic scripts

1. Communication

Communication is the act of conveying a message from one set of entities to another through the use of semiotic phenomena, namely, signs, symbols, kinesics, and various kinds of biosemiotic data among insects (Leonhardt, Menzel, Nehring et al. 2016), plants (Elhakeem, Markovic, Broberg et al. 2018; Heil and Karben 2010; Karban 2015), fungi (Cottier and Mühlschlegel 2012), and bacteria (Winnans and Bassier 2008). Communication among eukaryotes and prokaryotes is not random or accidental but motivated: consider bee-dancing or the exchange of pheromones among various species of insect. Trees exchange nutrients and information through mycorrhizal networks; they can also send chemical signals through the air to warn neighboring trees of threats, such as pests or disease. Going beyond communication among eukaryotes and prokaryotes, it is doubtful that natural events like wildfire and the onset of rain can truly be said to communicate even though they accidentally

motivate somewhat predictable responsive behaviors in eukaryotes and prokaryotes. Notwithstanding the immense scope of what counts as communication, this essay has the anthropocentric focus on the pragmatics of human linguistic communication. Though humans may communicate solely through visual signs or through touch alone, what this essay focuses on is communication as an act of languaging.[1]

The primary function of human language is to function as a vehicle of communication. Linguistic communication is a species of social interaction that is a kind of social behavior. An act of human communication comprises components, A-H.[2]

A. A motive for sender, S, (speaker, writer, signer) to communicate with recipient(s), R, (audience, hearer, reader, viewer) in order to achieve some (perlocutionary) effect.
B. S makes assumptions about common ground with R. (This is very rarely a conscious effort.)
C. Mindful of the context, S selects a medium for communication: speech or signing (face-to-face in person, person to person(s) via some electronic link – radio, phone, video, film), or written text (digital or otherwise).
D. Mindful of the context, S needs to compose the content and form of a message to be communicated in the form of φ. (The default communication is an utterance of φ or a coherent sequence of uttered φs.)
E. Mindful of the context, S transmits φ to R, taking account of possible interference from 'noise'. (The default transmission is utterance.)
F. Mindful of the context, S takes cognizance of cognitive and contextual factors that affect the readiness of R to receive the message in φ.
G. S intends that R interpret the message, recognizing the illocutionary point of φ in order to achieve the intended perlocutionary effect on R (Allan 2006).
H. The perlocutionary effect is that R acknowledges φ and responds appropriately, which often results in R becoming a reciprocal sender S.

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1 Levinson and Holler 2014 affirm that spoken language normally occurs within the interactional exchange of multi-modal signals, gesture and speech having evolved together. This is carried over in signing and sometimes indicated in writing.

2 This is a model of human behaviors and psychology. The relation of model to reality "is not analogous to that of soup to beef but rather of check number and overcoat" (Einstein 1973: 294). In other words: the model and the natural phenomena modelled are ontologically distinct entities (see Allan 2003; 2024; 2026).

All eight components A–H fall within the scope of pragmatics (Carnap 1959; Gazdar 1979; Levinson 1983; Allan and Jaszczolt 2012) and furnish the structure for this essay. Fully comprehensive coverage of the pragmatics of communication could only be achieved in a book length report, so this essay can offer merely an introductory sketch. Section 2 deals with motivation. Section 3 elaborates the significance of common ground. Section 4 expounds the components of context: C1 (the world spoken of), C2 (S's situation), and C3 (R's situation). Context and common ground shape meaning through text, deixis, the structured knowledge systems of semantic frames, encyclopedic scripts, and conventional norms of social behavior. Section 5 explains how S is motivated to communicate with R is in order to achieve some perlocutionary effect on R by having R recognize the illocutionary point of φ. Section 6 sketches the relevance of felicity conditions on the utterance. Section 7 applies the theoretical components of communication to two extant texts communicating the same events: (23) is a scene from the celebrated novel *The Big Sleep* by Raymond Chandler that is compared with (24), the matching passage from the eponymous 1946 movie. Section 8 concludes that there is robust evidence for the identified eight components of human communication, A–H.

2. S is motivated to communicate with R

Communication among eukaryotes is motivated; humans are eukaryotes therefore human communication is motivated behavior; indeed, all human behavior is motivated (Chen 2022: 25). The motive is the achieve some effect on R whether cognitive (rational or emotive[3]), or intended to provoke actional verbal or physical behavior.

3. S makes assumptions about common ground with R

Common ground (CG, Allan 2013; Clark, Schreuder and Butterick 1983; Stalnaker 2002) exists between members of community K who mutually know or believe some possibly singleton set of (purported) facts effable as Φ, the set of instances of φ.[4] A purported fact can

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[3] Cognitive behavior is sometimes described as merely rational (knowing, reasoning, judging) excluding emotive states; here the latter are subsumed.

[4] Philipp Wegener 1885 recognized the importance of what today is called 'common ground'. He recognized the context of situation, the situation of perception, the situation of remembrance or consciousness, and the situation of culture that allow for underspecification of meaning and thereby contribute to comprehension. He saw that understanding involves limiting and specifying expectations arising from CG: encyclopedic knowledge, the speech situation, and the co-text. Wegener identified a "logical subject", by which he meant the psychological subject in

be expressed as a proposition φ believed to be true by at least some members of K. When μ_K, a member μ of K, applies knowledge of (belief in the truth/existence of) what is effable as Φ in order to interpret φ, μ_K can presume that others in the community will also be able to apply such knowledge (Garfinkel 1964: 33). The existence of the facts effable as Φ, and the application of such knowledge to interpret φ, is what constitutes common ground for members of the community K. Once attended to, the message in φ increments the common ground.

S selects a medium of transmission on the basis of what seems most efficacious for communicating the message to R. S's medium of transmission is an effable fact that forms part of CG. S must make assumptions about R's capacity to understand φ well enough that S's expressed intention in the message is going to be, in S's opinion, more or less correctly interpreted (Allan 1986/2014, Clark, Schreuder and Butterick 1983, Colston 2008). Typically, S and R are members of same community and, broadly speaking, share knowledge of a common language and knowledge of a common culture. Assumed CG is based on an assessment of R's readiness (willingness and competence) to understand φ, and it motivates such things as management of politeness considerations, choice of language and language variety, style and level of presentation. Where S and R do not share knowledge of a common language and/or knowledge of a common cultural heritage they negotiate CG on the basis of common humanity (R like S is human, so R is presumed to share many perceptions, experiences, etc. with S).[5] Given the near constant exposure to language interchange during the waking hours of most human beings, under most circumstances, S and R automatically assume that for S to get a message across to R, S puts themself into R's shoes (Horton 2008: 202). CG allows meaning to be underspecified by S, so that language understanding is a constructive process in which a lot of inferencing[6] is expected from R. There is an

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much the same sense as Lev Vygotsky 1962 [1934] was later to do. Wegener 1885: 105 recognized iconicity and "schemata" (*ibid.* 120ff) similar to the frames of frame semantics or the dynamic scripts of Schank and Abelson 1977 which give rise to the kind of inferences described by Herb Clark 1977 and Ellen Prince 1981. Wegener directly influenced Hermann Paul, Bronislaw Malinowski, and John R. Firth.

5 Ss also address animals and inanimate or metaphysical objects such as icons, gods, and ghosts: in such circumstances R is anthropomorphized.

6 Inferencing, which may arise from spreading activation within an associative network, includes enrichment of implicitures and implicatures, disambiguation, and the like. This may be problematic for neurodivergent Ss and/or Rs.

assumption that the overlap in S's and R's assessments of mutual CG enables S to be satisfied that R understands φ well enough for S's communicative purpose to, in S's judgment, succeed (i.e. the perlocutionary effect of the message in φ will at least closely approximate what S intended). One complication is that S will often address more than one R and so is required to assess CG with an audience of any number of people.

CG includes pragmatic entailments: α pragmatically entails β, when β cannot – given α – be denied without creating a paradox, absurdity, or contradiction. Pragmatic entailment gives rise to Moore's paradox (Moore 1952: 543), namely the absurdity of (1) and (2).

(1) φ and I don't believe that φ.
(2) φ and I believe that not-φ.

Pragmatic entailment underlies the so-called 'presupposition failure' (Macagno 2023) in (3):

(3) In 1990, the King of France died.

The presupposition in (3) that fails is the violation of the preparatory condition on it that S purports to believe that there existed a King of France in 1990 (Austin 1962a; 1975; Section 6 below).

As conversation proceeds, the CG grows (Stalnaker 2002: 701): if, where X, Y, and Z are interlocutors, X says *φ* and Y says *χ* then, normally all of X, Y and Z (keeping score in terms of Lewis 1979) will know that X either subscribes to or purports to subscribe to φ and Y to χ, whether or not the other interlocutors also subscribe to φ and χ. It is, of course, possible that R does not know/believe φ, permitting miscommunication to arise. For instance, if X says *I've just been talking to Louise* and Y responds *Louise who?* then X is expected to explain who "Louise" is. Sometimes S assumes something is not in CG with R, when in fact it is; in which case, R will often correct S's false assumption (Horton and Gerrig 2005: 24).

We have established: (a) CG for any community K of two or more people is that (almost) every member of K, μ_K, believes some fact or set of facts effable as Φ. (b) Φ is purported to be true within K.[7] (c) A member μ_K is presumed to know or believe Φ by (almost) every other member of K. (d) μ_K knows/believes that (a), (b), and (c) are purported to be true. (e) S and R are both members of K.

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[7] This includes the possibility that φ is true (*Joe Biden won the 2020 election for POTUS* is true) and the possibility that ¬φ is true (*It is false that Donald Trump won the 2020 election for POTUS* is true)

The oddity of (5) in contrast to (4) is custom/situation-based deriving from utterance external CG.

(4) A. Have some more oysters.
B. Have some more lamb [with those potatoes].
(5) ?* Have some more lambs [with those potatoes].

The CG relevant to evaluating (4)–(5) is that, where one or more ingesta are normally eaten at a sitting, a countable NP is used when speaking English felicitously; where only a part is normally eaten at one sitting, the uncountable (bare) form is used except in generics like *Hindus don't eat cows, and Muslims don't eat pigs* (Allan 1980). From this follows the difference between *Have a coffee* [cup of coffee] and *Have some coffee* [from this pot]. A non-native speaker of English who uttered (5) might be offering more pieces of lamb rather than more whole lambs.

4. Context

Context is critically significant in communication components C, D, E, F: S needs to compose the content and form of a message to be communicated in the form of φ; S selects medium for communication; S transmits φ to R (taking account of possible interference); S takes cognizance of cognitive and contextual factors that affect the readiness of R to receive the message in φ. S utters φ to R in a context that comprises three components: C1, C2, and C3.

4.1. Context C1

C1, is the world (and time) spoken of/written of/signed by S. It is a mental model of an actual or recalled or imagined world (and time). C1 captures what is said about what at some world – a possible world accessible from C2, the context of S's situation. A model of the world (and time) spoken of is the content of a mental space (Fauconnier 1985) which can be readily associated in a variety of ways with other worlds (and times) occupying other mental spaces. C1 is constituted by the topic of discourse revealed by expression φ's co-text, namely, what has been said and what is said, including text that follows φ. This is effected (i) via the semantic frames and encyclopedic scripts evoked by the various constituents of φ (Allan 2026; Bartlett 1932; Fillmore 1982; Marslen-Wilson, Levy and Tyler 1982; Mazzone 2011; Minsky 1977; Prince 1981; Sanford and Garrod 1981; Schank 1984; Schank and Abelson 1977); and (ii) S's attitude to what is spoken of or the persons addressed as this is revealed by the locution. (i) and (ii)

contribute to identifying what S's purpose might be in making the utterance, which is the effective meaning of φ.

Beyond earliest childhood, very little we encounter is totally new in all its aspects; most of what we hear and read can be interpreted wholly or partially in relation to structured knowledge arranged into modules of information. S presupposes this common ground when constructing a text so that understanding (6) is to invoke the restaurant script (Schank and Abelson 1977; Schank 1982; 1984; 1986) as a set of inferences, some of which are defeasible (can be cancelled without contradiction).

(6) Sue went to a restaurant last night with her boyfriend.

From (6) we infer that, most probably:

(a) Sue intended to eat at the restaurant with her boyfriend.
(b) Sue entered the restaurant, probably with her boyfriend.
(c) Sue and her boyfriend sat down.
(d) They ordered food.
(e) The food was brought.
(f) They ate it.
(g) Either Sue or, more likely, her boyfriend paid the bill.
(h) Then they left the restaurant.

In (7) many of the inferences in the first clause (identical with (6)) are cancelled in the clauses that follow.

(7) Sue went to a restaurant last night with her boyfriend but, as soon as they'd got inside the door, they had a huge fight and left before even sitting down.

It is confirmed that they entered and exited but implicitly denied that they sat down, ordered, ate, and paid. There is a distinction between the restaurant script – consisting of a dynamic structure of event sequences – and a restaurant frame. Both are built from encyclopedic knowledge identifying the function of a restaurant and what kind of thing it is and what sorts of events take place there (Allan 2026)[8].

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[8] An encyclopedia functions as a structured data-base containing exhaustive information on many, potentially all, branches of knowledge. A lexicon is properly that part of an encyclopedia which stores information about the formal, morphosyntactic, and semantic specifications of listemes. To reflect reality, no language has one single unique all-encompassing encyclopedia, instead

As can be seen from the example above, scripts contain structured information about dynamic event sequences that typically give rise to certain implications. Regular components of a script are predictable such that deviations from a script are potentially newsworthy. Scripts have personae, props, and action sequences. A restaurant script has customers, servers, cooks, etc. The props include tables, chairs, menus, cutlery, plates, food. The events include the customer entering the restaurant, ordering food, the food being brought by the server, the eating of the food, the requesting, presentation, and paying of the bill, and the customer leaving the restaurant. The vocabulary used in the script evoked by going to a restaurant indicates its semantic associations, but it is unhelpful to simply list the terms as *bill, chairs, cook, customer, drink, eating, entering, exiting, food, menu, order, server, tipping*, etc. The script is much more valuable because it shows how the semantic associations are organized in respect of one another. Some are logically necessary: you cannot exit from a place before entering. Other parts of the encyclopedic script are simply conventional and can vary: in some establishments you pay before getting food; in some the cooking precedes the ordering. There is a very large number of scripts; many overlap and there must be networking among them. For instance, entering a restaurant has much in common with entering any other business premises and is distinct from entering a private home. There is a hierarchy: generally applicable script-like memory organizational packets have more specific scripts (like the restaurant script) and finer-grained scenes within them (e.g. ordering food). There is much research to be done, but it is certain that communication and language understanding make use of encyclopedic scripts, and that the vocabulary used in describing the scripts constitutes a semantic field of words whose interrelationships are defined in terms of the frames and event sequences in the script. Encyclopedic scripts supply contextual information that builds the common ground which is essential to the interpretation of language texts.

Allan 1980; 1981; 2011 (see also Copestake and Briscoe 1992) drew attention to the significance of identifying C1, the world spoken of, in making the different interpretations of the animal nouns in sentences (8)–(13).

(8) It’s because Nellie likes rabbits that she won’t eat rabbit.
(9) The girl holding the plate was wearing rabbit.
(10) The girl who wore mink was eating rabbit.

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being a network of modules because different individuals make different interpretations of the so-called facts (Allan 2024; Monmonier 1991).

(11) Because she decided she preferred the lamb, Hetty put back the pigskin coat.

(12) The butcher has some impala right now.

(13) The tannery has loads of impala right now.

(8) refers to live rabbits and then rabbit-meat, (9) to rabbit pelt, (10) to mink pelt and rabbit meat, (11) to lamb pelt, (12) to impala meat, and (13) to impala pelts. In (8)–(13) the different interpretations are derived from the semantics and pragmatics of the co-text.

As we saw in (6), underspecification is rife in everyday communication. H Paul Grice 1975: 43 distinguished 'what is said' – the truth-conditional aspects of meaning – from 'what is implied, suggested, meant' – the non-truth-conditional pragmatic overlay that is implicated. Grice writes of (14), "B implicates that Smith has, or may have, a girlfriend in New York" (*ibid.* 51).

(14) A: Smith doesn't seem to have a girlfriend these days.
B: He has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately.

The implicature is inferred from what B actually says given the cooperative assumption that it is a rational response to A's remark, i.e. that it is relevant to the co-text. Implicatures (more precisely, conversational implicatures) are defeasible inferences. The four Gricean (categories of) maxims that give rise to such implicatures were reduced to three in Stephen Levinson 1995; 2000, two in Laurence Horn 1984, and one in Sperber and Wilson 1995 [1986]; see Table 1.

Table 1. Sources for implicatures in Grice, Levinson, Horn, and Sperber and Wilson

GRICE	LEVINSON	HORN	S. AND W.
Quality: Be truthful.			
Relation: Don't be irrelevant without cause.		R: Make your contribution necessary; say no more than you must (given Q).	Be optimally relevant.
Quantity: Say no more and no less than is necessary to get the point across.	Q: What isn't said, isn't		
	I: What is expressed simply is stereotypically exemplified.	Q: Make your contribution sufficient; say as much as you can (given R).	
Manner: Don't be stylistically inept.	M: What's said in an abnormal way isn't normal.		

It has become a matter of controversy whether or not there is a clear distinction between 'what is said' and 'what is meant'. Horn 1972 identified sets of scalar implicatures (e.g. *three N +> exactly three N*; *some N +> not all N*; *warm +> not hot*)[9] which Grice 1978 accepted as Generalized Conversational Implicatures because they do not rely on a particular context, unlike the Particularized Implicature in (14). When Grice 1978: 117 wrote "[s]enses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity" (Modified Occam's Razor), he was describing the underspecification of semantics: additional meanings are supplied pragmatically. This became known as 'radical pragmatics' (Cole (ed.) 1981). The idea is that the negative in a sentence like (15) is not ambiguous and that truth value is determined for the utterance in context: (15) was true of Louis XIV in 1650 but today there is no appropriate referent (violation of the preparatory condition on it, see (3) above) and that fact accounts for the negative.

(15) The King of France is not bald.

In (16) we assume that the light came on as a result of Sue flicking the switch, whereas in (17) Sue's flicking the switch seems to follow the light coming on.

(16) Sue flicked the switch and the light came on.
(17) The light came on and Sue flicked the switch.

These are pragmatic inferences that can be cancelled and, certainly out of context, (16) and (17) have the same truth conditions, because $(p \wedge q) \leftrightarrow (q \wedge p)$. However, according to Robyn Carston 1988, though they have the same logical form, they have different truth conditions determined on the basis of pragmatic enrichment: (16) is true just in case Sue's flicking the switch did cause the light to come on.

Grice held that implicature steps in where literal meaning gives way to figurative meaning, so he distinguished *saying* from *making as if to say*. It is now generally believed that pragmatic inference kicks in *ab initio* and is needed to recognize literal as well as nonliteral language (Bach and Harnish 1979; Allan 1986; Sperber and Wilson 1995 [1986]; Jaszczolt 1999; Recanati 2004). The meaning of *open* is contextually distinct in *open a door, open a window, open mind, open a wound, have eyes opened*. The fact that *It's raining* is necessarily understood as referring to rain in some particular locality has led Relevance Theorists to name this an "explicature" on the basis that it enriches logical form by making it more explicit; Bach 1994 calls it an "impliciture" because it is an implicit expansion of the

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9 +> symbolizes 'conversationally implicates'.

semantic content. According to Carston 2002, (19) is an explicature of (18) and (20) an implicature (because it is functionally independent).

(18) I've already eaten. [Uttered at lunchtime.]
(19) I've already eaten lunch.
(20) I am no longer hungry.

Explicatures as first conceived were not defeasible. However, it does seem possible that *I've already eaten; I had a large mid-morning snack in place of lunch* is an alternative to (18); however, it is a moot point whether this is not simply an alternative to (19) that repairs but doesn't cancel it. What it does show is that the content of explicature is far less certain than the identity of the understood eater in the nonfinite clause of *I want to eat lunch.*

Aspects of C1 have been studied since Aristotle (c 384–322 BCE) wrote his *Poetics* and *Rhetoric* (Aristotle 1984). In *Rhetoric* Aristotle discusses ways in which to express a point of view persuasively and how to counter an opposing point of view effectively. In Book III, he identifies three things to consider when speaking: the means of persuasion, the kind of language to use, and the proper construction of sentences (*Rhet.* 1403^{b}5). *Rhetoric* lays a foundation for modern studies of metaphor, rhetoric, and discourse (e.g. the Rhetorical Structure Theory of Mann, Matthiessen and Thompson 1992; Mann and Thompson 1986; Matthiessen and Thompson 1988). Aristotle's *Rhetoric* also contains ideas which are quite similar to some of the four categories of conversational maxims identified in Grice 1975 (Allan 2004).

C1 typically aims to be coherent (Asher and Lascarides 2003; Gernsbacher and Givón 1995; Halliday and Hasan 1976; Hobbs 1979; Jurafsky and Martin 2026 Ch.24). Each proposition normally has a topic of focus and some sort of comment on it such that there is topic coherence and comment coherence within the text that constitutes C1 (Firbas 1992; Givón 1983; Prince 1981). In the world presented in the text of C1, normally one of the entities referred to is salient. Texts in which adjacent sentences maintain the same salient entity are more coherent than those which shift back and forth among several entities. This structuring is the focus of centering theory (Grosz 1977).

Once attended to, φ increments the common ground. In other words, φ pragmatically entails that S presupposes that R is prepared to add φ, without objection, to the context C1.

4.2. Context C2

C2, is, from S's point of view (deriving from S's Weltanschauung[10]), the situation in which φ is expressed. C2 captures who does the saying to whom, and where and when this takes place. C2 is the locus for S's choice for the medium of transmission. And, mindful of the context, S takes cognizance of cognitive and contextual factors that affect the readiness of R to receive the message in φ. Thus, C2 normally determines the social relationships and conventions that S is expected to follow and, in consequence, sets the standard for the psycho-social appropriateness of what is said. Thus C2 influences style (Semino and Short 2004) and politeness factors such as terms of address and reference to others (Brown and Gilman 1960; Brown and Levinson 1987; Ervin-Tripp 1972; Escandell-Vidal 1996; Fraser 1990; Geertz 1972; Lakoff 1973; Shibatani 2006); and they influence kinesic acts such as gesture, facial expression, and the positions and postures of interlocutors (Hall 1959; Argyle 1988; Clark 1996; Danesi 2006; Levinson and Holler 2014). If S is seeking to be polite to R, S will construct φ to be inoffensive to R at least, and, at best, pleasing to R. In other words, S tries to ensure that R does not lose face. Social interaction is generally oriented towards maintaining (saving) face. Those who are skilled at this are said to be perceptive and diplomatic, they have social *savoir faire*. In Anglo-communities, face is one**'**s 'public self-image': the way that one perceives one's self to be viewed in the eyes of others. In European communities until the mid-twentieth century, a person's public self-image was largely determined by their family's place in society. In some other communities, the notion of self is still today sublimated in a similar way to the public image of the family, clan, or religious community of which one is a member. Face has two aspects: the want of a person to have their attributes, achievements, ideas, possessions, and goals well regarded by others; and the want of a person not to be imposed upon by others (Brown and Levinson 1987, Watts, Ide and Ehlich 1992, Scollon and Scollon 1995, Lee-Wong 2000). There is a general presumption that S will be polite except when intending to affront R.

Together with C1, C2 is what governs whether such terms (in φ) as *bitch, cunt,* or *nigger* are, from S's point of view (POV), used as a slur or an expression of camaraderie and whether or not a particular form of words is polite or not. In other words, C2 includes what is known about S and the predictable perlocutionary effect of this and similar uses of φ and its constituents (Allan 2015; 2020b).

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[10] A person's *Weltanschauung* is their conception, philosophy, or view of the world which shapes that person's point of view (the perspective from which a subject or event is perceived).

C2 provides anchors for indexical categories (Peirce 1931, Vol.2, Ch.2) such as tense, personal pronouns, deictic locatives and demonstratives that occur in C1. Corresponding to the fact that in personal pronoun systems, S is first person, R is second person, all others are third person, many languages, including some English dialects, have corresponding locatives meaning roughly 'near S' (*here*), 'near R' (*there*), 'not-near either S or R' (*yonder*). C2 and C3 may determine choices of adverbials and directional verbs relative to the location of S and R; e.g. the choice among the verbs *come, go, bring, come up, come down, come over*, etc. C2 also plays a role in determining the topic and the linguistic register or jargon – that is, the variety of language associated with a particular occupational, institutional, or recreational group: for instance, legalese, medicalese, cricketese, linguisticalese, and so forth (Biber and Finegan (eds) 1989; Allan and Burridge 1991; 2006).

Bronislaw Malinowski 1923: 306, 309 saw language as, principally, a display of social interaction and a way of instigating events; he emphasizes the importance in establishing C2 of the cultural, geographic, social, and economic conditions under which φ is uttered. He had a positive attitude to the importance of gossip in social bonding (*ibid.* 314), an idea mooted by Robin Dunbar 1996 as a motivation for the creation of human language. Malinowski coined the term *phatic communion* for gossipy interchange which is neither the result of intellectual reflection nor intended to arouse such reflection in the listener but instead aims to foster the give and take of convivial gregariousness as an indispensable element of concerted human action (*ibid.* 315f). Malinowski's views were adopted by Roman Jakobson 1960, John Rupert Firth 1957, and Michael Halliday (Halliday 1978; Halliday and Matthiessen 2004).

4.3. Context C3

C3, is the situation of interpretation from R's point of view (deriving from R's Weltanschauung) in which R seeks to understand φ, viz. the meaning of φ in the context C1 + C2. In face-to-face interaction, C3 is closely similar to C2, but different in POV. So far as possible, S predicts CG with R in order to shape utterance φ for maximum comprehensibility. Where C3 is very different from C2, R may be well able to understand what S intended to mean, but φ can have reduced comprehensibility and its psycho-social appropriateness may be differently evaluated from the way S expected to be understood.[11] For instance, Henry Fielding's *The History of Tom Jones* has the following interchange between aunt Mrs Western and her niece Miss Sophia Western:

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[11] Nina Haket points out that one's interpretation can change in C3 when reflecting on a recalled remark or text encountered earlier.

> "How, Miss Western," said the aunt "have you the assurance to speak of him in this manner, to own your affection for such a villain, to my face!" "Sure, madam," said Sophia.
>
> (Fielding 1749 XVII.8)

Such formality, at least towards older generation family members, was common among English speakers until the early twentieth century, it seems ridiculously pedantic today and if practiced in the twenty-first century would be inappropriate. Here's an instance when μ_K R (me, the author of this essay) seeks to interpret φ, R can presume that others in the community (such as you, reader of this essay) will employ similar knowledge in order to interpret φ.

5. S intends that R recognize the illocutionary point of φ in order to achieve R's intended perlocutionary effect

The motive for S to communicate with R is in order to achieve some perlocutionary effect on R. For R to get the message, S intends that R recognize the illocutionary point of φ (Allan 2006; Bach and Harnish 1979). The perlocutionary effect is that R acknowledges φ and responds appropriately – which often results in R becoming a reciprocal sender S. In the quote above from Fielding's *Tom Jones*, the aunt's illocutionary point is to have Sophia recognize that her aunt is offended by Sophia's blatant admission of affection for Tom Jones (whom the aunt regards as a villain) such that the aunt intends the perlocutionary effect of reprimanding Sophia, whose response is resigned subservient acceptance.

Dieudonné Thiébault 1802: 206f recognized that such a communicative act required S, R, and a topic of discourse in C1. Moritz Lazarus wrote that for R to understand something is to associate the sound heard with the same thought s/he would associate with it as S (Lazarus 1884: 23) – R puts themselves in S's shoes. Thus, meaning is not decoded but constructed such that R_1's understanding will often differ from that of another person, R_2. This echoes George Berkeley 1734, but has a psychological instead of an ideological basis. Malinowski also recognized communicative acts:

> [I]n all communities, certain words are accepted as potentially creative of acts. You utter a vow or you forge a signature and you may find yourself bound for life to a monastery, a woman or a prison.
>
> (Malinowski 1935 2: 35)

John Langshaw Austin was reacting to this tradition (Hare 1971 Ch.6) in the 1955 William James Lectures at Harvard University, published posthumously as *How To Do Things With Words* in Austin 1962a (revised in Austin 1975). Austin referred to these communicative acts

as “speech acts”; his notions were further developed by many scholars including John Searle 1969, and Kent Bach and Robert M Harnish 1979. Austin insisted on a distinction between what he called “constatives”, which have truth values, and “performatives” which (according to him) do not (Austin 1962b; 1963). Austin’s claim that performatives do not have truth values has been challenged from the start (e.g. by L Jonathan Cohen 1964). On this view, the truth value of performatives is less communicatively significant than what Austin called their “illocutionary force”. In making an utterance, S performs an illocutionary act by using a particular locution with the illocutionary force of a statement, a confirmation, a denial, a reprimand, a prediction, a promise, a request, etc. Austin made a lexical classification of illocutionary verbs which was augmented by Zeno Vendler 1972 and in exhaustive detail by Ballmer and Brennenstuhl 1981. In reality a locution (φ) will often bear more than one illocutionary force. For instance, *I’ll see you at 10* is a statement, prediction, and potentially commissive; yet, using it, S will usually have only one message, to convey – depending on context, perhaps a promise or a threat. The illocutionary force that carries this message is what I have been calling the “illocutionary point” of the utterance. Austin observed that utterances without performative verbs also perform speech acts, e.g. (22) can be used to make a promise just like (21).

(21) I promise to put the cat out.
(22) I’ll put the cat out.

Austin would say that (21) and (22) have the same illocutionary force of promising, but that this illocution is the explicit function of the performative verb in (21) whereas it is left to be inferred in (22), an example of what became known as ‘indirect speech acts’. In the later lectures of Austin 1962a he identified two other components of a speech act: locution and perlocution. The locutionary act is saying something with a particular sense and reference – uttering φ; the perlocutionary act is the effect achieved on R by the illocutions in the utterance of φ.

Jacob Mey’s “pragmeme” is a speech act (pract) that modifies contexts (Allan 2020a; Capone and Graci 2024; Mey 2001; 2016). The idea is that the context in which a speech act occurs, C2, affords a set of possibilities to both S and R for what kinds of things can appropriately be said (in C1) in respect of C2. Thus, for example, the pragmeme of insulting maps the attack on the target (with offensively dishonoring or contemptuous speech or action and/or treating the target with scornful abuse or offensive disrespect) to the φ that seeks to achieve the perlocutionary effect of demeaning someone and/or of affronting or outraging

them by manifest arrogance, scorn, contempt, or insolence. To successfully perform a pragmatic act of reference requires astute assessment of C2 and CG and choice of the language expression (the pract) that will best point the hearer to the intended reference in those circumstances.

6. Felicity

Austin 1975: 14-15 argued for four kinds of felicity conditions on speech acts. (i) A preparatory condition to establish what ought to be presupposed in a felicitous use of the illocution.[12] (ii) An executive condition to determine whether or not the speech act has been appropriately carried out; (iii) A sincerity condition – which has a similar function to Grice's maxim of quality (Grice 1975), and Bach and Harnish 1979 rightly rename this the preparatory condition: assertions are sincere if S believes in the truth of φ; requests are sincere if S believes R has the capability and might be willing to carry out the act requested – and so forth. (iv) A fulfilment condition determined by the perlocutionary effect of the speech act (the one intended by S) such that R acknowledges φ and perhaps responds becoming a reciprocal sender S.

Austin requires that the procedure invoked by the illocutionary act "must be executed by all participants correctly and completely" (Austin 1975: 14). He exemplifies this "executive condition" with a misexecution in *I bet you the race won't be run today* said when more than one race was arranged for that day. But such misexecutions should be dealt with under generally applicable maxims of the cooperative principle. Today, the only executive condition which still seems warranted is one on declarations which either bring about or express decisions on states of affairs such as marriage, job appointment/termination, and umpiring – because these rely for their success on the speaker being sanctioned by the community to perform such acts under stipulated conditions.

7. Applying the theoretical components of communication

It is enlightening to apply the theoretical components of communication to two extant texts communicating the same events. (23) is from the celebrated novel *The Big Sleep* by Raymond Chandler 1939 and it is compared with (24), the matching passage from the eponymous 1946

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[12] A proper treatment of presupposition cannot be undertaken in this brief survey (see Beaver 1997; Gazdar 1979; Jaszczolt 2002 Ch.8; Karttunen 1973; Seuren 2006; Stalnaker 1974; Strawson 1950). My view is that so-called 'presuppositions' are conversational implicatures that (a) hold under negation and (b) relate specifically to the preconditions on the speech act (Allan 2001).

movie film with Humphrey Bogart and Lauren Bacall in the lead roles, directed by Howard Hawks (https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0038355).[13] The initial assumption that (23) and (24) have the same communicative function is borne out on examination. Interesting differences arise from the different modes of transmission: written text versus film. Erving Goffman 1981 distinguished "author" (composer of φ) from "animator" (utterer of φ) and "principal" (who has ultimate responsibility for φ). In (23) it is essentially Raymond Chandler who holds all three roles, though there is a conventional pretense that his characters, Marlowe and Vivian, are animators and even authors and principals of their respective dialogues. In (24), the film requires that actors Bogart and Bacall are the animators and that their personae, Marlowe and Vivian, are the authors and principals of what is said. It is the interaction of the animators in (24) that plausibly accounts for the changes to the dialogue from (23).

(23) I had a room and a half on the seventh floor at the back. The half-room was an office split in two to make reception rooms. Mine had my name on it and nothing else, and that only on the reception room. I always left this unlocked, in case I had a client, and the client cared to sit down and wait.

I had a client.

[Chapter 11]

She wore brownish speckled tweeds, a mannish shirt and tie, hand-carved walking shoes. Her stockings were just as sheer as the day before, but she wasn't showing as much of her legs. Her black hair was glossy under a brown Robin Hood hat that might have cost fifty dollars and looked as if you could have made it with one hand out of a desk blotter.

'Well, you *do* get up,' she said, wrinkling her nose at the faded red settee, the two odd semi-easy chairs, the net curtains that needed laundering and the boy's size library table with the venerable magazines on it to give the place a professional touch. 'I was beginning to think perhaps you worked in bed, like Marcel Proust.'

'Who's he?' I put a cigarette in my mouth and stared at her. She looked a little pale and strained, but she looked like a girl who could function under a strain.

'A French writer, a connoisseur in degenerates. You wouldn't know him.'

'Tut, tut,' I said. 'Come into my boudoir.'

She stood up and said 'We didn't get along very well yesterday. Perhaps I was rude.'

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[13] Chandler's novel is online at https://gutenberg.ca/ebooks/chandlerr-bigsleep/chandlerr-bigsleep-00-h.html. The film excerpt for (24) can be found at https://youtu.be/nhDl1B7yKNA.

‘We were both rude,’ I said. I unlocked the communicating door and held it for her. We went into the rest of my suite, which contained a rust-red carpet, not very young, five green filing cases, three of them full of California climate, an advertising calendar showing the Quints rolling around on a sky-blue floor, in pink dresses, with seal-brown hair and sharp black eyes as large as mammoth prunes. There were three near-walnut chairs, the usual desk with the usual blotter, pen set, ashtray and telephone, and the usual squeaky swivel chair behind it.

‘You don’t put on much of a front,’ she said, sitting down at the customer’s side of the desk.

I went over to the mail slot and picked up six envelopes, two letters and four pieces of advertising matter. I hung my hat on the telephone and sat down.

‘Neither do the Pinkertons,’ I said. ‘You can’t make much money at this trade, if you’re honest. If you have a front, you’re making money – or expect to.’

‘Oh – are you honest?’ she asked and opened her bag. She picked a cigarette out of a French enamel case, lit it with a pocket lighter, dropped case and lighter back into the bag and left the bag open.

(Chandler 1939: 102-103)

Howard Hawks film *The Big Sleep* was made in 1944, but not released until 1946. The dialogue in (24) occurs from 32 minutes 13 seconds until 32 minutes 55 seconds into the film. I have retained the actual film dialogue in (24), which differs from the official script (by William Faulkner, Leigh Brackett, and Jules Furthman – https://www.dailyscript.com/scripts/Big_Sleep.pdf).

(24) 65. INT. BUILDING - HALLWAY AT MARLOWE’S OFFICE DOOR

Marlowe opens the door, which has Philip Marlowe in gilt letters on the upper glass.

66. INT. MARLOWE’S OFFICE - THE WAITING ROOM

A small room, cheaply furnished, with a closed door in one wall. Vivian sits waiting for him, beautifully but simply dressed, quite at ease. She seems in a better humor this morning, smiling at the surprised Marlowe.

MARLOWE Good morning.

VIVIAN So you do get up. I was beginning to think perhaps you worked in bed like Marcel Proust.

MARLOWE Who’s he?

VIVIAN You wouldn’t know him. A French writer.

MARLOWE Come into my boudoir.

67. INT. MARLOWE'S OFFICE

Like the waiting room, it's shabby and not large. The usual desk, chairs, and filing cabinets.

VIVIAN You don't put on much of a front, do you?

MARLOWE There isn't much money in this business if you're honest.

VIVIAN Are you honest?

MARLOWE Are we gonna start that again?

VIVIAN I'm sorry. Also about yesterday. Perhaps I was rude.

MARLOWE We were both rude.

(https://youtu.be/nhDl1B7yKNA)

Author Raymond Chandler is $S_{RC,LA,1938}$[14] of (23) and I'll name the S of (24) $S_{HLWD,1944}$. For both (23) and (24), I am recipient $R_{KA,Oz,2026}$ and you reading this might be $R_{X,L,2027}$. The coherence in the English language used and the media of transmission – book in (23) and movie film in (24) – establish CG with R. The motive and overall communication in (23) and (24) is the same for both excerpts: a bantering interaction between Philip Marlowe and Vivian that constitutes the C1 – with overall perlocutionary intention of entertaining R (reader of (23), viewer of (24)) by engaging R in events and personae of the story. However, there are instructive subtle differences in achieving that overall perlocutionary effect. Part of the difference between (23) and (24) arises from the fact that the Vivian Rutledge of (24) is played by the 20-year-old Lauren Bacall. Thus in the film she is described (at 4:47 minutes into the film) as "married a couple of years ago to a man named Rutledge, but it didn't take".[15] In the book, Vivian Regan had "been married three times, the last time to an ex-bootlegger who went in the trade by the name of Rusty Regan" (Ch.2) – whom Marlowe later discovers had been shot dead by Vivian's sister Carmen. So, in (23) Vivian has to have been at least as old as Marlowe, who says "I'm thirty-three years old" (Ch.2), and probably older. In (24) Marlowe says "I'm 38" (4 minutes 18 seconds) – actor Humphrey Bogart was at the time 44. So there is a much greater age disparity between Marlowe and Vivian in the film than in the book, and this vindicates some of the textual differences.

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[14] In a letter to Leroy Wright dated July 6, 1951 Chandler wrote "*The Big Sleep* was written in the spring of 1938" (MacShane 1981: 281). At the time he was living in Los Angeles.

[15] It is said the filmmakers didn't want Vivian to be so closely associated with Regan (Shawn Regan in the film), hence the surname change.

Relevant to this discussion is the character of Vivian. Marlowe is a sardonic, hard-boiled, tough guy with great moral integrity, Vivian is equally sardonic and strong-minded, as well as sharp and protective towards her morally weak, self-destructive, younger sister. These framing character traits evoke pragmatic scripts that plausibly account for the combative verbal interchanges between Vivian and Marlowe – the Ss and Rs within the text.

The raconteur is Marlowe, financially challenged Los Angeles private detective, $S_{PM,LA,1936}$. The "1936" in the subscript is a presumption that the action described predates the publication date of 1939, but not by much. It can be justified by a quote from (23): "an advertising calendar showing the Quints rolling around on a sky-blue floor, in pink dresses, with seal-brown hair and sharp black eyes as large as mammoth prunes." This presumably refers to the 1936 calendar of the Dionne quintuplets in Figure 1 (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dionne_quintuplets). Such a precise temporal anchor is, however unnecessary; it is absent from the film. Rs will satisfactorily locate the action around the mid twentieth century on textual clues for (23) and visual clues in (24).

Figure 1. 1936 Calendar featuring the Dionne quintuplets[16]

$S_{RC,LA,1938}$ develops CG with Rs (such as $R_{KA,Oz2026}$) along the following lines (based on conventional semantic frames and pragmatic scripts): a private detective is expected to have some kind of office; Marlowe's business is not flourishing and this is consistent with his workplace being nondescript, even shabby: "net curtains that needed laundering and the boy's size library table with the venerable magazines on it to give the place a professional touch […] five green filing cases, three of them full of California climate". The final sentence

16 An internet search will uncover several similar calendars issued by various companies.

of the first paragraph “I always left this [door] unlocked, in case I had a client, and the client cared to sit down and wait” hints that clients did not always care to sit down and wait.

The woman is Mrs Vivian Regan/Rutledge née Sternwood, daughter of a millionaire. They had previously met in the mansion of her father for whom Marlowe is working and they had been mildly rude to each other; this is remembered as CG in the two final paragraphs of (23) and the final two interchanges of (24). The description of Vivian in (23) is of a smart, well-dressed woman. In (24), stage direction 66 reads “*Vivian sits waiting for him, beautifully but simply dressed, quite at ease.*” She is attractive and handsome but not sexy as in a romance. In (23) there is no reference to her face or bosom, as one might find in a Mills and Boon novel, consequently, the casting of Lauren Bacall to play Vivian in the film, (24), was perfect; Marilyn Monroe would have been entirely inappropriate (though MM could have been appropriately cast as Vivian’s sister Carmen).[17] Such comments about the film of the novel are only tangentially relevant to the C3 interpretation of (23) but relevant because they contribute to interpreting Vivian’s nature and character. In C3, R may legitimately increment what S presents as part of the CG beyond what is explicitly shared with S.

In (23), the description of Vivian’s hat ($50 in 1938 ≈ $1100 today) shows that Chandler was implying Marlowe thought it hugely overpriced and perhaps ugly. In (24), Vivian does not wear a hat. Her reaction to Marlowe’s shabby office “wrinkling her nose at the faded red settee, the two odd semi-easy chairs, the net curtains that needed laundering”, is telling and consistent with her critical “You don’t put up much of a front” in both (23) and (24). Vivian is wealthy and elegant; although slightly troubled, she was earlier described as “strong-looking” and is here designated “a girl who could function under a strain”. The banter with Marlowe helps to establish Vivian’s character.

The shabbiness of Marlowe’s rooms is carefully described at some length in (23) so that Rs can picture it in their imagination (impecunious office script). The scene descriptions in (24)66,67 are comparatively brief as instructions to a set designer (who probably had recourse to the book too). Viewers of the film see for themselves the shabby furnishings in the nondescript rooms.

Let’s now turn to the verbal interactions between Marlowe and Vivian. There is an interesting discrepancy between (23) and (24) in the onset to their interaction in Marlowe’s

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[17] Compare the respective characters played by Bacall and Monroe in the 1953 film ‘How to Marry a Millionaire’ (https://www.imdb.com/title/tt0045891).

waiting room. In (23) Vivian immediately initiates the banter pragmeme by chiding Marlowe for keeping her waiting by arriving late to the office:

$S_{VR,LA,1936,1}$ "Well, you *do* get up [… .] I was beginning to think perhaps you worked in bed, like Marcel Proust."

In (24), before she says this, Marlowe is seen walking to his office, opening the door to reveal Vivian seated on a bench reading a magazine. He politely greets her (greeting pragmeme from the greeting script):

$S_{PM,LA,1944,1}$ "Good morning."
$S_{VR,LA,1944,1}$ "So you do get up. I was beginning to think perhaps you worked in bed like Marcel Proust."

Marlowe's greeting is not in the published film script and so counts as an ad-lib (animator as author). Whereas the book version in (23) is more dramatic, the film version in (24) is more realistic for the encyclopedic script for when a business owner encounters a client. Furthermore, as already mentioned, Bogart was at the time 44 and Bacall was 20, so it would be conventionally accepted as polite for him to greet her to initiate interaction (today, as well as in 1944). So, the CG in the film has to be sensitive to the actors playing the characters in the interaction. In both (23) and (24) Vivian's jibe and a display of culture pragmatically entails that $R_{PM,LA,1936/1944,1}$ recognizes that $S_{VR,LA,1936/1944,1}$ assumes he should recognize the import of the reference to "Marcel Proust". It has the perlocutionary effect of provoking Marlowe to claim in both (23) and (24) that he is at a loss as R becomes S:

$R/S_{PM,LA,1936/1944,2}$: "Who's he?"

This pragmatically entails that $S_{PM,LA,1936/1944,1}$ does not know who "Marcel Proust" is – an apparent lack of CG between them – and asks $R_{VR,LA,1936/1944,1}$ to identify him (on the assumption that she can do so). In (23) this is followed by:

$R/S_{VR,LA,1936,2}$ "A French writer, a connoisseur in degenerates."
$S_{VR,LA,1936,3}$ "You wouldn't know him."
$R/S_{PM,LA,1936,3}$ "Tut, tut."
$S_{PM,LA,1936,4}$ "Come into my boudoir."

$R/S_{VR,LA,1936,2}$ is a slightly dismissive identification that informs $R_{PM,LA,1936,2}$ who Proust is (according to Vivian) and Marlowe will assume that she is speaking truthfully. The put-down of Marlowe in $S_{VR,LA,1936,3}$ "You wouldn't know him" is interesting, has the force of *I should have known you wouldn't know who Proust was*: had Vivian earlier supposed that Marlowe

would not know of Proust, why did she bother to name him? Perhaps because of Proust's reputation for working from his bed (encyclopedic knowledge of Proust). Another possibility is that author Raymond Chandler is deliberately displaying the social disparity between Vivian and Marlowe. Marlowe's "Tut, tut" response ($R/S_{PM,LA,1936,3}$) has the perlocutionary effect that Vivian is informed of Marlowe's (pract of) self-deprecating acceptance of her put-down.

The interchange in (24) is slightly different from that in (23).

$R/S_{VR,LA,1944,2}$ "You wouldn't know him."
$S_{VR,LA,1944,3}$ "A French writer."
$S_{PM,LA,1944,3}$ "Come into my boudoir."

Here Vivian's response to Marlowe's $S_{PM,LA,1944,2}$: "Who's he?" focuses on the bantering insult ($R/S_{VR,LA,1944,2}$) followed by the minimal identification of Proust. And there is no self-deprecating response to this like that in (23); instead, it is ignored as Vivian is invited into the inner office.

Marlowe's flippant "Come into my boudoir" in both texts ($S_{PM,LA,1936,4}$, $S_{PM,LA,1944,3}$) in place of *Come into my office* is primed by the mention of "French" and perhaps, in (23), the noun "degenerates", which are part of the CG with Vivian. In the 1930s and 1940s it was ironically flirtatious – Marlowe would not have said it to friendly cop Bernie Ohls. In C3 today it might be interpreted as sexual harassment, but not in the period at which (23) and (24) were created and set. Marlow is understood by Vivian, who accedes without comment in (24), but in (23):

$S_{VR,LA,1936,4}$ "We didn't get along very well yesterday. Perhaps I was rude."
$R/S_{PM,LA,1936,5}$ "We were both rude."

This interchange demonstrates remembered CG. Because Vivian brings it up voluntarily, $S_{VR,LA,1936,4}$ implicitly apologizes for her part in it (an indirect apology pragmeme evoked by the apology script). In $R/S_{PM,LA,1936,5}$ Marlowe offers a rapprochement by also implicitly admitting fault, the matching self-criticism being positive face-work. The similar interchange for (24) comes later in the action, after some additional dialogue (discussed below).

The scene in the inner office begins after Vivian has cast her eyes about. Essentially the perlocutionary effect is the same in both (23) and (24), it comments on the lack of prosperity indicated by the shabbiness of the office. But in (24) the interchange serves as an introduction to the mutual apology for rudeness which has preceded it in (23).

$S_{VR,LA,1936,5}$ "You don't put on much of a front."

$R/S_{PM,LA,1936,6}$ “Neither do the Pinkertons. You can’t make much money at this trade, if you’re honest. If you have a front, you’re making money – or expect to.”

$R/S_{VR,LA,1936,5}$ “Oh – are you honest?”

The explanation for the shabby office ($R/S_{PM,LA,1936,6}$) is more elaborate in the book; in the film there is no reference to Pinkertons (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pinkerton_(detective_agency)). The added tag question in the film, $S_{VR,LA,1944,4}$, is a little more chatty than the book text because of the actual (physical) face-to-face interaction between the animators of the film encounter as against the imagined (metaphysical) interaction of the book text. (24):

$S_{VR,LA,1944,4}$ “You don’t put on much of a front, do you?”

$R/S_{PM,LA,1944,4}$ “There isn’t much money in this business if you’re honest.”

$R/S_{VR,LA,1944,5}$ “Are you honest?”

$R/S_{PM,LA,1944,5}$ “Are we gonna start that again?”

$R/S_{VR,LA,1944,6}$ “I’m sorry. Also about yesterday. Perhaps I was rude.”

$R/S_{PM,LA,1944,6}$ “We were both rude.”

In both media Marlowe asserts his integrity ($S_{PM,LA,1936,6}$, $R/S_{PM,LA,1944,4}$) leading Vivian to banteringly question him ($R/S_{VR,LA,1936,5}$, $R/S_{VR,LA,1944,5}$) which in the film provokes a reprimand from Marlowe “Are we gonna start that again?” an implicit plea to stop squabbling. The perlocutionary effect provokes an immediate apology from Vivian, $R/S_{VR,LA,1944,6}$, which she extends from the present occasion to their clash the previous day when she admits to having perhaps been rude. In turn, Marlowe apologizes ($R/S_{PM,LA,1944,6}$). Mutal apologies follow the encyclopedic script for conventional polite resolutions to disagreements and a face-work attempt to establish camaraderie.

The comparison of (23) with (24) demonstrates the significance of the eight components of communication listed in Section 1 and elaborated in Sections 2–6. We identified motives on the part of author Chandler and the filmmakers as well as those of the story personae, Marlowe and Vivian. There is the significance of common ground among Ss and Rs, the evidence of semantic frames, encyclopedic scripts, and employment of pragmemes that incorporate cultural norms and expectations, and the importance of the various components of context to establishing atmosphere and interpersonal understanding. We also saw that the different media of communication (book versus film) affect the way in which relationships are established and information conveyed. Throughout, it was obvious that S takes cognizance of cognitive and contextual factors that affect the readiness of R to receive the message in φ – on the part of book author and film-maker and also between the story

personae, Marlowe and Vivian. We saw the successful achievement of intended perlocutionary effects on R and, within the story world, R becoming a reciprocal sender S.

8. Conclusion

We have robust evidence for the fact that human communication comprises components, A-H as identified in Section 1.

A. A motive for sender, S, (speaker, writer, signer) to communicate with recipient(s), R, (audience, hearer, reader, viewer) in order to achieve some perlocutionary effect.
B. S makes assumptions about common ground with R.
C. Mindful of the context, S selects a medium for communication: speech, signing, or written text.
D. Mindful of the context, S needs to compose the content and form of a message to be communicated in the form of φ. (The default communication is an utterance of φ or a coherent sequence of uttered φs.)
E. Mindful of the context, S transmits φ to R, taking account of possible interference from 'noise'. (The default transmission is utterance.)
F. Mindful of the context, S takes cognizance of cognitive and contextual factors that affect the readiness of R to receive the message in φ.
G. S intends that R interpret the message, recognizing the illocutionary point of φ in order to achieve the intended perlocutionary effect on R.
H. The perlocutionary effect is that R acknowledges φ and responds appropriately, which often results in R becoming a reciprocal sender S.

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