A history of semantics
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Naming

[M]an “makes” his territory by naming the “things” in it.  (Chatwin 1988: 301)

Human beings name things in their environment. The name helps to distinguish and identify the denotatum (thing named) and is essential to communication with fellow humans about such denotata. In Plato’s Cratylus (Plato 1997) c. 385 BCE, Socrates advances the hypothesis that the earliest name-giver (onomatourgos) selected a name that captures the essence of its denotatum, that is in some way iconic as with onomatopoeic bird names like cuckoo or whippoorwill. On this hypothesis the meaning of a word would be ‘natural’ because directly recognizable from the form of the word. Many of the Ancients sought to demonstrate that names are far more descriptive than the facts allow. For example Socrates in Cratylus 406c derives the name Dionusos (god of Bacchanalia) from didous ton oinon ‘giving wine’. In De lingua latina V: 101 (c. 45 BCE) Varro suggests that because the fox is fleet-footed, volpes ‘fox’ is a blend of volare ‘fly’ and pes ‘foot’ (Varro 1938). Isidore of Seville suggested c. 625 CE that oratio ‘utterance’ derives from oris ratio ‘the mouth’s reason’. None of these is correct and many such ‘etymologies’ are utterly absurd (see Allan 2010). Indeed, the implausibility of such accounts was recognized by Socrates in Cratylus (426b-427b, 434e-435c), but a clear statement that names are symbols which denote by convention is first found some 25 years after Cratylus in Aristotle’s On Interpretation 16a3, 16a20 (Aristotle 1984).

It is generally accepted today that language expressions have meaning by convention, but this invites the question: How does the convention get established? The most acceptable explanation is the Kripke 1972 notion of ‘baptism’, i.e. the initiation of a name using practice. Kripke limited this notion to proper names (like Aristotle and Athens) and natural kind terms (like gold, heat and tiger) but there is no compelling reason against extending it to names for artefacts and everything else. Once a name exists in the language, Kripke 1972: 302 presumed there to be a ‘historical chain’ stretching back through users of the name to the original baptism. The motivation for Kripke’s historical chain conjecture is that the proper name persists across time denoting just the name-bearer, whereas common names denote a class of entities each of which is distributed in time. Note, however, that the class or kind persists; and the forms of proper names can be shared by different entities (e.g. there has been more than one woman named Elizabeth Taylor and there is more than one city named London). We can assume that Kripke’s ‘historical chain’ is simply a variation on a long established view that a history of conventional usage characterizes the vocabulary in the language and allows successive generations to communicate easily.

Before we leave the matter of proper names, Peter Abelard (1079-1142), Walter Burley (c. 1275-1345), John Stuart Mill (1806-1873), and a handful of today’s philosophers believe that proper names and indexicals make ‘direct reference’, that is, that they have no semantic

1. Denotation is the relation between language expressions and things or events in worlds – not just the world we live in, but any world and time that may be spoken of. In this essay I assume reference to be a speaker’s use of a language expression in the course of talking about (referring to) its denotatum (Allan 2013, Strawson 1950).

2. Indexicals (deictics) are determined by the situation of utterance.
content but directly pick out the referent; common names refer distributively to individuals, while collectives (herd, pair) and quantified nominals (three ducks) pick out distributively a contingently determined set of individuals. This ignores the fact that in every language most personal proper names identify characteristics of the referent: *Elizabeth* is appropriate to females and not males and is of European origin, *Měi* is appropriate to females only and is of Chinese origin, *Kofi* is of Akan origin and it is appropriate to males not females. So in fact, most proper names do have a minimal semantics that identifies some basic characteristics of the typical name bearer. However, Frege 1892 was wrong to attribute encyclopaedic information about a particular name bearer (such that Aristotle was the tutor of Alexander) as the semantics of the name. There is still controversy about the status of proper names in linguistic semantics, but the notion that names make direct reference and have no semantic content extinguishes the semantic difference between *Cicero is Cicero* and *Cicero is Tully* which have the same truth value and make identical reference.

**Realism vs nominalism**

Around 200 CE Alexander of Aphrodisias adopted Aristotle’s suggestion (*On Interpretation* 16a3) that the relation of words to their denotata is mediated through the mind, a view championed by Boethius (c. 480–524) a major influence on the medieval Latin tradition in philosophy. Another contention of Alexander is that universals (all dogs, all coal) do not exist in reality but only in the mind. Some thoughts derive from real entities, but universals don’t, they are mental abstractions; here’s a controversy that echoes through the middle ages into the modern era. Boethius added a twist of his own by claiming that the mental abstractions derive from reality by application of intelligence, reason, imagination, or the senses (Boethius 1860).

Peter Abelard (1079–1142) promulgated the doctrine that universals are mere words (nomina), i.e. he is a nominalist (see King 2004). He rejected Boethius’ criterion for universals on the basis that it could only derive from an aggregation of individuals, yet there could be no prior criterion for such aggregation. According to Abelard, natural kinds are ordained by God and could have been otherwise: frogs could have had reason, men could have been amphibians. He concludes that universality is not a feature of real world objects, it is merely linguistic: humans speak of similarities that they perceive distributed among individuals referred to using the same language expression (a common noun or verb). Sentences (propositiones) refer to the world and not to someone’s understanding of the world, thus *If something is human it is animal* is a truth about the world such that an individual can understand the concept human without (previously) entertaining the concept that the human is animal. Language is not a medium for the transmission of ideas from one human to another, but conveys information about the world – a position taken up later by Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) and Noam Chomsky (b. 1928). Abelard recognized that true entailments necessarily follow from premises. *If Socrates is a human being then Socrates is an animal* is necessarily true since ‘whatever the species is predicated of, so too is the genus’ (Rijk 1970: 323).

William of Ockham (c. 1285–1349) identified two kinds of significatio: ‘primary’ which allows for correct reference, and ‘secondary’ which applies to predicates that (supposedly) denote their nominal counterparts, for instance, *brave* denotes bravery. There was also suppositio “supposition”, which identifies what kinds of reference are made by the speaker using the nominals within a proposition and consequently figures in the statement of truth conditions. For Ockham, as for Abelard, mental language is primary, spoken language secondary, written language tertiary. The truth of a proposition and true synonymy are
defined only for mental language (see Spade 2002). On universals Ockham was a nominalist who began with ideas similar to Abelard, but came to believe that universals simply predicate something of many individuals; thus he recast the universal *all men are animal* in terms of a particular: *if something is a man, it is animal* (a move echoed in Discourse Representation Theory, Kamp 1981). The medieval view was that *intellectus est universalium, sensus autem particularium* ‘understanding is of universals, but sense-data derive from particulars’ (Spade 2002: 162). For Abelard and Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), knowledge was the effect of sense-data (*species*) transmitted from entity to mind, but Ockham rejected this on the ground that universals would necessarily have to exist in the entities, which is impossible because everything but God is contingent.

Walter Burley/Burleigh (c. 1275–1345) was a realist critical of Ockham’s nominalism. For Burley semantic distinctions derive from ontological differences between the entities denoted. Individuals are the *significata* of singular names and universals are the *significata* of general names. *Man* applies as a general term to all men because it denotes the universal *humanity* that is present in and essential to each man in the real world. *Humanity* has no extension distinct from that of *man*.³ After 1324, Burley no longer claimed that universals are constitutive parts of the individuals of which they are predicated, though they do reveal the substantial nature of the particular. Each particular is a token for a universal such that the extension of a general name is a set of such particulars. Propositions are the creation of cognitive acts; they relate to the real world by combining the things to which their constituents refer. The truth of *man is animal* is a fact about the real world because the denotata of *man* and *animal* exist in the real world. In *De puritate artis logicae* 1324–8 Burley discusses the difference between *Twice you ate a loaf of bread* in which ‘loaf of bread’ refers to two loaves fused for this mode of expression and the fallacious *A loaf of bread you ate twice*, which refers to a particular loaf that cannot be eaten twice (Burley 2000 §93). Today, the first of these would be dealt with in event-based semantics. Burley was the inventor of ‘donkey sentences’ (Geach 1968; Kamp 1981; Groenendijk and Stokhof 1991). He notes that in *Omnis homo habens asinum videt illum* ‘every man who has a donkey sees it’ the antecedent of *illum* ‘it’ is in the subordinate clause *habens asinum* and not the *propositio categorica* (Burley 2000 §130–32; Seuren 2006). As Burley points out, a man who owns two donkeys might see only one of them, thus allowing for the truth of ‘some man who has a donkey doesn’t see it’ leading to the contradictory consequence ‘therefore some man who has a donkey is not a man who has a donkey’. Quite clearly something is amiss, because there is nothing wrong with *every man who has a donkey sees it*. I return to the modern treatment of the semantics of donkey sentences later.

John Locke (1632–1704) in his *Essay Concerning Humane Understanding* reiterated the notion that language is conventional, disclaiming any inherent or necessary link between a word and its denotatum (Locke 1700: III.ii.1). ‘Ideas’ provide the mind with representations of objective qualities of objects (such as size, shape, or weight) and also secondary qualities such as colour, taste, or smell which are subjective (ibid. Book II). To understand thinking and knowing one must understand language as the means of thought and communication (Book III). Locke claimed that words only mean what they are understood to mean; consequently, usage must be the sole arbiter of meaning (III.ii.2). Linguistic forms represent the ideas of things and not the things themselves (III.ii.5). Sometimes words are used even

³ The extension of a language expression designates something that exists in a particular world, usually the world being spoken of. The term was first used by Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole in 1662 (Arnauld and Nicole 1996: 40). It pairs with what they called ‘comprehension’ but was later dubbed *intension* by Sir William Hamilton 1876: 101 for the characteristic property or set of properties of a typical denotatum.
when there are no ideas corresponding to them as with generic terms and universals – which Locke suggests are creations of the mind, through abstraction; they denote ‘nominal essences’. Like Alexander of Aphrodisias, Abelard, Ockham, and Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) before him, Locke was a nominalist: ‘universality belongs not to things themselves, which are all of them particular in their Existence’ but ‘are the Inventions and Creatures of Understanding [...] a general term is a sign of an abstract Idea in the mind’ (Locke 1700: III.iii.11f). Locke’s views on universals (and many other things) were challenged in Leibniz’s Nouveaux Essais sur l’entendement humain (Leibniz 1781 [1765]). For instance, Leibniz claimed (ibid. 288ff) that Locke’s position allows for reference to particulars only by proper names and that common names are already universals, founded on similitude.

The earliest forays into lexical semantics

In the Western Classical Tradition of linguistics (see Allan 2010), lexical semantics began with etymologies and glossaries of literary works that gave way to word lists with attributed meanings (both monolingual and bilingual) resembling modern dictionaries. The Lexeis (‘Glossary’) of Aristophanes of Byzantium (c. 257–180 BCE) offered glossaries of poets and dramatists (Aristophanes of Byzantium 1986). The Onomasticon of Julius Pollux, c. 180-238 CE was a ten book dictionary of Attic synonyms and phrases arranged according to subject matter – like a thesaurus (Pollux 1846). In the tenth century the Suidae Lexicon (Suidas 1928-38) was an encyclopaedic Greek lexicon of 30,000 alphabetic entries offering meanings with explanations. A celebrated Renaissance Latin dictionary was Ambrogio Calepino’s (c. 1450–1510) Cornucopiae first published in 1502. The first true bilingual dictionary published in Britain was John Palsgrave 1530 Lesclarcissement de la langue françoyse which had almost 19,000 entries. A milestone in modern lexicography was Samuel Johnson 1755, A Dictionary of the English Language: in which the words are deduced from their originals, and illustrated by examples from the best writers. Today, the application of lexicographical techniques to digitized corpora has revolutionized lexicography (see Hanks 2013). However, attempts at the systematic representation of dictionary meanings by e.g. Russian lexicographers Jurij Apresjan 2000 and Igor Mel'cuk 1984–1991 in terms of semantic primitives have not been widely adopted.

The tenth book of Isidore of Seville’s Etymologiae was a Latin lexicon (Isidore 1850), but the interesting aspect of ancient etymologies is that, unlike modern etymologists who seek to map the diachronic development of the meanings and forms of the word4, the ancients sought to explain the meaning of the word in terms of its perceived component forms (Robins 1997: 27). They assumed that knowledge is embodied in word meanings and can be elucidated by reference to the original meaning; hence the original forms and meanings of words in what would today be called the proto-language were, supposedly, finessed. Although the explanations in Ancient etymologies are often faulty, they do focus attention on the meaning of the word and on the existence of lexical networks based partly on the semantic relations among listemes5. Today’s version of such lexical relations is the wordnet, see www.globalwordnet.org.

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4 The first modern etymologist was Gilles Ménage in Les Origines de la Langue Françoise (Ménage 1650).
5 Listemes are language expressions whose meaning is not determinable from the meanings (if any) of their constituent forms and which, therefore, a language user must memorize as a combination of form and meaning. The term listeme is based on the fact that these are items listed in dictionaries. They are often referred to as “lexical items” but may be sublexical (like re-) or phrasal (like sweat blood, Bob’s your uncle).
Modern use of the term *semantics* stems from an article by Michel Bréal (1832–1915) ‘Les lois intellectuelles du langage: fragment de sémantique’ (Bréal 1883) in which he defined it as ‘la science des significations’ (*ibid.* 133). The term gained much wider currency with the publication of *Essai de Sémantique: Science de Significations* (Bréal 1897) translated as *Semantics: Studies in the Science of Meaning* (Bréal 1900). He regarded semantics as an essential and hitherto neglected part of linguistic study. Linguistics is a human not a natural science (Bréal 1897: 309, 249f). A hearer ‘goes straight to the thought behind a word’ modulating the sense so as to capture the intention of the speaker (*ibid.* 107). Bréal (*ibid.* 182) agreed with William Whitney 1875: 87 that speakers understand language without recourse to etymology. So, the search for mythical ‘true meaning’ gave way to a search for the patterns and causes of semantic change. ‘[L]anguage facts are […] inspired and guided by an intelligent will’ (Bréal 1897: 210); once again Whitney 1867: 50 had already said something similar: ‘Each single part [of a language expression] is conscious and intentional, the whole is instinctive and natural.’ Words are signs of thoughts, and meanings change in line with speakers’ needs to communicate. ‘Words are not exact models of ideas; they are merely signs for ideas, at whose significance we arrive as well as we can’, wrote Whitney 1867: 20. As Whitney 1875 also said, old words are used in new contexts, and thereby their meanings subtly change. It is the ‘customary office of a word to cover, not a point, but a territory, and a territory that is irregular, heterogeneous, and variable’ (*ibid.* 110). This opens the way for prototype and stereotype semantics (see below). For Bréal, semantic change has to be studied with an eye to the contexts and reference of terms in former times. Bréal thinks that analogy in the creation of new terms and the extinction of redundant ones is the ‘logic of language’. The system operates through rational inference. He was unusual in looking not only at lexical meaning but language functions (Bréal 1897: 189). Like Hermann Paul, whose *Prinzipien* Bréal (*ibid.* 307) praised for its contribution to semantics, Bréal sees the multiple meanings in decontextualized language reducing to one meaning or ‘valeur’ in reference. The use of *value* by Whitney and Bréal is tied to referential import, whereas Saussure 1916 uses the term to mean ‘differential value’ within the semantic field as part of the language system. For Bréal, language doesn’t merely describe or narrate; it is used in a variety of what today would be called illocutionary functions (commanding, taking possession, persuading, pleasing, promising, questioning, and exclaiming).

### Componential analysis

In the seventeenth century there were many attempts to identify a ‘philosophical language’ common to all mankind (Lodwick 1647, 1652, 1686, Dalgarno 1661, Wilkins 1668, Leibniz 1765). These prefigure twentieth century proposals for universally applicable semantic primitives and the notion of componential analysis echoed in the binary analysis of Thomas Hobbes 1839: 25. Componential analysis seeks to identify the sense of a listeme in terms of one or more semantic components. The principal means of accomplishing this has been

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7. The *Essai* is a compilation of essays. The translation was initiated by Lady Welby-Gregory, mother of the translator, Mrs Henry Cust (née Nina Welby-Gregory).
8. Sense (Lyons 1977: 174) is decontextualized meaning (such as you find in a dictionary), abstracted from innumerable textual occurrences of the listeme or combination of listemes. The sense of an expression *e* is essentially a linguistic representation of its intension, i.e all the attributes perceived in or conceived of the typical denotatum of *e* (assuming that *e* is used in a conventional manner). Intensions are sometimes identified with concepts (e.g. Cann 1993, Gamut 1991), but concepts are psychological entities and intensions are the content of concepts.
through the structuralist method of contrastive distributional analysis; though there is no consistent one-to-one correlation between semantic components and the morph(eme)s of any language. Listemes that share semantic components are semantically related. Semantic components reflect the characteristics of typical denotata, hence there is a hierarchy of semantic components which corresponds to perceived hierarchies among denotata. For instance, **FELINE** is a semantic component of **cat** and entails the semantic component **ANIMAL** which is also, therefore, a component of **cat**. This suggests a thesaurus-like structure for semantic components. It follows that the set of semantic components for a language can be discovered by identifying all the relationships that can be conceived of among the denotata of listemes. In practice, this could be everything in all worlds, actual and non-actual. There have been numerous attempts to carry out such a task; among the most successful of them was *An Essay Toward a Real Character and a Philosophical Language* (Wilkins 1668) although this had no demonstrable influence on twentieth century componential analysis. For instance Wilkins reconstructs **father** as ‘relation’ + ‘consanguinity’ + ‘direct ascendant’ + ‘male’ (*ibid.* 249, 396). Since the nineteenth century, anthropologists had been comparing widely differing kinship systems in culturally distinct societies by interpreting them in terms of universal constituents that equate to semantic components (see Krooher 1909). Two of the earliest articles in the componential analysis of meaning, Lounsbury 1956 and Goodenough 1956, appeared consecutively in the same issue of the journal *Language* and both were analyses of kin terms. They showed that semantic analysis could be carried out using approved methods of structural analysis, similar to those used to filter out the phonetic components of the Sanskrit stop phonemes. For instance, Lounsbury’s paper begins with a comparison of Spanish and English kin terms: **ti-o, hij-o, abuel-o, herman-o** (**uncle**, ‘son’, ‘grandfather’, ‘brother**) vs **ti-a, hij-a, abuel-a, herman-a** (**aunt**, ‘daughter’, ‘grandmother’, ‘sister**). He notes that English has no gender morphs corresponding to the Spanish suffixes -o and -a, but gender is nonetheless a significant component in the meaning of the English kin terms. Their covert gender must be compatible with the sex of the person denoted; consequently, it is anomalous to call one’s uncle **aunt**, or one’s sister **brother**. Hence, too, the anomaly of *My brother is pregnant*. And when the terms **aunt** and **uncle** are extended as terms of respect to an older generation, they are assigned on the basis of the sex of the referent. There are grammatical consequences: the personal pronoun anaphoric to **uncle** is **he/him**; the one for **aunt** is **she/her**. **Father, uncle, and aunt** have in common that they are **FIRST_ASCENDING_GENERATION**. **Father** and **uncle** additionally have in common that both are **MALE**, whereas **aunt** is **FEMALE**. **Aunt** and **uncle** are both **COLLATERAL**, whereas **father** is **LINEAL**. The meaning relationships between **father**, **uncle**, and **aunt** can be seen from the semantic components identified.

Componential analysis in semantics was influenced by the adaption of distinctive feature analysis based on the methodology of Prague school phonology to morphosyntax. Roman Jakobson 1936 identified the distinctive ‘conceptual’ features of each case in Russian. In ‘Componential analysis of a Hebrew paradigm’, Zellig Harris 1948 analysed the verb paradigm using the categories of tense, person, and gender on a similar distributional basis to this; the result corresponds to Jakobson’s analysis in terms of conceptual features. A third strand in the development of componential analysis was semantic field theory. The semantic field of a listeme is determined from the conceptual field in which its denotatum occurs; its structure the structure of the conceptual field. The notion of semantic field is found in Humboldt 1836 and it was later developed by Trier 1931; Porzig 1950; Weisgerber 1950; and Geckeler 1971. In *Structural Semantics*, Lyons 1963 examined the meanings that can be ascribed to words such as **téchnē** ‘skill’, **epistêmē** ‘knowledge’, **sophía** ‘wisdom’, **aretê** ‘virtue’, etc. in the semantic fields of knowledge and skill in Plato’s works. Lyons was
motivated by Trier’s survey of the shifting field of High German *wisheit*, *kunst* and *list* but unlike Trier’s subjective speculations, Lyons presents a rigorous analysis using techniques derived from works such as Harris 1951 and Chomsky 1957. Few scholars have undertaken extensive analysis of a semantic field, but Bendix 1966 analysed the field of *have* and its counterparts in Hindi and Japanese, Lehrer 1974 analyses the fields of cooking and sound, and Backhouse 1994 is an extensive study of taste terms in Japanese. A conceptual field such as colour, kinship, or cooking terms is covered by a number of listemes in a language, each denoting a part of the field. Different languages, and at different times in history any one language, may divide the field differently among listemes. Although the sensory data in the colour spectrum is the same for all human beings, languages name parts of the field differently (see Berlin and Kay 1969, Maclaury 1997). The differential value of a listeme is that part of the conceptual field that it denotes in contrast with the part denoted by other listemes in the same semantic field. Although Western Dani *laambu* is a possible translation for English *yellow* its differential value is very different: *laambu* implies *not-mili* ‘not cool-dark’, whereas *yellow* implies ‘not-white, not-red, not-green, not-blue, not-black, not-brown, not-pink, not-purple, not-orange, not-grey’. Unlike the field of colour terms, the field of cooking terms is not neatly circumscribed; it is difficult to decide whether the whole field is covered by the analysis in Lehrer 1974, and what effect extensions or diminutions of the field can have. Since 1974, microwave ovens have become ubiquitous and require the semantic field to be revised with the advent of this new form of cooking. To generalize: when new objects and new ways of doing things come into existence there is a change in the conceptual field that usually leads to a change in the semantic field resulting from the adding of listemes or the semantic extension of existing ones. Seemingly closed fields such as case inflexions or kin terms should permit exhaustive componential analysis in which every term within the field is characterized by a unique subset of the universal set of semantic components defining the field. However, these systems invariably leak into other fields when meaning extensions and figurative usage are considered. Furthermore an exhaustive componential analysis of the entire vocabulary of a language is probably unachievable, because it proves impossible to define the boundaries, and hence all the components, of every field.

Semantic primes and their interpretations constitute the primitive symbols that constitute the vocabulary of the semantic metalanguage. We may suppose that semantic components are composed from semantic primes, but what are these primes and how many are there? A semantic prime is reminiscent of Morris Swadesh’s ‘basic vocabulary’ created to plot diachronic relationships between unwritten languages. It consists of names for things common to the experience of all human communities (the sun, human body parts and functions, etc.). The purpose of the list was to find cognates in a pair of languages (Swadesh 1955); hence one name for the programme is lexico-statistics (Embleton 1986). For related languages, the time of divergence from a common mother language is estimated from the proportion of vocabulary common to both, a procedure called glottochronology.

Proponents of Natural Semantic Metalanguage (NSM) believe that semantic primes (originally named *primitives*) and their elementary syntax exist as a minimal subset of ordinary natural language (Goddard 1994: 10). A number of seventeenth century seekers after a universal language including Dalgarno 1661, Lodwick 1652; and Wilkins 1668 proposed primitive semantic components. Their contemporary, Antoine Arnauld, recognized that the meanings of most words can be defined in terms of others, but that ultimately there are some

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9. Around 1200 these meant approximately: ‘knowledge’ (which subsumed) ‘courtly skill’ and ‘technical skill’. By 1300 *wisheit* had narrowed to ‘mystical knowledge’; *kunst* shifted to ‘artistic skill’, while *list* was effectively replaced by *wizzen* meaning ‘technical skill’.
undeﬁnable semantically primitive words (Arnauld and Nicole 1996 [1662]). Uriel Weinreich 1962: 36 identiﬁed a discovery procedure for a semantic metalanguage built upon natural language. The idea was to stratify the language into (a) a central core of semantic primes whose members are deﬁnable only circularly and by ostensive deﬁnition such as ‘colour of the sky’ in the entry for blue. (b) The next stratum out uses items whose deﬁnitions contain only core items without (further) circularity. (c) Each more peripheral stratum uses items from the preceding strata without circularity. Anna Wierzbicka has been carrying out this programme in a cross-language context since 1972, searching for a universal set of semantic primes expressed principally through the vocabulary of English. The number of semantic primes has grown from 14 in Wierzbicka 1972 to 63 in Goddard 2009. There is a distinct NSM for every language, and primes are often not isomorphic across languages like the ﬁgures 1, 2, 3 are. NSM primes are compositionally and often semantically different across languages; their meanings show partial overlap rather than complete identity: English SOME corresponds to French IL Y A … QUI; English THERE IS to French IL Y A. There is a professed need for different variants of a single prime (allolexes) which makes the so-called ‘semantic primes’ f ar more like meaning clusters than unit primes, for example: English I and ME; DO, DOES, DID; Italian TU (singular ‘you’) IS A PRIME, BUT, VOI, LEI (plural/polite ‘you’) are semantically complex and deﬁned in terms of TU. There is no satisfactory account of the syntax of NSM, though see Wierzbicka 1996: 19–22, Goddard 1998: 329–36.

It is important to consider the payoff between the effectiveness of a semantic deﬁnition and its accuracy. This requires that the purpose of the semantic analysis be identiﬁed. For whom or what is the resulting semantic speciﬁcation designed? NSM semantic deﬁnitions are not designed to be used by machines that simulate language understanding; they are intended to be easily accessible to a non-native speaker of the language. But every such reader will already know what, say, a cup is, so a brief description would be sufﬁcient (as in Katz 1977: 49, compare Labov 1973: 366f, Wierzbicka 1984, and comment in Allan 2001: 280f. ‘For dictionary purposes, the concept has only to be identiﬁed, not fully speciﬁed,’ wrote Cruse 1990: 396. This, of course, applies to the whole lexicographical endeavour and not just to NSM.

Componential semantics presupposes a checklist of properties to be satisﬁed for the correct use of the decomposed expression (Fillmore 1975: 123). For example, the default denotatum of bird is bipedal, has feathers, and is capable of ﬂight. But there are several species of ﬂightless birds (e.g. emus, penguins); a downy chick and a plucked chicken are featherless, but nonetheless birds; and a one-legged owl and a mutant three-legged hen are also birds. So the notion of a checklist of essential properties for the denotatum is problematical. Prototype and stereotype semantics are alternatives to checklist theories of meaning.

**Prototype and stereotype semantics**

The prototype hypothesis is that some denotata are better exemplars of the meaning of a lexeme than others, therefore members of the category denoted by the lexeme are graded with respect to one another. For example, a bird that ﬂies, such as a pigeon, is a better exemplar of the category Birds than a penguin, which doesn’t.

How are prototypes discovered? Battig and Montague 1969 asked subjects to list as many Vegetables, or Fruits, or Diseases, or Toys, etc. as they could in 30 seconds. They hypothesized that the most salient members in each category would be (a) frequently listed and (b) high on the list. They found, for instance, that a carrot is the prototype for Vegetable,
i.e. the best exemplar of the category because it was listed frequently and early. A tomato belongs to two categories: it is a Vegetable in folk belief and technically a Fruit. On the Battig and Montague scale, a tomato ranked 6th as a Vegetable and 15th as a Fruit. George Lakoff 1972a interprets such rankings in terms of fuzzy sets of objects with a continuum of grades of category membership between 0.0 and 1.0. The carrot is the best instance with a value 1.0, a tomato has the value 0.68 (and 0.14 membership in the fuzzy set Fruit), and a pickle is graded only 0.006 of Vegetable. Any entity assigned a value greater than 0.0 is a member of the category, i.e. the pickle is a Vegetable no less than the carrot. What the fuzzy set membership value indicates is how good or bad an exemplar of the category a certain population of speakers perceives that entity to be. A tomato is vegetable-like because it is eaten, often with other vegetables, as part of an hors d’oeuvre or main course. It is not eaten, alone or with other fruits, for dessert. A tomato is fruit-like because it grows as a fruit well above the ground and not on or below it. Also, it is often eaten raw and the extracted juice is drunk like fruit juices. Tomatoes are cultivated for food (whereas flowers are cultivated for ornamentation); so it is our practice of eating tomatoes as if they are vegetables rather than fruit that explains their relative ranking in each category. Eleanor Rosch carried out a series of experiments on prototype semantics summarized in Rosch 1978. Rosch 1973 found that the common cold is a very poor exemplar of Disease – which conflicts with the Battig and Montague finding. The discrepancy between the two findings is explained by the fact that Rosch gave her subjects only six diseases to rank (cancer, measles, malaria, muscular dystrophy, rheumatism, cold) and a cold is the mildest of them. Obviously, establishing the prototype depends upon the experiences and beliefs of the population investigated. Consequently, the claimed prototypicality ranking is valid for the community surveyed, but not for all speakers of the language, or even the same subjects on a different occasion.

Ludwig Wittgenstein (1953: §§66–71) wrote of some categories being defined not by a checklist of properties but by ‘family resemblances’. George Lakoff 1987 adopted this notion into prototype theory identifying chains of similarities among members of a category. Take the example of the word mother and the category ‘Mother’. The prototypical mother is the woman who produces the ovum, conceives, gestates, gives birth to and then nurtures a child (giving rise to the traditional definition of mother). Radiating from this are more peripheral attributes of a mother. The natural or biological mother produces the ovum, conceives, gestates, and gives birth to the child. The genetic or donor mother supplies the ovum to a surrogate mother in whose womb the genetic mother’s ovum is implanted and in whose body the foetus develops through to birth. The nurturant mother may be the genetic mother, a surrogate mother, adoptive mother, or foster mother. In addition there is a stepmother, a mother-in-law, while polygamous societies and certain kinship systems (like many in Australia) offer additional complexities. Figurative extensions arise: the prototypical or natural mother is the source for necessity is the mother of invention. A mother’s status is recognized in the convention of referring to mother nodes in a mathematical tree structure. The nurturant mother is the source for house-mother and also mother superior in a religious order. By contrast, descriptions like single mother or working mother can connote challenges to the individual’s capacity as a nurturant mother. What we see here is a set of identifiable resemblances among these uses and meanings of the word mother, but no set of properties common to all of them. As Wittgenstein pointed out, the boundaries of a category can be extended and some of its members are more peripheral than others. Some extended meanings are figurative (e.g. mother superior), and a very important development in late twentieth century studies of meaning was the general acceptance, following Lakoff and Johnson 1980, that metaphor and metonymy are all pervasive in language and not clearly demarcated from
‘literal’ meaning (see Coulson 2001; Kövecses 2002; Sweetser 1990; Traugott and Dasher 2002).

In ‘The meaning of “meaning”’, Hilary Putnam 1975 proposed a stereotype semantics such that the meaning of a language expression e (typically a lexeme) is a minimum set of stereotypical facts constituting a mental image, mental construct, or Gestalt with the attributes of the typical denotatum, including pragmatic connotations (see Allan 2007). Putnam expressly allows for experts to have considerably more knowledge at their command than their fellows – which raises the question: Do the words elm and beech have the same stereotype and meaning for a botanist as they do for an inner city dweller who can’t distinguish an elm from a beech? Presumably not. However, if the botanist were to point out and name an elm, the inner city dweller would know that referent is not a beech, even if s/he could still not recognize another elm thereafter.

How is ‘a (stereo-)typical denotatum of e’ distinguishable from ‘as-good-an-exemplar-as-can-be-found among the class of things denoted by e’? Presumably, the stereotype properly includes the prototype. For instance, whatever the stereotype of vegetable may be, it properly includes the prototype carrot and the peripheral onion. The stereotypical vehicle includes the prototypical car and/or bus together with the peripheral horse-drawn wagon. If this is correct, then we should favour the stereotype in giving the semantics of language expressions.

Frame semantics

Frames (Goffman 1974; Fillmore 1982, 2006, Fillmore and Atkins 1992) identify the characteristic features, attributes, and functions of a denotatum, and its characteristic interactions with things necessarily or typically associated with it. For example, a restaurant is a public eating-place; its attributes are: (1) business premises where, in exchange for payment, food is served to be eaten on the premises; consequently, (2) a restaurant has a kitchen for food preparation, and tables and chairs to accommodate customers during their meal. Barsalou 1992: 28 describes attributes as slots in the frame that are to be filled with the appropriate values. The frame for people registers the fact that, being living creatures, people have the attributes of age and sex. The attribute sex has the values male and female. It can be represented formally by a function BE_SEXED applied to the domain D={x:x is a person} to yield a value from the set {male, female}. The function BE_AGED applies to the same domain to yield a value from a much larger set. Knowledge of frames is called upon in the proper use of language. Attributes for events include participants, location, and time of occurrence, e.g. the verb buy has slots for the attributes buyer, seller, merchandise, payment: these give rise to the thematic structure (valencies, case frames) of the verb. An act of buying occurs in a certain place at a certain time (a world-time pair with values relevant to evaluation of truth, see below). The ‘lexical semantic structures’ of Pustejovsky 1995 systematically describe semantic frames for every listeme. To sum up, frames provide a structured background derived from experience, beliefs, or practices, constituting a conceptual prerequisite for understanding meaning. The meaning of a language expression relies on the frames, and it is these that relate listemes one to another.

Semantics within syntactic structures

Most semantic relations extend beyond listemes to the syntactic structures into which the listemes combine. Although the semantics of propositions has been considered within philosophy since Plato, Aristotle, and more particularly the Stoics, the first step within linguistics was undertaken by a philosopher Jerrold J. Katz and a cognitive scientist Jerry
Katz sought to establish a theory of meaning (sense) that would do all of the following: define what it is; define the form of lexical entries; relate semantics to syntax and phonology by postulating semantic theory as an integral component of a theory of grammar; establish a metalanguage in which semantic representations, properties, and relations are expressed; ensure the metalanguage is universal by correlating it with the human ability to conceptualize; identify the components of meaning and show how they combine to project meaning onto structurally complex expressions. Essentially, these are goals that should be met by any semantic theory – though what is meant by ‘component of meaning’ and the integration of semantics with phonology and syntax may be radically different within different theories. Missing from Katz’s conditions is the requirement that the meaning of language expressions needs to be related to the real and imaginary worlds people speak and write of. Furthermore, Katz’s theory offered no account of utterance or speaker meaning.

Katz’s semantic theory is interpretative. The earliest version was geared to the syntactic model of Chomsky 1957 and was fatally flawed (see Bolinger 1965, Weinreich 1966). In later versions Katz’s theory was designed to assign meanings to the output of autonomous syntactic rules of a transformational generative grammar of the kind described in Chomsky 1965 but he never updated it to accommodate later developments in generative syntax. Nor did Katz ever validate the vocabulary and syntax of his theory, and we can only learn to interpret his metalanguage by abduction from his examples, among which there is little consistency, and so his semantic markers remain only partially comprehensible. There were at least five differently structured semantic readings for chase given by Katz himself (Katz 1966, 1967, 1972, 1977b, Katz and Nagel 1974) and an additional two in Janet Fodor 1977 (see Allan 1986 for extensive discussion). Compare (1), the semantics for chase given in in Katz 1967: 169, with (2), given in Bierwisch 1969: 160.

(1) \(((\text{Activity of X}) (\text{Nature: Physical})) (\text{Motion}) (\text{Rate: Fast}) (\text{Character: Following Y}) (\text{Intention: Trying to catch ((Y) (Motion))})\)

(2) \[[[\text{Physical}] \text{Activity} \land [\text{Fast} \text{ Motion}]X \land [\text{Following}]XY \land [\text{Trying}]X([\text{Catch}]XY) \land [\text{Motion}]Y\]

The vocabulary is similar but there is a striking difference in structure. Bierwisch approximates the standard and conventional syntax of predicate logic, but the syntax of Katz’s markers is nonstandard and unconventional. The marker (Activity of X) classes chase with verbs such as eat, speak, walk, and remember (as against state verbs like sleep or wait, and process verbs like grow, or freeze). The marker (Rate: Fast)) distinguishes chase from creep and walk. (Character: Following Y)) distinguishes chase from flee or wander. The variables ‘X’ and ‘Y’ indicate where the semantics of the actor and undergoer should be inserted, thus imposing a structure onto the semantic interpretation. We can only interpret Katz’s semantic markers for chase, for instance, because it uses English words whose meanings we combine to match up with our existing knowledge of its meaning. If we reword his various semantic markers for chase into more or less normal English, they will all read something like X is quickly following the moving object Y with the intention of catching it.
Katz has claimed (as have, e.g., Lakoff 1972b, McCawley 1972) that the English used in the semantic metalanguage is not English, which is used only as a mnemonic device. However, the only way to make any sense of the metalanguage is to translate it into a natural language. That is why analysing bachelor into \{\text{Human}, \text{Adult}, \text{Male}, \text{Single}\}, as did Katz and Nagel 1974: 324, is a more enlightening semantic analysis than, say, \{48, 41, 4D, 53\}. Formalism, especially unconventional formalism, can only be justified if it increases explicitness of statement, rigor of analysis, and promotes clarity of expression.

Katz’s semantic theory was the first to try to comprehensively integrate linguistic semantics with syntax. Logicians had taken steps in this direction since the Stoic period, and Prague school linguists had studied aspects of functional sentence perspective a decade or so earlier but, in spite of its shortcomings, Katz’s conception of the syntax–semantics interface was far more wide-ranging and influential, and it did identify the parameters that other theories needed to engage with. A major limitation was no proper treatment of pragmatics and no obvious extension beyond sentences to texts. These faults are also to be found in most of its rivals.

**Alternatives to Katzian semantics**

Noam Chomsky was educated in the Bloomfieldian school that eschewed semantic theory as speculative. For him semantics was at best an add-on for the syntactic base, a position affirmed by Katz and later by Ray Jackendoff. The *Aspects* theory developed in Chomsky 1965 had a level of deep structure at which the meaning of each sentence constituent was specified and the meaning ‘projected’ upwards through nodes in the phrase marker to semantically interpret the sentence. Deep structure was separate from a level of surface structure at which the form of the sentence (as used in everyday utterance) was specified. This conception of grammar leads naturally to the view that pairs of formally distinct but semantically equivalent expressions arise from the same deep structure by different transformations, e.g. (a) *X caused Y to die* and *X killed Y* or (b) *X reminds me of Y* and *X strikes me as similar to Y* or (c) *my mother* and *the woman who bore me*. In what became known as generative semantics, the initial structures in a grammar are semantic rather than solely syntactic. It grew directly from reaction to the ‘standard theory’ of Katz and Postal 1964 and Chomsky 1965 with its emphasis on syntactic justification. One of the earliest works in generative semantics was Lakoff 1965, originally conceived as an extension of standard theory. Lakoff postulates phrase markers that terminate in feature bundles like those in *Aspects*; he differs from Chomsky in proposing that listemes be inserted into only some of these terminal nodes, the rest functioning as well-formedness conditions on lexical insertion and semantic interpretation. For example, *kill* replaces the semantics of *DEAD* when it is c-commanded by an unlexicalized inchoative verb that in turn is c-commanded by an unlexicalized causative verb (see Lakoff 1965; Allan 1986 for details). In 1965 Lakoff believed that lexical insertion preceded other transformations. Gruber 1965 contains lexical structures that have most of the syntactic characteristics of standard theory trees, but some terminal nodes were semantic components. Gruber argued that some transformations must operate on prelexical syntax (prior to lexical insertion). For instance from the prelexical structure VP[V[MOTIONAL, POSITIONAL] PrepP[Prep[ACROSS] ...]], lexical insertion will put either the verb *go* under the V node and the lexeme *across* under the Prep node, or alternatively map the single verb *cross* into a combination of both the V and Prep nodes. The

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10. The first use of the term was by Lakoff in 1963 (Lakoff 1976); the earliest published use of the term is in Bendix 1966: 12.
latter was a radical innovation: because semantic interpretation is made before transformations such as Passive apply, semantics and syntax are interdependent. A similar conclusion was reached in Postal 1966, 1970, 1972 and Lakoff and Ross 1976 [1967]. Weinreich 1966 showed that lexical insertion is semantically governed and that syntactic structure is merely the skeleton for semantics. McCawley 1968a assumes that all natural language syntax can be represented by the symbols S(entence), V (predicate) and one or more NPs (arguments). In initial structure, V consists of a primitive semantic component or ‘atom’ and NP is either a recursive S node or a variable (an index) designating the referent. Thus, in generative semantics, initial symbols represent semantic components set into structures that are a hybrid of predicate logic and natural language syntax – both well-established conventional systems. These structures could be rearranged in various ways by transformations before lexical forms were mapped onto them. Additional transformations may rearrange or delete nodes until the final derived phrase marker gives a surface form for the sentence together with its structural description. Meaning is determined directly from the initial semantic structure.

**Conceptual semantics**

For Ray S. Jackendoff, semantics is a part of conceptual structure in which linguistic, sensory, and motor information are compatible (see Jackendoff 1983, 1987, 1992, 2002, 2007). Jackendoff, although not subscribing to prototype or stereotype semantics, believes that word meaning is a large, heterogeneous collection of typicality conditions (i.e. what’s most likely the case, such as that a bird typically flies) with no sharp distinction between lexicon and encyclopaedia. According to Jackendoff, every content-bearing major phrasal constituent of a sentence corresponds to a conceptual constituent. S expresses STATE or EVENT. NP can express almost any conceptual category. PP expresses PLACE, PATH, and PROPERTY. Jackendoff is principally interested in the semantic structure of verbs, with a secondary interest in function-argument structures in the spatial domain. He makes no attempt to decompose nouns semantically, treating them as semantic primitives. In his view, only kin terms and geometric figures admit of satisfactory semantic decomposition. By contrast, he finds that verbs decompose into comparatively few classes (as also in Role and Reference Grammar, see below).

Jackendoff’s vocabulary of semantic primitives is very much larger than the set used by NSM researchers (see above). The syntax of his lexical conceptual structure (LCS) is a configuration of functions ranging over arguments. For instance,

(3) *Bill went to Boston* $[\text{EventGO([\text{ThingBILL}], \text{PathTO([\text{ThingBOSTON}])]})]$

(4) *Bill drank the beer* $[\text{EventCAUSE([\text{ThingBILL}], \text{EventGO([\text{ThingBEER}], [\text{PathTO([\text{PlaceIN([\text{ThingMOUTH OF([\text{Thing\alphaB}]})])]})]])])}]$

A preferred alternative to the double appearance of BILL in (4) is Argument Binding, symbolized ‘$\alpha$’ in (5), in which other arguments are also spelled out.

(5) $[\text{EventCAUSE([\text{ThingBILL}]^a, \text{A-actor}, \text{EventGO([\text{Thing-liquidBEER}], \text{A-theme}, [\text{PathTO([\text{PlaceIN([\text{ThingMOUTH OF([\text{Thing\alphaB}]})})]])])}]})]$

Conceptual semantics shows that a semantic decomposition of verbs making extensive use of just a few primitives is a feasible project. The syntax of LCS is a function-argument structure similar to that of predicate calculus, so that someone acquainted with predicate calculus can construct a lexical conceptual structure despite the fact that Jackendoff does not
employ standard logical formulae. Although LCS makes no use of logical connectives, some of the more complex formulae imply conjunction between the function-argument structures in a lexical conceptual structure. There is a score of primitive verbs so far identified, so although the set of functions is restricted, the vocabulary of primitive arguments is unbounded. Conceptual semantics integrates with a dominant syntactic theory in late twentieth century linguistics.

**Thematic roles**

The original motivation for identifying thematic roles (‘valencies’, ‘(deep) cases’, and ‘θ-theta roles’) was to indicate in the syntactic frame of a predicate which surface cases, prepositional, or postpositional phrases it governs – all of which typically identify the roles of participants (people, objects, places, events) within the states of affairs (see, e.g., Fillmore 1968, Anderson 1971, Cruse 1973, Starosta 1988, Dowty 1991, Goldberg 1995, Van Valin and Lapolla 1997). Each such term is theory-dependent and the definition of a particular role in one theory is likely to be different in at least some respects from its definition in another theory, despite the same label (e.g. agent, patient) being used. There is probably a boundless number of thematic roles; for instance, roles such as effector and locative have a number of subcategories, and it is possible that ever finer distinctions can be drawn among them; so it is hardly surprising that no one has satisfactorily identified a full set of roles for any language (see Allan 2001: 374, Allan 2010: 274).

According to Van Valin 1993, Van Valin and LaPolla 1997, the definition of thematic roles in grammar is so unsatisfactory that we should admit just two macroroles ‘actor’ and ‘undergoer’ in the grammar. The macroroles of Role and Reference Grammar are defined on the logical structures of verbs. The maximum number is 2, the minimum is 0 (in sentences like Latin *pluit* ‘[it’s] raining’ and English *It’s raining*). ‘Actor’ and ‘undergoer’ roughly correspond to ‘logical subject’ and ‘logical object’ respectively. They are called macroroles because they subsume a number of thematic roles. They are properly dependent on hierarchies such as the actor hierarchy, \DO(x,...) < \DO'(x,...) < \PRED(x,...) ;\footnote{DO only appears in the few logical structures that necessarily take an agent e.g. for *murder* as against *kill*.} the undergoer hierarchy without an actor, \PRED(x,...) < \PRED(...,y) < \PRED(x) (where A < B means ‘A outranks B in the hierarchy’). In contrast to the uncertainty of assigning thematic roles, assigning macroroles to a clause predicate is well-defined.

**The importance of truth conditions**

Donald Davidson 1967b: 310 said that ‘to give truth conditions is a way of giving the meaning of a sentence.’ Truth is dependent on worlds and times: *Marilyn Monroe would have been 74 on June 1, 2000* is true: although MM died in 1962 we can imagine a possible world of June 1, 2000 at which she was still alive, and given that she was born June 1, 1926, she would indeed be 74. McCawley 1968a, b was one of the first linguists to adopt and adapt truth conditions and predicate logic into grammar, most popularly in his book *Everything that Linguists Have Always Wanted to Know about Logic* (McCawley 1993 [1981]). The importance of truth conditions had often been overlooked by linguists, especially those focusing on lexical semantics. Hjelmslev 1943, Lyons 1968 and Lehrer 1974 all suggest that the nine listemes bull, calf, cow, ewe, foal, lamb, mare, ram, stallion – which constitute a fragment of a semantic field – can be contrasted with one another in such a way as to reveal the semantic components in Table 1.
Table 1. A componential table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BOVINE</th>
<th>EQUINE</th>
<th>OVINE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bull</td>
<td>stallion</td>
<td>ram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>cow</td>
<td>mare</td>
<td>ewe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>calf</td>
<td>foal</td>
<td>lamb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALE</td>
<td>FEMALE</td>
<td>YOUNG</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADULT</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The basis for claiming that BOVINE or MALE is a semantic component of bull cannot be a matter merely of language. It is a relation speakers believe exists between the denotata of the terms bull and male and bovine (i.e. things in a world that these terms may be felicitously used to refer to). Doing semantic analysis of listemes, it is not enough to claim that (6) is linguistic evidence for the claim that MALE is a semantic component of bull, because (7) is equally good until a basis for the semantic (and therefore grammatical) anomaly has been established that is independent of what we are seeking to establish – namely the justification for the semantic components identified in Table 1.

(6) A bull is male.

(7) A bull is female.

The only language-independent device available is an appeal to truth conditions, and this takes us to the denotata of bull and male. In fact what we need to say is something like (8).

(8) In every admissible possible world and time an entity which is a bull is male and in no such world is an entity which is a bull a female.

Note that the semantic component MALE of Table 1 must be equivalent to the relevant sense of the English word male. Thus, the assumption is that semantic components reflect characteristics of typical denotata as revealed through their intensions across worlds and times. In any case, they provide the justification for postulating the semantic components in Table 1 as a set of inferences such as those in (9).

(9) For any entity x that is properly called a bull, it is the case that x is adult ∧ x is male ∧ x is bovine.

In fact it is not part of a general semantic characterization of bull that it typically denotes adults; one can, without contradiction, refer to a bull calf. Rather, it is part of the general naming practice for complementary sets of male and female animals. Nor is bull restricted to bovines, it is also used of male elephants, male whales, male seals, male alligators, etc. The initial plausibility of Table 1 and (9) is due to the fact that it describes the (stereo)typical bull. The world of the English speaker is such that bull is much more likely to denote a bovine than any other species of animal, which is why bull elephant is usual, but bull bovine is not. This reduces (9) to something more like (10).

(10) For any entity x that is properly called a bull, it is the case that x is male and probably bovine.

What is uncovered here is that even lexical semantics is necessarily dependent on truth conditions together with the probability conditions that are nonmonotonic inferences.

The development of formal semantics

Charles Sanders Peirce is celebrated for being a founder of pragmatics, but he also made extensive and highly original contributions to mathematical logic. He introduced into logic the material-conditional operator and operators like NAND and NOR. Peirce 1870 invented
the notion of a variable and a syntax for the logic of relations of arbitrary adicity. By 1883 he had developed a syntax for quantificational logic. However, it is Gottlob Frege (1848–1925) who usually gets the credit for developing the first system of formal logic using a metalanguage modelled on the language of arithmetic in his *Begriffsschrift* (Frege 1879). His philosophical papers mostly deal with one or another aspect of systems of signs. The distinction made in Frege 1892 between *Sinn* (‘sense’) and *Bedeutung* (‘denotation; reference’) is comparable with Arnaud’s comprehension–extension, Hamilton’s intension–extension, or John Stuart Mill’s connotation–denotation (Mill 1843) though it is uncertain whether he was directly influenced by any of these. Frege noted that \( a = a \) and \( a = b \) are obviously statements of different cognitive value, as we can see from the fact that although the morning star refers to Venus and the evening star also refers to Venus, the two phrases differ in sense and intension. Frege distinguished senses from ideas (concepts), which some of his followers have failed to do. Ideas are particular to individual language users, senses form ‘a common store of thoughts which is transmitted from one generation to another’. Although he doesn’t say so, this view is compatible with sense being a property of the language itself, which is, of course, transmitted across generations. The fact that truth is assigned to the reference of propositions led him to raise questions about what have come to be called opaque and intensional contexts.

In *Foundations of Arithmetic* Frege asserts (echoing James Harris and Jeremy Bentham) that words have meaning only in virtue of being constituents of sentences that have sense (Frege 1884: 70). In other words, meaning is a function of context. This context principle is the top-down counterpart to the bottom-up principle of compositionality often assigned to Frege, e.g.

\[
\text{[E]very sentence, no matter how complicated, can be seen as the result of a systematic construction process which adds logical words one by one.} \quad (\text{Gamut 1991 I:15})
\]

And it is found in Frege 1963: 1, which states that we can ‘distinguish in the thought corresponding to parts of a sentence, so that the structure of the sentence serves as an image of the structure of the thought’. But it is a principle that goes back at least as far as Plato’s *Sophist*.

It became clear during the twentieth century that an indefinite noun phrase requires the hearer to create a subset \( x \) from a set \( y \) such that \( x \subset y \) as in *Two coffees, please* (a set of two from the set of all possible coffees relative to the context of discourse). Bertrand Russell 1905 presented a theory of definite descriptions in which a sentence such as (11) has the logical translation (12) for some \( x \) such that \( x \) is a lamb, and for every \( y \) such that if \( y \) is a lamb then \( y \) is identical with \( x \), such that \( x \) is sick.

(11) The lamb is sick.
(12) \( \exists x (Lx \land \forall y (Ly \rightarrow y=x) \land Sx) \)

The definite indicates a readily identifiable referent by equating set \( x \) with set \( y \) (perhaps by naming it) such that a definite article is similar to a universal quantifier. This has become known as the quantificational reading of the definite article and some people believe that the referential use of a definite description rests on prior understanding of its quantificational meaning (Bach 2004, Kripke 1977, Neale 2001, Salmon 1991). There is a contrary view, refuting the quantificational analysis in favour of direct reference, that effectively sees the use of definites as analogous with pointing, thus rendering the definite unanalysable (Devitt 2007, Kaplan 1978, 1989, Reimer 1998, Wettstein 1983). The controversy shows no sign of abating.
Since about the time of Cresswell 1973 and Keenan (ed.) 1975, there have been many linguists working in formal semantics. Formal semantics interprets formal systems, in particular those that arise from the coalescence of set theory, model theory, and lambda calculus with philosophical logic – especially the work of Richard Montague (Montague 1974, Dowty, Wall and Peters 1981), and the tense logic and modal logic of such as Prior 1957 and Kripke 1963, 1972. By and large, formal semantics has ignored the semantics of listemes such as nouns, verbs, and adjectives – which are typically used as semantic primes (but see Dowty 1979). It does, however, offer insightful analyses of secondary grammatical categories like number and quantification, tense, and modals.

Event-based semantics was initiated by Davidson 1967a. The idea is to quantify over events, thus Ed hears Jo call out is a complex of two events as shown in (13), where there is the event \( e \) of Jo’s calling out and the event \( e' \) of Ed hearing \( e \).

\[
\exists e [(\text{call out}(Jo, e) \land \exists e' \text{ hear}(Ed, e, e'))]
\]

Following a suggestion of Parsons 1980, 1990 participant roles can be incorporated as in (14), Max drinks the beer.

\[
\exists e [\text{drink}(e) \land \text{agent}(e, Max) \land \text{patient}(e, \text{the beer})]
\]

This facilitates the nonspecification of the characterizing statement Max drinks in (15).

\[
\exists e [\text{drink}(e) \land \text{agent}(e, Max)].
\]

There is always the question of how the meanings of complex expressions are related to the simpler expressions they are constructed from: this aspect of composition is determined by model theory in Montague semantics, which is truth conditional with respect to possible worlds. Where traditional predicate and propositional logic was concerned only with extension (existence) in the (real) world, intensional logics allow for existence in a possible (hypothetical) world. Just as intensions are comparable with ‘sense’, extensions are comparable with ‘reference’ or, better, denoting something within a particular model or set of models.

**Dynamic semantics**

As a rule, any two successive references to an entity involve some kind of change to it on the second reference. For instance:

\[
\text{(16) Catch } \{\text{a chicken}_{1}\}. \text{ Kill } \{\text{it}_{2}\}. \text{ Pluck } \{\text{it}_{3}\}. \text{ Draw } \{\text{it}_{4}\}. \text{ Cut } \{\text{it}_{5}\} \text{ up. Marinade } \{\text{it}_{6}\}. \text{ Roast } \{\text{it}_{7}\}. \text{ When you’ve eaten } \{\text{it}_{8}\}, \text{ put } \{\text{the bones}_{9}\} \text{ in the compost.}
\]

All nine subscripted NPs refer to the creature identified in ‘a chicken’, which refers to a live chicken. By 2 it is dead, by 3 featherless, by 5 dismembered, by 7 roasted, and by 8 eaten. 9 refers to the chicken’s bones after the flesh has been stripped from them. Thus 7, for instance, refers not to the chicken in 1, but to the caught, killed, plucked, drawn, cut up, and marinaded pieces of chicken. Heim 1983, 1988 described this as updating the file on a referent. These successive states of the chicken are presented as updates in the world-time pair spoken of. The dynamic aim is similar in Discourse Representation Theory (DRT, Kamp 1981, Kamp and Reyle 1993) where the interpretation of one in a sequence of utterances (a discourse) is dependent on co-text such that the next utterance is an update of it. DRT has been especially successful in capturing the complex semantics of so-called donkey sentences, originating in Walter Burley’s *Omnis homo habens asinum videt illum* (see above). For instance, (17) (in a move presaged by Ockham) paraphrases as (18).
(17) Every girl who owns a pony loves it.
(18) If a girl owns a pony, she loves it.

A discourse representation structure (DRS) for (18) is (19). The arrow $\Rightarrow$ indicates that the second box is a consequence of the first. The lefthand box is interpreted first, then the righthand box. Notice that the anaphor for a-pony-loved-by-the-girl-who-owns-it is $z$, and it does not occur in the lefthand box. The DRS for (17) is (20).

\begin{align}
(19) & \quad x & \quad y & \quad z \\
& \text{girl}(x) & \text{pony}(y) & \Rightarrow \\
& x \text{ owns } y & & z = y \\
& & x \text{ loves } z
\end{align}

\begin{align}
(20) & \quad x & \quad y & \quad z \\
& \text{girl}(x) & \text{pony}(y) & \Rightarrow \\
& x \text{ owns } y & & \text{every } x \\
& & z = y \\
& & x \text{ loves } z
\end{align}

Notice that (20) does not say that Every girl owns a pony, whose DRS is (21).

\begin{align}
(21) & \quad x \\
& \text{girl}(x) & \Rightarrow \\
& & \text{every } x \\
& & \text{pony}(y) \\
& & x \text{ owns } y
\end{align}


**Conclusion**

This essay has sketched a history of semantics, but much is omitted. I began with concerns about what names are and where they come from, then turned to the persistent realist vs nominalist controversy as it concerns universals. I reviewed various opinions about the relationship between human minds, language expressions, and aspects of their meanings such as sense and intension, reference and extension. In the Western Classical Tradition, lexical semantics began with etymologies and glossaries of literary works that gave way to word lists with attributed meanings (both monolingual and bilingual) resembling modern dictionaries. Study of semantic relations among listemes gave rise to lexical semantics. Componential analysis began in the eighteenth century but in its modern form from the mid-twentieth. There have been very few exhaustive studies of the semantic components in any semantic field and componential analysis is moribund. There is also a serious problem determining what counts as a semantic prime/atom, despite the efforts of proponents of the Natural Semantics Metalanguage. Prototype semantics, stereotype semantics, and frame semantics complement rather than replace componential analysis. The contribution of syntax to the meaning of utterances was at last incorporated into semantic theory, though the efforts of Katz and Jackendoff really need to be augmented by the techniques of dynamic semantics. And the contribution of pragmatics has been completely ignored in this essay (see Allan 2001, Allan 2010).

[[WORDS 10811]]
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