Chapter 1

Introduction: Pragmatic objects and pragmatic methods

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The Cambridge Handbook of Pragmatics defines pragmatics from different points of view, presenting the main orientations in pragmatic research of both wide and narrow scope, incorporating seminal research as well as cutting-edge state-of-the-art solutions. It addresses the question of rational and empirical research methods, the question of what counts as an adequate and successful pragmatic theory, and how to go about answering the questions that pragmatic theory identifies. The Cambridge Handbook of Pragmatics aims to offer accessible introductions that present the many different problems and approaches to be found in the current literature on pragmatics.

There is no doubt that acts of communication deserve methodologically sound pragmatic theories. The state-of-the-art studies of discourse practices, utterance interpretation and processing, and acts of speech demonstrate that a lot of progress has been achieved since the times of programmatic slogans of ordinary language philosophers, urging philosophers and linguists to focus on language use rather than on fitting natural languages into the mould of formal languages of logic. First, we have progressed as far as the unit of analysis is concerned; while Grice (e.g. 1975) talked about pragmatic inferences from an utterance, a pragmatic equivalent of the syntactic unit of a sentence (albeit not necessarily a linguistic equivalent, showing to one’s interlocutor a picture or a clear gesture would do just as well), now we are equipped with sophisticated theories that take discourses as units of study. Second, we progressed beyond observations that assertives are not the centre of pragmatics, which we owe to Austin (1962), Searle (1969) and other speech act theorists, to sophisticated analyses of non-assertive acts of communication. Next, and arguably most importantly, we leaped forward to incorporate pragmatic theory into linguistics as a legitimate and even potentially formalizable level of analysis of language. At the same time, pragmatics remains the level that makes most use of rich and bidirectionally equally invaluable interfaces. The “pragmatic turn” (Mey 2001: 4) is now definable not only as a manifesto that proclaims a shift from the focus on sentence structure to the uses we make of sentences in communication as initiated by Peirce, Morris or Carnap, and nowadays generally associated with
Wittgenstein’s *Investigations* (1953). Instead, it is implemented as powerful pragmatic theories.

The message this collection sends out is that pragmatics is a well-established subdiscipline of linguistics and at the same time a progressive branch of philosophy of language. When Jacob Mey published his first edition of the *Concise Encyclopedia of Pragmatics* in 1998, he talked of pragmatics as a “relatively young science”, “a truly catholic discipline” in view of being a descendant of philosophy and linguistics (Mey 1998: xxvii). Judging from textbooks such as Levinson’s seminal *Pragmatics* (1983), it was indeed so; notwithstanding its depth of argumentation, that textbook is still sometimes described by professionals as a collection of articles that define the scope of a new discipline. We hope the current *Handbook* will testify to the enormous progress on this front. We also hope to have demonstrated progress in pragmatic methods as well as a slight shift of emphasis since that presented in the excellent handbook by Horn and Ward (2004) several years ago. The cutting edge research on the semantics/pragmatics interface led to the pragmatic turn orientation in the domains of the conceptualisation of syntax (Kempson), dynamic semantics and pragmatics (see Zeevat), two-dimensional semantics and pragmatics (Brogaard), the study of presupposition (van der Sandt), meaning and truth conditions (Recanati), compositionality and intentional contexts (Jaszczolt), literal/nonliteral distinction (Carston), to name only a few conspicuous examples. In another dimension, the volume also points out the progress in experimental methods for testing theories of discourse interpretation, and notably inference and automatic construal of intended meaning (Katsos, Giora, Allan, Haugh and Jaszczolt). Yet another welcome area of change in the general orientation of pragmatics is the increasing integration of the Anglo-American and continental European pragmatics. While the first has always been firmly based on the philosophical foundations of the ordinary language philosophy on the one hand, and the interface with grammar on the other, and has remained close to the philosophical outlook on conversation\(^1\), European researchers put more emphasis on the domains collectively called macropragmatics (see e.g.Verschueren 1999), including notably the domain of sociopragmatics and topics such as cross-cultural and intercultural communication and ideology. This integration is evident in several chapters in the volume (Kecskes, Haugh, and Terkourafi). Yet another dimension of integration is that of post-Gricean semantics/pragmatics disputes that adhere to the tool of truth conditions as for example in truth-conditional pragmatics (see Recanati 2004, 2010 and this volume) and cognitive

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\(^1\) See e.g. Huang 2007 on the interfaces with semantics and syntax.
linguistics. Non-literal meanings can be understood as part of truth-conditional content (see also Carston, this volume, and Jaszczolt 2005, 2010 and this volume), at the same time exemplifying human tendencies for certain kinds of conceptualisations.2

The *Handbook* is divided thematically into three sections. The first introduces problems and objects of study for pragmatics as well as the main current pragmatic theories. In agreement with the editors’ assessment of the current progress in pragmatics, more attention has been given to the problems and methods identified and followed by post-Griceans, such as the role of inference and intentions. Section II focuses on applications of pragmatic approaches to selected phenomena that present a particular challenge for this subdiscipline and that produced cutting-edge analyses in the literature. Section III follows with the most seminal interfaces into which pragmatic theory enters, reviewing, among others, the semantics/pragmatics and syntax/pragmatics boundary disputes.

The content of the chapters is as follows. The current chapter introduces readers to the aims, objectives, and objects of study of pragmatics, pointing out seminal discussions in the literature concerning the focus, scope and methods of pragmatic analysis largely through a discussion of the contributing chapters. Next, Mira Ariel’s ‘Research paradigms in pragmatics’ introduces the main orientations of Gricean inferential pragmatics, form/function pragmatics, and historical and typological pragmatics, also discussing the division of labour among them. For the most part, theories from different research paradigms complement each other, despite being in competition when they address the same linguistic phenomenon (e.g. the neo-Gricean versus Relevance-theoretic analyses of scalars and *and*). Ariel outlines three prominent research paradigms under the assumption that grammar is encoded and pragmatics is inferred. Grice’s insight about the crucial role of inferencing for conveying the speaker’s intended message has been adopted by all inferential pragmatics theories as a major ingredient in utterance interpretation. Form-function pragmatics uses naturally occurring examples to investigate a small subset of pragmatic meanings associated with constructions and discourse markers. Much historical and typological pragmatics research analyzes the current grammar as pragmatically motivated. All newly formed form/function correlations are crucially context-bound as interlocutors exploit grammar to fulfil interactional goals. Once grammaticalised (conventionalised) cancellability no longer applies, nor is contextual support needed. Each of these approaches amends the classical code model of language. For

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2 For a discussion of the compatibility of the cognitive and truth-conditional perspectives see also Jaszczolt 2002, chapter 17.7.
inferential pragmatists truth-conditional codes cannot exhaust speakers’ intended on-line meanings, because *ad hoc* contextual inferences are generated in addition. For form-function pragmatists, also, not all codes are truth-conditional. Finally, contra generative grammarians, historical/typological pragmatists argue that classical codes cannot account for possible versus impossible natural language grammars. Since each approach finds different flaws in the classical code model, they each enrich it, but differently. This is demonstrated in their different approaches to referring expressions. The conclusion is that all three paradigms are necessary for a complete picture of grammatical forms, and for what should be assigned pragmatic status.

In Chapter 3, ‘Saying, meaning, and implicating’, Kent Bach addresses Grice’s notion of saying and the post-Gricean concepts of *what is said*, *explicature*, and *implicature*, remarking on some deplorable confusions in the literature such as conflating implicated and inferred meaning or bestowing linguistic expressions, rather than speakers, with implicatures. It serves as an introduction to Grice’s intention-based view of communication, his intention-based theory of meaning and his notion of implicature. A speaker can say something without meaning it or she can mean something without saying it, by merely implicating or impliciting it. This is possible because we rely on recourse to common ground (including the conversational maxims) when communicating and on the very fact that the utterance is made under that condition. Bach therefore distinguishes linguistic and speaker’s meaning. He points out that Grice could usefully have invoked the Austinian differentiation of locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary acts rather than requiring that to say something entails meaning it. This would have clarified his account of the speaker saying, meaning, and the resulting communicative effect. Implicature is explained with the help of the concepts of intention, inference in communication, and a comparison with logical implication and is presented in the critical perspective of post-Gricean developments, including the disputes concerning the speaker’s vs the addressee’s perspective and the classification of implicit meanings. Like relevance theorists, Bach finds that the distinction between saying and implicating needs supplementing with *impliciture* (which overlaps RT *explicature*) for that part of meaning that is located between what is said and what is implicated. In brief, implicitures are cancellable expansions of what is said (such as *and* expanded to ‘and then’, *It’s raining* to ‘it is raining here and now’). Conversational maxims or what Bach prefers to call *presumptions* do not directly generate implicatures and implicitures but raise possibilities that the hearer should take into account when figuring out the speaker’s message. A hearer
does not necessarily have to infer the thing the speaker implicates but merely that the speaker implicates (means) it.

The confusions surrounding implicature are further discussed and relevant issues are clarified in the next chapter, in which Larry Horn, like Kent Bach, emphasises that speakers *implicate*, while hearers *infer*. The chapter ‘Implying and inferring’ offers a thoughtful analysis of the foundations of the Gricean program and of the term *implicature*, with recourses into the history of relevant concepts such as Frege’s defence of conventional implicatures (‘andeuten’). Horn discusses the various meanings and uses of *infer, imply, and implicate*, as well as the nouns *explicature* and *implicature*. He points out that so-called Gricean scalar implicature from *some* to *not all* was recognized by Mill as early as 1867 who pointed out that the use of the word ‘some’ is normally associated with the denial of the possibility of the use of a stronger word ‘all’. This is an early refutation of those who contend that *some* simply means ‘not all’. Horn discusses and compares the original Gricean maxims, his own Q and R principles, Levinson’s three way Q, I and M principles, and the single Relevance theory principle of relevance. He holds to the Gricean view that conversational implicature arises from the shared presumption that speaker and hearer interact to reach a shared goal. He criticizes Levinson for defining generalized conversational implicatures as default inferences, arguing that an implicature is an aspect of speaker’s meaning, not hearer’s interpretation – although many others too fail to make such a distinction. There are, of course, many who dispute that GCIs are defaults. Pragmatic enrichments that supply the conditions necessary to build truth-evaluable propositions involve what Recanati has called *saturation* and Bach completion. Horn argues that Bach’s impliciture – constructed from what is said – such that *some N* (= what is said) implicitly communicates ‘not all N’ (= what is meant), but on a Gricean account this combines with what is said to yield ‘Some but not all’ such that impliciture includes scalar implicature and does not supplant it. Such scalar implicatures are challenged by Relevance theorists and relegated to pragmatically derived components of propositional content known as explicatures. As a confirmed Gricean, Horn finds explication an unnecessary category of analysis.

In ‘Speaker intentions and intentionality’, Michael Haugh and Kasia Jaszczolt focus on the role of intentions in communication. They assess the link between intentions and the property of intentionality exhibited by relevant mental states and continue by discussing the explanatory function of various types of intentions identified in the literature, pointing out strengths and weaknesses of utilising intentions as well as the question of where intentions are located, contrasting cognitive, interactional and discursive perspectives. They put the
intention-based theory of utterance meaning into a philosophical perspective of the intentionality of mental states which underlie communication (although allowing that cognitive pragmatics assumes that the recognition and attribution of communicative intentions underlies communication). They raise the question of how pragmatic theory can be soundly founded on the imprecise and empirically untestable notions of intentions and intentionality defined as the act of consciousness directed at an object. Haugh and Jaszczolt counter that the advantages outweigh this shortcoming, claiming for instance that intentionality better predicts speaker meaning as the means used to convey the speaker’s intention than alternatives such as default rules of inference and the semanticized pragmatic relations between sentences postulated in dynamic approaches to meaning. Intensions in communication derive their theoretical status from the intentionality of consciousness which is hopefully to be revealed by experiments in neuroscience. Speech acts have basic intentionality as externalizations of mental states, and also derived intentionality as linguistic objects, thus the same conditions of satisfaction pertain to the mental intention and to the linguistic intention. There is speaker intention as envisaged by Grice, but is this a private goal of the speaker or is it also the intention to achieve a social goal? Furthermore the intention in some cooperative endeavours is a we-intention and even an emergent co-constructed intention. Thus the notions of intention and intentionality are productively deployed in many different ways in pragmatics.

Chapter 6, ‘Context and content: Pragmatics in Two-Dimensional Semantics’, moves into the domain of context as understood and approached in two-dimensional semantics. Berit Brogaard explains the utility of David Kaplan’s content-character distinction in accounting for indexical expressions, as well as the advantages of a formal notion of context, where context cannot be simply identified with a speech situation. She also discusses links between context-sensitivity and cognitive informativeness. Context figures in the interpretation of utterances in many different ways. In the tradition of possible-worlds semantics, the seminal account of context-sensitive expressions such as indexicals and demonstratives is that of Kaplan's two-dimensional semantics (the content-character distinction), further pursued in various directions by Stalnaker, Chalmers, and others. The two dimensions are (1) narrow content which can take the form of linguistic meanings (e.g., functions from context to content) or descriptive Fregean contents, and (2) wide content is a set of possible worlds or a structured Russellian proposition consisting of properties and/or physical objects. This chapter introduces and assesses the notion of context-sensitivity presented by the various two-dimensional frameworks, with a special focus on how it relates to the notion of cognitive
significance and whether it includes an intuitively plausible range of expressions within its scope. Three types of two-dimensional semantic frameworks are assessed in terms of how well they account for the connection between cognitive significance and the broader notion of context-sensitivity. It is argued that context-sensitivity and cognitive significance are, to some extent, inseparable. For example, linguistic strings have twin tokens with a different content that David Chalmers calls ‘twin-earthable expressions’. When an earthling uses *water*, the term picks out H$_2$O; when this earthling’s counterpart on Twin-Earth uses *water*, it picks out XYZ (to exploit a notion of Putnam’s). Thus *water* has a variable character and is broadly context-sensitive, which helps explain the cognitive significance of sentences such as *water is H$_2$O*: the earthling may not know what determines the character of *water*, so being told that the character of *water* determines H$_2$O is informative. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the prospects of using epistemic two-dimensional semantics to account for context-sensitive expressions in dynamic discourse.

In Chapter 7 François Recanati introduces the orientation of contextualism in the theory of meaning and defends it against some competing views. Among others, he addresses the issue of compositionality, context-dependent meanings in lexical pragmatics, and the contextualist concept of content modulation. His ‘Contextualism: some varieties’ reviews several different positions with respect to contextualism. In the modular position, to determine what the speaker means, pragmatics takes as input the output of semantics, but they do not mix, and in particular, pragmatic processes do not interfere with the process of semantic composition which, based on what is said, outputs the truth-conditions and ignores the speaker’s beliefs and intentions. But some contextualists hold that pragmatic competence is involved in the determination of truth-conditional content because the semantic value of a context-sensitive expression varies from occurrence to occurrence as a function of what the speaker means. In addition, the content of an expression may depend on the speaker’s context, e.g. whether *water* is H$_2$O or XYZ; therefore every expression is context-sensitive. So Recanati concludes that, at least for a contextualist, context-sensitivity is pervasive in natural language and that, rather than an algorithmic, grammar-driven process, semantic interpretation is a matter of holistic guesswork that seeks to make sense of what the speaker is saying. Nonetheless, the adjusted (called here modulated) sense of an expression $e$ in a context $c$ is the result of applying a so-called modulation function $mod\ (e,\ c)$ that is appropriate for this context to its semantic interpretation $I(e)$ – which is a moderate form of contextualism.

Next, in ‘The psychology of utterance processing: context vs salience’, Rachel Giora focuses on the process of utterance interpretation, considering the salience of the lexicon vi-
à-vis context-dependent meaning and introducing her influential \textit{Graded Salience Hypothesis} according to which contextually irrelevant lexical meanings are activated to a certain degree. She discusses a number of factors that shape utterance interpretation: salient/coded meanings, contextual information, and their unfolding interaction (or lack of it). Experiments show that salient meanings cannot be blocked, not even by a strong context. Such contexts do not facilitate non-coded, inferred or novel interpretations such as irony, but they do slow down ironic targets compared to more salient literal counterparts. Novel metaphoric items in supportive contexts take longer to read compared to their salient (normally literal) interpretation. Non-coded ironic utterances are always processed according to their most salient (often literal) meaning first, despite a strongly supportive context. The Graded Salience Hypothesis posits that salient meanings are activated faster than less salient ones. In addition, suppression of contextually incompatible meanings is sensitive to discourse goals and requirements, allowing for contextually incompatible meanings and interpretations to be retained if they are invited, supportive or non-intrusive. Salience is a matter of degree: regardless of its degree of literality, a meaning is salient if it is coded in the mental lexicon and enjoys prominence due to cognitive priority, experiential familiarity, frequency, or conventionality. Contra Grice, nonliteral interpretations may be the default, even when innovative, free of semantic anomaly, and context-less; for example, statements such as \textit{He is not exceptionally bright} are assigned an ironic interpretation even outside a specific context. The psychology of utterance processing is a multi-faceted phenomenon whose products may be surprisingly creative and even amusing.

In Chapter 9, ‘Sentences, utterances, and speech acts’, Mikhail Kissine revives Speech Act Theory, revisiting the concept of illocutionary force and the sentence-utterance-speech act links. He seeks to sort out the interrelationships among sentences, utterances and illocutionary contents. He disputes Searle’s view that any illocutionary act type IA can be matched with a certain sentence type \( s \) in such a way that IA corresponds to the literal meaning of \( s \); i.e. that illocutionary force is directly derivable from sentence meaning. Kissine demonstrates that imperative mood does not necessarily signal directive illocutionary force and that entreaties such as \textit{Have a nice day} are not indirect or non-literal speech acts. He argues convincingly that non-directive uses of the imperative mood are as literal and direct as the directive ones. Kissine takes up Grice’s point that uttering a sentence amounts to its acquiring an illocutionary force. If the speaker wishes to express the belief that \( p \), the utterance will be an assertive speech act; if it is that the speaker intends to bring about the truth of \( p \), the utterance will be a directive. A speaker who is sarcastic does not say anything,
but just makes (acts) as if to say something – which is counter-intuitive. A sarcastic utterance of *Of course, John is ready* is a full-fledged, contextually determined proposition and not just a propositional radical. The semantics of sentence-types constrains which locutionary-act types the utterance of sentences can potentially constitute and the locutionary act performed in turn constrains the range of direct illocutionary forces. Although a rational reconstruction of the steps leading to the recognition of the illocutionary point can be proposed, according to Bach and Harnish’s standardisation thesis the illocutionary point of a conventionalised indirect speech act is automatically derived without going through the derivation of the primary, literal speech act. This is a good reason for not taking rational reconstructions of indirect speech act interpretation as reflecting actual interpretive processes; especially since, well before the age of seven, children respond adequately to indirectness and produce conventionalised indirect requests, but have not yet mastered second-order mental state attribution such as is required for understanding irony and for lying efficiently. The hypothesis also allows that explicit performatives can be interpreted as assertions, notwithstanding the fact that, in most cases, explicit performatives are not interpreted as assertions.

Next, in ‘Pragmatics in update semantics’, Henk Zeevat introduces a group of formal approaches to meaning known under the umbrella term of *update semantics* and suggests looking at them as a way of formalising pragmatics. This is a natural way of approaching them because they stress the importance of the dynamism of discourse in that information states are regularly updated by new information. He focuses in this chapter on presupposition, implicature, speech acts, and disambiguation, and concludes by emphasising the methodological advantage of the orientation in its power to test predictions. He regards update semantics as central to any theory of interpretation because it is a technical tool for being precise about what utterances do to information states involved in communication. A new utterance updates an existing information state and the basic formula is simple: the update of $\phi$, written $[\phi]$ on an information state $\sigma$ (written $\sigma[\phi]$) could be given as $\sigma$ restricted to those worlds $M$ such that $[[\phi]](M) = \text{true}$. Update semantics is shown to be central to accounts of pronouns and presupposition. Update semantics is also useful in resolving issues with the communicative effect of, e.g. *John has two pigs*: resolving whether this answers such questions as *How many pigs does John have?* or *What animals does John have?* or *Who has pigs?*. It can also seek to establish the relevance of an utterance and suggest that surprising information be questioned, doubtful information should be justified, and the background clarified if there is ambiguity. Update semantics offers a rigorous account of slow
and continuous shifts in the meaning such as that from root to epistemic modality. Finally, Zeevat claims that the changes in information states captured in update semantics can be evaluated experimentally.

Jaroslav Peregrin’s contribution ‘The normative dimension of discourse’ concerns an interesting but often neglected topic of pragmatism and normativity. He addresses the issue of a model of discourse as a rule-governed enterprise and discusses the, largely implicit, rules that allow people to engage in discursive practices. He introduces the latter following the views of Wilfrid Sellars and Robert Brandom, starting with rules of material inference and ending with a normative use-theory of meaning, seeing meaning of expressions as their inferential roles. He argues that discourse interacts with normative relationships among people, relationships such as obligations or entitlements. He explores the possibility that normativity is crucial for language: a certain kind of normativity is actively constitutive of our distinctively human mind (reason), founding our concepts and infiltrating the semantics of our language. If this is true, then normativity is a key ingredient of our speech acts. An underlying assumption is that language is not merely for transfer of information but foremost a means of achieving practical ends. His concept of meaning is distinctly pragmatic: an expression means something when it is correct to use it in this way, which gives rise to a set of rules. Such rules are social facts, a collective awareness of corresponding behavioural regularities in both compliance and deviation. A boundless number of meanings are acquired in the achievement of practical aims of communicating, such that lexical items are tools rather than ‘codes’.

For example, *This is a dog* means that ‘this is a dog’ because normally the speaker is disposed to use the word *dog* when referring to a dog. More often than not, this disposition does not provoke overt utterance: the link between referent and utterance is normative rather than causal: it is correct to utter *This is a dog* when a dog is in focus. It is for this reason that a rule is said to be a matter of a collective awareness of what is correct where something else is incorrect, leading to the appropriate behaviour. The correlation between *This is a dog* and its referent identifies a convention that identifies a kind of habit, but also a habit that is a norm because it identifies what is taken to be correct and appropriate behaviour. Applications to artificial intelligence are also discussed.

Chapter 12 moves to the domain of the lexicon. In ‘Pragmatics in the (English) lexicon’, Keith Allan focuses on the interaction of semantics and pragmatics in the lexicon, accounting for frequency, familiarity and speakers’ assumptions. He examines ways in which pragmatics intrudes on the lexicon, which is largely an addition to the semantic specifications; for instance, it is useful to identify the default meanings and connotations of listemes. Default
meanings are those that are applied more frequently by more people and normally with
greater certitude than any alternatives. Pragmatic components include encyclopaedic data
such as the euphemistic status and the origin of jeepers, and nonmonotonic inferences (NMI):
in addition to the lexicon entry specifying the necessary components of meaning in the
semantics for an entry, it should also specify the most probable additional components of
meaning, which are accepted or cancelled as a function of contextual constraints (such as that
bull typically denotes a bovine but when used of, say, a whale, this meaning is cancelled). A
credibility metric is proposed for propositions and used to calibrate NMIs in the lexicon to
correspond with the degree of confidence one might have in the truth of the inference (e.g.
the bull will denote a bovine in an estimated number of cases). A review of collective and
collectivizable nouns (mostly game animals) reveals that whereas different interpretations for
collective nouns arise from their morphosyntactic context (a fact that needs to be captured in
the lexicon), nouns that are collectivizable occur under the pragmatic constraint that they are
restricted to a defined set of contexts. Discussion of the much disputed semantics of and
postulates a uniform semantics by which English and has the semantics of logical
conjunction but there is a graded salience captured in an algorithm that assigns one of a set of
nonmonotonic inferences as supplementary meaning on the basis of context. A minimalist
semantics is proposed for sorites terms: e.g. if baldness is defined as lack of a full
complement of hair, two speakers, or the same speaker on different occasions, may differ as
to what counts as ‘not a full complement of hair’ such that there is no single state of hair-loss
for which it is invariably true of x that x is bald for all occasions and all speakers.

Next, in ‘Conversational interaction’, Michael Haugh introduces approaches to
conversation, focusing on Conversation Analysis and stressing its view of conversation as
emergent and non-summative, all of which is amply illustrated with insightfully analysed
excerpts from dialogues. He emphasises that pragmatic phenomena cannot all be subsumed
under emergent phenomena of the ‘here and now’: social and cultural factors also have to be
given their due attention. Therefore, he supplements the discussion with situatedness in
sociocognitive worlds of interlocutors. The framework for analysing pragmatic phenomena in
conversational interaction is based on a tripartite distinction among pragmatic meaning,
action, and evaluation, which along with investigations of the interactional machinery and the
sociocognitive engine underpinning conversation, forms the basis of a program for
investigating the pragmatics of conversational interaction. A wide range of methodologies are
used to elicit the properties of emergence and situatedness that characterize conversational
interaction. While face-to-face conversation dominates our use of language, different types of
computer-mediated communication are increasingly frequent in our daily lives (instant messaging, asynchronous forms such as email exchanges, blogs, discussion boards and social networks). These need to be accommodated within dyadic as well as multipartite theories of conversational interaction in pragmatics. They also tend to refute the assumption that talk is inherently fleeting because they often log the conversation to leave a record that engenders greater metalanguage and metapragmatic awareness amongst interactants themselves, with such awareness offering a rich analytical vein for future research on conversational interaction.

In the final chapter of this section, ‘Experimental investigations and pragmatic theorising’, Napoleon Katsos addresses the collaboration of pragmatics and psycholinguistics, viewing pragmatics as a discipline aspiring to cognitive plausibility. In the discussion he draws on recent experimental evidence, in particular in the domain of scalar implicature. He cites experimental evidence from both young children and adults measuring the time-course of the process of meaning derivation and noting the preferences when assessing competing default vs unitary accounts of scalar implicature (SI). Broadly speaking, default accounts stem directly from the work of Grice whereas unitary accounts stem from Relevance Theory. Some experimental results favour the unitary account, but others counter it. Neither the default nor the unitary hypothesis is completely vindicated by experimental results. Some discrepancies are explained on the assumption that the richer experience of adults leads them to interpret SI differently from young children. Katsos suggests that minor changes in the details of an experimental design impact the interpretation of the data. One conclusion is that Gricean maxims, being essentially philosophical heuristics, enjoy some psycholinguistic validity.

Section II opens with the arguably most commonly discussed topic in theories of meaning, namely that of reference and referring in discourse. In Chapter 15, ‘Referring in discourse’, Arthur Sullivan offers an overview of Russell’s approach and Strawson’s objections to it, discussing the notions reference and speaker’s referring against the background of, and from the perspective of, current minimalism-contextualism debates. The question that emerges from this perspective is whether reference is a context-dependent or context-independent notion. He defines reference as a relation between a use of an expression and the entity it stands for. He points out that in strict usage within philosophy the term applies only to the relation between singular terms (such as proper names and pronouns) and what they are used to single out. Thus, a sentence such as The oldest woman in Mongolia expresses a general proposition and its subject NP does not refer whereas the proper noun in Brigitte was sexy does (typically) refer. Strawson challenged this Russellian orthodoxy with his concept of the
act of referring by a speaker. Thus reference depends on the speaker’s context-specific communicative intentions. This is the more usual interpretation within linguistics. Next, the semantics of an indexical referring expression specifies a relation that is contextually dependent and is not constant across distinct uses, whereas the reference of a non-indexical is constant across different uses. A distinction made between speaker’s reference and semantic reference correlates with that between pragmatic context-conditioned speaker’s meaning and context-independent semantic meaning or between Kaplan’s content vs character and Frege’s *Bedeutung* and *Sinn*.

The problem of reference is continued in the next chapter ‘Propositional attitude reports: pragmatic aspects’, in which Kasia M. Jaszczolt addresses pragmatic aspects of propositional attitude constructions and attitude ascription. Propositional attitudes have traditionally been discussed in the domains of philosophy of language and formal semantics where the core issues are truth-preserving substitutivity and semantic compositionality. In this chapter reference and referring in intensional contexts are approached from the perspective of an act of communication, and compositionality is shifted to the domain of pragmatics. She argues that reports on people’s cognitive attitudes (such as believing, doubting, knowing, fearing, or hoping) pose a problem for pragmatics as well as for semantics. A belief (e.g. that the author of *Wolf Hall* is visiting Cambridge) may be reported in very many different ways. For instance, the holder of the attitude knows the identity of the subject of the uttered sentence and is able to substitute other expressions to refer to them; does not know the identity of the subject and holds a, so to speak, ‘half-digested attitude’; is mistaken as to the identity of the subject. Furthermore, all these also apply to the reporter. Interpersonal differences in background information constitute a pragmatic problem. There is too the semantic problem with substitutivity *salva veritate* of coreferential expressions giving rise to either *de re* or *de dicto* readings. Ideally if two expressions have the same meaning, then they have all properties in common but, in reality, individuals may have different thoughts associated with the subject of the belief; thus Jaszczolt wants to introduce into the semantic representation a theoretical derivative of the mode of presentation (MoP) under which a belief is held. Normally, the speaker formulates the utterance in such a way that its meaning can be recovered by the addressee without creating ambiguities or mismatches between the intended meaning and the recovered meaning. But an exception arises when the addressee’s informational state is misjudged by the speaker. This can be dealt with, says Jaszczolt, when semantics is conceived of as contextualist. MoP is examined in the light of the proposals of Schiffer, contextualists like Recanati, intensionalists like Chalmers, and mentalists like
Fodor. Jaszczolt also asks whether belief reports should be analysed in terms of the way it is assessed by a hearer rather than, or as well as, in terms of speaker intention. All in all, in the contextualist spirit, she argues that the pragmatics of attitude reports is crucial to discussions concerning their meaning.

In ‘Presupposition and accommodation in discourse’, Rob van der Sandt introduces the concept of presupposition and asks pertinent questions concerning the behaviour of presupposed information in discourse. He discusses the semantic and pragmatic roles of presupposition and employs the concept of accommodation as a solution to bridging the gap between information content in a sequence of sentences/utterances. The main part of the paper is devoted to the presentation of accommodation in the dynamic framework of Discourse Representation Theory, demonstrating thereby the interaction of semantic and pragmatic content. Van der Sandt defines presupposition as information that is taken for granted by the participants in a conversation; the nonpresuppositional remainder is either asserted, questioned, requested, and so forth. There is a general condition that the presupposition has to be given for the non-presuppositional remainder to be interpretable. If the presuppositional information is not already in common ground (such as prior discourse) but nevertheless uncontroversial, a cooperative hearer will construct the context to include the required information (e.g. My daughter’s husband has just been kidnapped addressed to someone that did not know the speaker had a daughter, and a fortiori not that she was married). Lewis called this ‘accommodation’ which is here shown to be constrained by conditions on binding (understood as a discourse relation) and the cooperative principle.

Accommodation adds presuppositional material to the common ground. Normally, sentences are interpreted in context but when uttered in isolation a sentence typically offers clues as to what contexts would qualify for it to be felicitously interpreted: constraints of global and local informativity and consistency suffice as constraints on acceptability. Van der Sandt argues for presuppositional expressions being anaphoric expressions similar to pronouns in that they induce a search through discourse structures in order to find a suitable antecedent to link up with. But they differ from pronouns and other impoverished anaphors in their structure and content. In If France has a king, the king of France is bald the antecedent of the conditional implies that France may have a king and this cancels the presupposition that France does have a king. If the addressee cannot find an antecedent for a pronoun, the sentence/utterance cannot be interpreted; the algorithm does not end in completion. Finally, van der Sandt adopts Partee’s suggestion that verb tense be treated as a kind of pronoun and
encodes the tense morpheme as a presuppositional expression consisting of an anaphoric variable and an associated temporal constraint.

In Chapter 18, ‘Negation’, Jay David Atlas addresses the phenomenon that gave rise to the semantics/pragmatics boundary disputes of the 1970s, namely the functioning and scope of negation. He introduces what came to be known in some circles as the Atlas-Kempson thesis, saying that negation is semantically underspecified between wide and narrow scope, leaving a role to play for pragmatic inference in further precisification. He assesses this view against other solutions in pragmatic theory. The chapter begins by reviewing Aristotle’s account of negation on sentences and terms, and the characterizing of contraries, subcontraries, and contradictories. Next, he points out that not sentences encompass exclusion negations, the exclusion of exclusion negations, choice negations, and forms of meta-linguistic negations. He answers Horn’s criticism of the Atlas-Kempson thesis that not sentences are semantically non-specific rather than lexically or scope ambiguous. Semantical non-specificity makes pragmatic inference essential to every interpretation of utterances of not sentences, removes the unmotivated asymmetry in the application of Gricean implicatures to negative sentence-strings, provides a theoretical foundation for research in semantic processing, and provides a perspective from which to assess the controversies between the semantical underdeterminists and the minimal semanticists.

Another seminal issue for pragmatics is that of sentential and discourse connectives. In ‘Connectives’, Caterina Mauri and Johan van der Auwera discuss the phenomena in an impressively broad, cross-linguistic, typological perspective, dispelling the myths of their universality at the syntactic or semantic level, at the same time opening a new ground-breaking perspective for their pragmatic study. They conclude that what is left to inferential mechanisms of interpretation in some languages or at some diachronic stage of a language may be part of the encoded semantics in other languages or at successive diachronic stages. The connection between states of affairs (SoAs) may be encoded by invariable discourse connectives, auxiliaries, clitics, pre- and post-positions, case affixes, adverbial affixes and suprasegmental marking. The authors show that simple juxtaposition may give rise to inferred sequentiality which becomes established in the semantics of the connection and in turn gives rise to causal and purposive relations. The burden of communication gradually passes from pragmatics to semantics. Disjunctive connectives frequently develop from the overt indication of the potential nature of the linked SoAs: speakers reinterpret irrealis markers, such as dubitative adverbs, hypothetical forms, or interrogative markers, as the overt indicators of the notion of an alternative, thus reanalyzing them as disjunctive connectives. If
only one of the pair of SoAs is irrealis it may invite a conditional reading. Adversative
connectives frequently derive from sources denoting temporal values: the co-existence over
time of two SoAs comes to be perceived as a surprising one: a consequence of the fact that
the differences existing between the two events are foregrounded at the expense of their
temporal relation.

In Chapter 20, ‘Spatial reference in discourse’, Luna Filipović discusses spatial reference
in a cross-linguistic perspective focusing on its universal and language-specific aspects. She
presents the problem of the conceptualization of the relationship between objects and events,
assessing the dispute concerning the trade-off between universalism and relativity. Reviewing
discussions on the relation between spatial structures and semantic/conceptual structures by,
among others, Jackendoff, Talmy and Levinson, Filipović concludes that the various
perceivable characteristics of phenomena such as e.g. figure, ground, a point, a line, a plane, a
boundary, parallelness, perpendicularity, horizontality, adjacency, contact, support,
containment, and relative magnitude are universal, but the way in which languages capture
them varies greatly. Uncertain is the extent to which Talmy’s categories of verb-framed vs
satellite-framed languages generalises. When we habitually express certain features, they
become entrenched and it seems that languages, cultures and environments make some
perceptual, conceptual and linguistic features more or less salient. It seems that languages
reflect a culture’s dominant perspective, but this does not preclude the registration of other
spatial properties that can be used and referred to in discourse.

The next contribution, by Louis de Saussure, follows suit with ‘Temporal reference in
discourse’. While tense and aspect have enjoyed wide coverage in the linguistic literature,
there has been little discussion of pragmatic inferences from temporal and aspectual
information where it is not overtly encoded in the lexicon or grammar. De Saussure helps fill
this gap by addressing temporality and aspectuality from the perspective of pragmatic, mainly
post-Gricean theory. He illustrates the discussion with cross-linguistic comparisons.
Temporal reference needs to include the aspectual properties of the represented eventuality
and also modality to resolve any conflict between the time indicated by a tense and a salient
time stemming from other information (as with epistemic futures). Grammatical tenses and
temporal adverbials are often poor guides to the temporality of an event or state intended by
the speaker. In languages where tense and aspect are optional, reliance on pragmatic means of
conveying temporality is even more pronounced. The chapter shows how aspect, a central
conceptual feature of verbs and verb clauses, is changed by pragmatic processing under
various contextual conditions. Tense provides only hints about how to construct the
pragmatically meaningful temporal reference; it is manipulated to fulfil discursive aims (e.g. through deictic shifting). Pragmatic accommodation of aspect is shown in several languages (e.g. *Al and Kate knew each other at university* is understood inchoatively). Pragmatic implicatures of a pair of sentences like *Mary came in. John stood up* suggest a temporal sequence. *I didn’t turn off the stove* can be understood as a deictic present; also pragmatically present is the initial clause in *I wondered if you’d like to come to supper on Saturday.* Finally, de Saussure discusses some pragmatic issues relating to the temporal interpretation of connectives and indexicals.

Chapter 22 pertains to ‘Textual coherence as a pragmatic phenomenon’. Anita Fetzer addresses the question of what makes a text coherent and discusses aspects of context that are relevant for that purpose. The core importance of this topic lies in the fact, too often ignored by pragmatists, that patterns can be found also in units larger than a sentence or a speech act. Fetzer points to the difficulty in accounting for textual coherence because of its inherent dynamism and complex, multi-facetted nature and the fact that the whole is more than the sum of its parts: it is simultaneously process and product, co-constructed with heavy reliance on deductive and abductive reasoning, inference and implicature. In discourse, common ground for the individual and the collective common ground are continuously updated: ratified discourse units and their ratified presuppositions being allocated to the collective discourse common ground. Coherence arises from a proper narrative structure and proper interplay between given and new information, theme and rheme, the sequential organization of communicative action (e.g. adjacency pairs), preference organization, and observation of the cooperative maxims. Fetzer examines thematic structure, discourse relations and discourse connectives, and ends by analysing the links between textual coherence, cooperation, common ground, and the many aspects of context.

In Chapter 23 we move to the topic of literal vs nonliteral discourse. In ‘Metaphor and the literal/nonliteral distinction’, Robyn Carston presents the phenomenon of nonliteralness, concentrating on various approaches to metaphor and on the comparison between metaphor and other tropes and, in particular, irony. Grice treated all instances of nonliteral language use (metaphor, metonymy, hyperbole, understatement, irony, etc.) as cases where a speaker says something so blatantly false, uninformative or irrelevant, that the hearer is prompted to undertake an inferential process to recover what the speaker really means. Thus nonliteral language is indirect communication, with the figurative meaning derived through conversational implicature. Carston critically assesses Grice’s pragmatic account; one objection is that to deliberately produce a blatantly false utterance is a pointless irrational act
since the speaker could express her intended meaning by producing a literal utterance which would be easily grasped by the hearer. Carston cites psycholinguistic experiments that claim metaphorical interpretations are derived automatically whenever the context makes them accessible. She further argues for a categorical distinction between metaphor and irony; the latter echoically metarepresents someone else’s thought and expresses a negative attitude toward it. Carston moves on to introducing the idea of _ad hoc_ concepts pursued in recent lexical pragmatics (e.g. describing someone as a chameleon to indicate their frequently changing opinions: which picks only one aspect of the lizard – and partially at that). These contribute the *explicature* of the utterance. This is in line with developments in cognitive linguistics wherein metaphorically used language is fundamental within thought. The chapter concludes by revisiting the literal/nonliteral distinction against the background of some recent discussions in the literature.

Section III opens with a historical perspective on pragmatics. In ‘Pragmatics in the history of linguistic thought’, Andreas H. Jucker traces the development of pragmatics as a subdiscipline of linguistics, pointing to an unprecedented diversification of subfields of pragmatics, especially in the continental European tradition. At the same time other fields of linguistics have extended to encompass a pragmatic perspective as well. There are paradigm shifts such as that in historical pragmatics from a study of native speaker competence to a study of language use, with a concomitant shift to reliance on corpus-based methods. Such investigations focus much more on the heterogeneity and variability of the data than on the homogeneity. Jucker begins by outlining the roots of pragmatics in the academic traditions of the nineteenth and early twentieth century and assesses the contributions of many relevant philosophers and linguists in the Anglo-American and continental European orientations, including Peirce, Morris, Carnap, Wittgenstein, moving on to Austin and Grice. He distinguishes the Anglo-American tradition as focusing on the study of meaning arising from the use of language, whereas the continental European tradition is more sociolinguistically and culturally oriented to a general account of language in use. Contrastive pragmatics sets out to compare interactive patterns in different cultures, while intercultural pragmatics focuses on the interactions between members of different cultures. The latter began by looking at the factors that prevent understanding but has progressed to analyse the processes that lead to mutual understanding. Experimental pragmatics uses elicitation techniques. The chapter concludes with a prospective on the future of pragmatics.

Next, we move to a series of papers on interfaces. In Chapter 25, ‘Semantics without pragmatics’, Emma Borg addresses the semantics/pragmatics boundary, defending the
concept of minimal semantics through cautious but powerful arguments and juxtaposing it with the contextualist construal and with a radical non-propositional minimalism. Borg argues against a strong version of the view that semantics deals with decontextualized meaning and pragmatics with meaning that varies according to context. She argues that sentences with demonstratives and (other) indexicals must appeal to context, thus context-sensitivity is an all-pervasive, core feature of linguistic meaning requiring contextual contribution to the conditions under which a proposition is evaluated for truth. Borg defends minimal (radical) semantics which strictly constrains the input of pragmatics to semantics and which is, to a large extent, free from contextual input: sentences express minimal propositions or minimal truth conditions that are recoverable via a grasp of word meaning and sentence structure alone and which do not require significant appeal to a context of utterance prior to their recovery. That leaves pragmatics to deal with context dependent speaker meaning. She carefully assesses the compatibility of this view with other main approaches in the boundary dispute, concluding that the compatibility is greater than it is usually thought to be. However she does admit certain unresolved problems for minimal semantics.

In Chapter 26, Ruth Kempson pursues the topic of ‘The syntax-pragmatics interface’, taking syntax to operate on discourses rather than sentences. Syntax is viewed as a set of mechanisms that pertain to utterances and their logical forms. As a result, the syntax/pragmatics interaction persists throughout any derivation. Kempson begins by reviewing the legacy of a distinction made between syntactic and semantic components of a grammar with pragmatics outside the grammarian’s remit. Recently, though, not only have semanticists sought to incorporate contextual considerations but have increasingly incorporated pragmatic properties such as generalized conversational implicatures. Contextualists agree that, due to interaction between information supplied by the grammar and pragmatic processes, there is more to utterance understanding than a narrow concept of sentence meaning provides. Furthermore, there is evidence of overlap between syntax and pragmatics, which is particularly evident with respect to ellipsis (gapping, stripping, sluicing, etc.) that has both sentence internal properties and some extending across sentences (anaphora and tense construal likewise). Lots of evidence is given for the grammatical, semantic and pragmatic properties inherent in elliptical expressions. Kempson demonstrates how a dynamic syntax can account for the underspecification of structure and content by logging the updating of context represented in tree structures, including those linked in discourse structures, using a modal logic of finite trees (LOFT). Thus, syntax is defined as the
dynamics whereby interpretation is built up. Although the trees represent parses, Kempson claims that sentence generation follows the same process such that parsers and producers alike use strategies for building up representations of content, either to establish interpretation for a sequence of words, or to find words which match the content to be conveyed. Thus texts (discourses) are seen as the growth of semantic representations with pragmatics as the articulation of constraints determining natural language syntax.

Next, in ‘Pragmatics and language change’, Elizabeth Closs Traugott puts pragmatics to use in addressing questions in historical linguistics. Although there is a view that meaning change derives from syntactic change, a more realistic hypothesis is that people contribute to language change throughout their lives. Interlocutors are active partners in the communicative dyad and may be invited to make novel inferences (as in the case of Carston’s “ad hoc concepts”). Change is both internal and driven by social factors. Where an expression $p$ implicates $q$ (there is an invited inference from $p$ that $q$) there may come a time when $p$ means $q$ (is ambiguous between ‘$p$’ and ‘$q$’) and eventually the ‘$p$’ sense disappears leaving only the ‘$q$’ sense. Traugott associates semantic narrowing with Horn’s Q-principle and semantic broadening with his R-principle. Discussing Levinson’s Q, I and M heuristics (wherein $Q > M > I$) Q accounts for conservatism, M for change. The semanticization of implicatures requires them to first be salient within a community. An important cognitive mechanism underlying change is metonymy, i.e. the co-presence of elements within the same conceptual framework. Shifts from temporal to casual, concessive, or conditional, or from deontic to epistemic modality all involve increase in subjectivity (revealing speaker point of view) over time within and across semantic domains. Traugott discusses many examples of change and emphasises the persistent significance of context. She also points to some other sources of semantic change than invited inference.

Chapter 28, ‘Pragmatics and prosody’, concerns the relationship between prosody and intentional communication. It is widely acknowledged that voice quality, pitch variation, the length of syllables and other pragmatic factors affect utterance meaning. However, the ways of incorporating this information into pragmatic theory are not yet well researched. Focusing on an example of a post-Gricean account, the theory of Relevance, Tim Wharton addresses this pragmatic role of prosody, discussing in particular the relationship between prosody and intentions in communication. Prosody encodes both linguistic and paralinguistic meaning. Subtle changes in the tone and quality of voice, and the range of pitch variation we use, the location of disjunctures (pause), the tempo of delivery, all convey attitudinal information and information about our physical, mental or emotional state. Some are natural signs over which
the speaker has little or no control, others (such as interjections) are natural signals which imply deliberate communicative intention. Prosodic signals such as lexical stress, lexical tone and nuclear tones facilitate the retrieval of certain types of syntactic, semantic or conceptual representation. Wharton discusses gesture as prosodic because gestures almost always accompany spoken language and they are part of a speaker’s communicative repertoire.

‘Pragmatics and information structure’ are taken up in Chapter 29. Jeanette K. Gundel discusses the fact that natural languages offer speakers a variety of morphological, syntactic and prosodic means to express the same basic informational content in different contexts. She traces the history of the concept of information structure, progresses to an in-depth analysis of givenness, and reviews ways that information structure is formally expressed. She distinguishes ‘referential’ from ‘relational’ givenness/newness and demonstrates their independence. There is a hierarchy of referential givenness (focus > activated > familiar > identifiable > referential > identifiable) typically signalled by determiners and pronouns. This hierarchy gives rise to scalar implicatures (e.g. in English the implicature that the interpretation of an indefinite article phrase is at most referential but not uniquely identifiable and familiar, etc.). Relational givenness involves a partition into two complementary parts determined by the assumed knowledge and attention state of the addressee at that point in the discourse: what the sentence is about (given/topic/theme/background) and what is predicated of this (new/comment/rheme/focus). The components of relational givenness are pragmatically relevant categories with clear pragmatic effects such as the (in)appropriateness of sentences with different possibilities for information structural interpretation in different discourse contexts. Referential givenness, on the other hand, is grammatical in the sense that different lexical items encode it as part of their conventional meaning. The topic of prosody and meaning, addressed in the previous chapter, reappears here because its contribution to differences in information structure can have truth-conditional effects.

Next, in the chapter ‘Sociopragmatics, cross-cultural and intercultural studies’, Istvan Kecskes discusses the closely interrelated topics of communication and society, cross-cultural communication, cross-dialectal and cross-sociolectal communication, as well as the acquisition of communicative skills of a newly encountered culture. When people communicate, they craft what they need to express to fit the context (presumed common ground); at the same time, the way people speak or write the words, expressions and utterances they use create the very situation, context, and socio-cultural frame in which the communication occurs. Meaning emerges from recalled fragments that are reiterated, reshaped and manipulated at the same time; new meaning arises as a more or less radical
alternation of something familiar and recognizable. Rather than focusing on conditions and rules for an individual speech act it is more appropriate to characterize acts of speech in a situation because the individual is situated in a social context that empowers and constrains them. Pragmatic competence is the ability to comprehend and produce a communicative act conditioned by awareness of social distance, speakers’ social status, cultural knowledge (including politeness), and linguistic knowledge. One needs to recognize the cultural relativity of definitions of sincerity, relevance, and the ranking of imposition. Attention should be paid to communication breakdown, misunderstanding, and language-based aggression as well cooperation and politeness. Kesckes also examines intercultural and cross-cultural pragmatics in the light of his socio-cognitive approach.

The final yet essential contribution addresses the issue of linguistic politeness. In Chapter 31, ‘Politeness and pragmatics’, Marina Terkourafi presents the main current approaches to that phenomenon in (socio)pragmatics, focusing on the questions of intentionality of politeness, the notion of face, and the mechanisms for conveying recognition of politeness and impoliteness in discourse. She reviews applications of post-Gricean pragmatics, speaker’s intention, implicatures, perlocutionary effects, and the Relevance-Theoretic notion of communication to the analysis of im/politeness. She distinguishes first-order explicitly normative politeness (the way polite behaviour is perceived by members of socio-cultural groups) from second-order politeness (as perceived within a theory of social behaviour and language usage). Terkourafi writes about impoliteness (rudeness, incivility) in adversarial encounters and notions of face – which she also divides into first-order face (in culturally defined contexts and settings) vs second-order face (a schematic theoretical notion pertaining to the image of the other in social-interactive behaviour). Importantly she recognizes that face pervades all instances of communication and that it depends on an interlocutor’s assumptions about the (relevant) intentions of other interlocutors. Nevertheless, cross-language data reveal that politeness is routinely achieved by means of conventionalised expressions that Terkourafi refers to as providing “cognitive frames”.

The Cambridge Handbook of Pragmatics is a comprehensive review of pragmatics that reflects the editors’ judgement concerning current cutting edge research at the beginning of the second decade of the twenty-first century as well as the editors’ assessment concerning the areas and theories that will mark progress in pragmatic research in the future. We hope it stands the test of time.